In recognition of National Vietnam War Veterans Day, AFHRA is proud to highlight the remarkable story of then-Captain Garryl C. Sipple, an O-1E Bird Dog pilot. Shortly after his assignment as a forward air controller to the I Corps in Khe Sanh, Capt Sipple participated in an oral history interview with Department of the Air Force historians in 1966. This interview was part of Project CORONA HARVEST, a follow-on effort to Project CHECO, aimed at capturing real-time operational data to inform senior DAF leaders.
In this interview, Capt. Sipple shared a vivid and real-time account of the challenges and possibilities for ground support in Vietnam. His insights were quickly elevated through CORONA HARVEST the chain of command, demonstrating the immediate impact of oral history efforts. Lt. Gen. W. B. Rosson, Chief of Staff to U.S. Military Assistance Command in Vietnam (MACV), described Capt. Sipple’s recommendations as a “fundamental proposition [that] will not go unheeded as we continue our campaigning.” Two years later, bolstered defensive measures at Khe Sanh proved pivotal. U.S. and allied ground forces held their defenses for 77 days, thwarting concentrated enemy efforts and safeguarding South Vietnam’s northwest region.
Capt. Sipple’s distinguished service included 525 combat missions during his first tour of duty in Vietnam. He later flew the F-4E Phantom II for 125 more combat missions from 1971 to 1972. Promoted to brigadier general on September 1, 1984, Sipple's final assignment was as vice commander of Warner Robins Air Logistics Center at Robins Air Force Base, Georgia. Tragically, he passed away on June 13, 1985. Three weeks prior to his death, General Sipple was the keynote speaker at the unveiling of the Vietnam Veterans memorial in Cynthiana, Kentucky. In the speech, Sipple described the monument as a “beacon of hope” honoring those who served in Vietnam to promote peace. He eloquently reminded listeners, “That’s why we were in Vietnam. For freedom.”
Captain Sipple’s oral history interview that includes detailed suggestion to bolstering Khe Sanh from his perspective as a forward air controller can be read, in full, below.
Interviewer: You indicated, based on your experience, that you had an idea as to how Khe Sanh might be defended in the event it was taken by the VC.
Interviewee: Yes. Actually, the proposal that I would make would probably be to help prevent Khe Sanh from being overrun. Of course, once it is taken it is going to be extremely hard for us to reoccupy that outpost. My proposal would be to put a gun position on Hill 1739 which I mentioned previously in the Dong Voi Mep mountains. This mountain is 5, 706 feet and it is approximately 12 kilometers north of Khe Sanh.
Interviewer: You can use the map if you want.
Interviewee: Alright. The map you are looking at is the 1-50, 000 map which is the map that the FACs and the Army forces use in Vietnam. In some cases, they will go to a 1-25,000 but the 1-50, 000 is the common map used by the FACs and the Army forces. This mountain has extremely steep sides consequently it would be easily defended by the people on top of the mountain. The area on the mountain itself has a flat plateau area. At one time it was an outpost. When I departed Vietnam in 1966 one of the last visual reconnaissance flights that I flew was in this vicinity and consequently I did look at this mountain again. At that time it still had bunkers in tact on top of the mountain. There was the wreckage of an H-34 Marine helicopter up there, some old fuel drums, things of this nature. So, at one time this mountain was used as an outpost. As I said, because of the steep sides on the mountain it would be very easily defended. There is a peak to the northeast of the mountain. The peak is approximately 50 to 100 meters higher than the small plateau area. Consequently, this peak would protect any gun from that is provide some
protection -- for the gun from artillery originating out of the Demilitarized Zone to the north and the northeast. Consequently, it would pose some problems for the North Vietnamese to hit this objective. Again, because the sides are so steep it would be physically impossible for us to get upon the mountain with any way other than helicopters. My proposal would be to put a 155 mm howitzer or 155 mm gun or an 8-inch howitzer on top of this mountain or a combination of the three. There is plenty of room on top of the mountain the plateau area to adequately put two to three guns up there and yet have plenty of spacing and plenty of room for ammunition supply. As for as how it could defend Khe Sanh – Khe Sanh prior to the fall of Lang Vei could get supporting artillery fire from the 105 mm howitzers at Lang Vei. Since Lang Vei has fallen it can get no support from Lang Vei. There is no artillery within striking range to provide support of Khe Sanh to my knowledge.
Interviewer: What advantages does this have over the, obviously, the gun emplacement technique itself.
Interviewee: Well, I can just cite again past experience, and I hate to rely on past experience or previous experience to try to justify a proposal. But in October 1965, three battalions made up of mixed forces of hard-core VC and North Vietnamese attacked the 1st Division, 3rd Battalion, outpost of the BaLong Valley which is mid-way between Khe Sanh and Quang Tri. During the first mortar attack on the BaLong Valley outpost, the artillery gunners were annihilated and also the guns were damaged to such an extent that they could not provide fire support for defense of the outpost. Consequently, the only thing that saved BaLong was artillery fire from Bal Cong (Nhu-Le) which is approximately 12 kilometers to the east. At that time there were two tubes of 155 mm howitzers at Bal Cong (Nhu-Le). They fired support of BaLong all night and as a result 143 VC were killed in the night-long battle. A large number of them directly due to the artillery at Bal Cong (Nhu-Le). At one time the VC did penetrate the perimeter defenses of BaLong. The American advisor and the Vietnamese commander of the 3rd battalion requested that the artillery be brought in upon the camp, which they did. Again, they were protected in bunkers. They beat off the VC to an extent that when they massed for another attack then the artillery could back off from the camp. Khe Sanh obviously doesn't have this capability. At the present time if a heavy mortar, artillery, and rocket attack were inflicted upon Khe Sanh, coordinated or followed by ground attack there is a good possibility that the guns of Khe Sanh would be destroyed. And consequently, Khe Sanh would get no support. Generally, we rely on air support in a case like, this -- air to carry the burden should the organic artillery be incapacitated. However, I also participated in the battle of the A Shau valley. At that time the weather was such that we could not get sufficient air support to bear, consequently A Shau fell. There were some Vietnamese commanders, and I tend to agree with them, that feel that if Ta Bat had been left open -- Ta Bat is a small outpost to the north of A Shau – if Ta Bat had been left open, A Shau would not have fallen, simply because Ta Bat could have supported A Shau with their artillery. This is an academic point -- something we will never prove. My proposal is that we do have something to help support Khe Sanh in the event of bad weather-in the event that air strikes can't be brought to bear. There is also the fact that you can't have observers over Khe Sanh at all times looking for the muzzle flashes of the North Vietnamese artillery or the mortars. An artillery unit on top of Hill 1739 would be in a position to observe muzzle flashes. They would be able to register the guns. They would be able to answer the fire of the North Vietnamese. Naturally they probably l would draw some fire themselves, however, as I pointed out the only effective area that could fire on the hill would be the area directly to the west which is another mountain and also the area to the southwest which is a flat plateau area. Again, in both cases the mortars and the artillery would have to be extremely accurate to hit this area and the possibility of creating severe damage simply because the hill is so high, would be a difficult target to hit. I think this is one of the advantages of being on top of this hill
Interviewer: So it is then obviously fairly well protected. It would afford an opportunity to place artillery on targets which might not be able to hit from the air because of weather or some other condition.
Interviewee: That is correct.
Interviewer: How about getting to it insofar as supplying it, and so forth
Interviewee: As far as getting to it, as I said the hills are so steep there is no way in. Of course, the VC control all of this area--the VC and the North Vietnamese. And there are no roads in the area. The only way we could get to it would be by helicopter. Now a CH-54 Skycrane could carry either 155 mm howitzer or the 8 inch howitzer, ammunition, supplies, this nature up to this mountain. The Skycrane has the ability to carry 15, 000 pounds in the hoist. It can hover out of ground effect at 8, 750 feet which gives it operating room to get up on top of this mountain. The CH-53 can carry 8, 000 pounds, however it can only hover out of ground effect at 4, 800 feet which would mean to carry troops up there it would have to carry troops near the top and again it would be I very marginal. But the area is fairly clear. There are plenty of helicopters LZ’s that could be cut out near the top and disembark troops in that manner. However, I think to get the guns up there themselves it would take the CH-54 Skycrane. Just to give you again an example of what else these guns could do--or what these howitzers could do--a 105 mm howitzer for example which is smaller than the type gun I would propose to put on top that hill could control an infiltration route running south and again you would have to refer to the 1-50, 000 map here to see this infiltration route--but it could control an infiltration route running south from X-Ray Delta 770 590to the vicinity of X-Ray Delta 770 540—a 105 mm could control this. The 155 mn howitzer which is the standard 155 howitzer could control an infiltration route running southeast from Laos--and again as this route comes out of Laos it follows a small stream or river valley--could control this route at approximately X-Ray Delta 558 537 and it also could control the infiltration route on Highway 102 which is an all weather dirt high way that runs through the Ben Hai river valley and it (Route 102) enters from North Vietnam about halfway in the IMZ--that is from the Laotian Border to the Gulf of Tonkin--from the point where it enters the DMZ it follows the Ben Hai river valley into Laos. The 155 could control this route or a small portion
Interviewer: Are you using a GO Ref coordinate system?
Interviewee: Yes, I am. Again, as far as the sides controlling or help suppressing the infiltration, both the 105 and the 155 howitzer could support Khe Sanh. Now the 105 howitzers could only reach to the northern edge of Khe Sanh. It could not support Khe Sanh on any attack from the west or from the south. However, the 155 mm howitzer can do this, it can support Khe Sanh by firing over Khe Sanh or firing to the east or the west of Khe Sanh. In the case of the North Vietnamese attack in early January 1966 when the 120 mn mortars were introduced in-country these mortars were fired out of two sites. The coordinates of the two mortar sites that we located--that is the series of the mortar sites--were X-Ray Delta 865 458 and X-Ray Delta 865 435. Again both 105 and the 155 from Hill 1739 could hit these mortar sites. Now the 105 I don't believe would be - in my opinion - would not be an effective weapon for the gun position. The 155 would probably be a fairly effective weapon but I would recommend that consideration be given to using an 8-inch howitzer upon this mountain or a pair or maybe three 8-inch howitzers. These could hit all the coordinates I have mentioned. In addition, they could also hit the infiltration route entrance that comes in from Laos. There is another infiltration route which enters from Laos at coordinate X-Ray Delta 658 486. Incidentally, these infiltration routes that I am mentioning and the coordinates I am mentioning may not be valid at the present time, however when I left Vietnam in July of 1 966 all of these infiltration routes that I have mentioned--coordinates that I have mentioned—were capable of supporting truck traffic. It is only reasonable to assume that they still could support truck traffic.
Interviewer: Was this suggestion ever put forth while you were over there?
Interviewee: No. At that time there was no real need to put it forth simply because of the fact that Khe Sanh was merely a Special Forces outpost, the Marines had not moved into this area, they did not have a TAOR in this area. They also had Ban Houaysan, the Royal Laotian outpost which is located on Route 9 just west of the Vietnamese-Laotian border. It controlled some of the North Vietnamese in the area west of Khe Sanh. Lang Vei which was an outpost owned by the 2nd Regiment, 1st Division, also supported Khe Sanh. With the exception of the infiltration, Special Forces did set up ambushes on these infiltration routes and we did conduct air strikes on the routes. There was no serious consideration of putting an outpost up on top of the hill simply because it wasn't needed. I think also, possible consideration should be given to putting a 155 mm gun on top of this mountain. Now I am m t advocating that you put all of these weapons that I have mentioned. I am just saying that these are possibilities that could be accomplished quite easily. A 155 mm gun has a range of approximately 14.3 miles. It actually has a range of – a published range -- of 25, 300 yards, approximately 14.3 miles or 23 kilometers. The 155 mm gun would provide the capability of hitting Route 102 where it enters the DMZ from North Vietnam. It would also be able to hit the two infiltration routes that I have mentioned that come in from Laos. It could fire in support of Khe Sanh. However, the disadvantage with the 155 mm gun, due to the direct fire nature, is that the 155 mm gun could not hit the mortar sites in a valley which is located just to the northeast of Khe Sanh approximately 15 to 18 hundred meters. The coordinates of these mortar sites and this area are X-Ray Delta 865 435. Again, as I said, the gun could not hit this because the Dong Tre Mountain which is Hill 1815 precludes direct fire upon mortar sites in this area. In summary, I would propose that serious consideration be given to putting either an 8 inch howitzer which is effective to 1 8,500 yards--correction, that is the maximum range -- fires a 200 pound projectile and this is about 16 kilometers we are talking about--firing this projectile. This weapon would be able to control the infiltration or at least help control the infiltration along the Ben Hai river valley. It could help control the infiltration coming in from Laos, it could support Khe Sanh and it could also by virtue of the people being on top of this mountain could fire down at the North Vietnamese artillery and the rocket site.
Interviewer: Do you have anything that you would like to know about?
3rd Voice: One big advantage of having these people here is the event that air can't get in. Now this mountain is 5, 000 feet high. If we have weather so bad that we can't get in these people would have no more visual capability that the air would.
Interviewee: That is correct. However, any artillery can be registered, and this would be their big advantage. For example, all that they would have to do is to fire and register a position. For example, registration number to the north of Khe Sanh. Maybe 500 meters north of Khe Sanh. Should Khe Sanh come under ground assault, the commander in Khe Sanh could say, "Hit Register #53."
Interviewer: Then would have an all weather capability which wouldn't exist from the air.
Interviewee: That is correct. I think that there is one other advantage that I think should be considered on this thing. We could put antipersonnel radar or SLAR radar set up on top of this mountain without too much complication. Again, this would have the advantage as you probably realize, the North Vietnamese anti-aircraft guns in the DMZ have made it increasingly difficult or at the time I left Vietnam, and I am assuming it is the same way--the Mohawk's which had the SLAR capability were having an extremely difficult time in the DMZ. If you had some kind of radar capability from the mountain you could observe this infiltration through the DMZ. So, this would be another advantage. There could be sensing devices put on top of the mountain which again could help the guns locate the target and better utilize the gun.
Interviewer: Fine. Is there anything else you can think of now-- any words of wisdom that you might like to pass on to anyone else that is going over there that is taking your place perhaps other than the ones that you have already mentioned?
Interviewee: No, except to fly high and fly fast.
Source - Oral History Interview of Capt. Garryl C. Sipple by Lt. Col. Robert Eckert, Apr 1968, typed transcript, Call # K239.0512-042, IRIS # 00903781, in USAF Collection AFHRA, Maxwell AFB AL.