


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LEGISLATION RELATING TO THE AAF TRAINING PROGRAM

1939 to 1943



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By: *Clanton W. Williams*
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Date:

20 May '44

LEGISLATION RELATING TO THE ARMY AIR FORCES

TRAINING PROGRAM, 1939-1943

By CMO Merton England and Dr. Chauncey Sanders

Prepared by
Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence
Historical Division
May 1944


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FOREWORD

It is the desire of the President, the Secretary of War, and the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, that a solid record of the experiences of the AAF be compiled. This is one of a series of studies prepared as a "first narrative" in the projected over-all history of the Army Air Forces.

The decision to make the information contained herein available for staff and operational use without delay has prevented recourse to some primary sources. Readers familiar with this subject matter are invited to contribute additional facts, interpretations, and constructive suggestions.

This study will be handled in strict compliance with AR 380-5.



THOMAS D. WHITE
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Assistant Chief of Air Staff,
Intelligence

Readers are requested to forward comments and criticisms, and to this end perforated sheets, properly addressed, are appended at the back of this study.

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Legislation Relating to the Army Air Forces
Training Program, 1939-1943

Introduction

During the greater part of the "armistice" from 1918 to 1939 the American people gave little thought to the growth of their military establishment. The neglect to make adequate preparations for national defense is clearly shown in a downward curve in military appropriations after World War I which was not checked until fiscal year 1936. But even then, though Army appropriations started on the upward path again, only \$1,071,000 were allotted for military aviation. The inauguration of the Air Corps extension program early in 1939 and the beginning of the war in Europe in the fall of that year brought a sharp increase in appropriations for Army aviation. The appropriation for fiscal year 1940 was nearly a quarter of a billion dollars, and for the following year almost four billion. The figure was approximately twenty-two billion for fiscal year 1942, more than ten billion the next year, and reached an all-time high of \$23,655,481,000 for the year ending June 30, 1944.

The transformation of these vast funds into planes, munitions, and highly trained personnel was a feat to be attained only by prodigious effort. The Air Corps had to procure and train pilots, "airmen" mechanics, mechanics, and technicians to operate and maintain the great armada of aircraft to be created by the national defense program. Before this process could be set in motion, congressional

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sanction was required for many of the steps to be taken. The inception of this legislative program came with the opening of the Seventy-sixth Congress in January 1939.

This study recounts the story of the legislative authorization for the Army Air Forces training program from 1939 through July 1947. Before the whole picture can be filled in, similar accounts must be made of legislative authorization for a serial procurement, for pay and allowances of personnel of the Air Corps establishment, and for organization of the Air Corps. The method of breaking down broad proposals and enactments into a specific category and labeling it "training legislation" was adopted because it makes possible centering of attention upon a closely related group of legislative bills, whereas treatment of individual bills in their entirety would result in a series of unrelated and involved discussions. Certain subjects treated are personnel legislation in the conventional meaning of the term, but such acts as those creating the grades of aviation cadet, aviation student, and flight officer are basic to an understanding of the training program and have a vital bearing upon what is considered as training legislation. Most of the legislative proposals and enactments treated in this study are directly civil aviation matters. They were included because they have vital bearing on the military training program. The story of the execution of training programs authorized

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by this legislation in another study. Such treatment as is given
herein applies only to the effect of any proposal included for
purposes of evaluation of the law or to point out its ramifications
without analysis.

Chapter I

PROVISION FOR THE NATIONAL DEFENSE MILESTONES

The impact of public demand and presidential leadership brought legislative results in the first session of the Seventy-sixth Congress which convened on January 3, 1939. In his annual message to the Congress on January 12, President Roosevelt indicated his awareness of the looming foreign menace and of the potentials of modern warfare, particularly air power. He called attention to the fact that "there is new range and speed to offense" and asked for an early appropriation of about \$525,000,000, of which \$10,000,000 should be expended by June 30, 1940. Of this sum he asked that \$450,000,000 go to the Army, \$65,000,000 to the Navy, and \$10,000,000 for civilian pilot training.

With particular reference to military aviation, the President stated that information from abroad indicated that the ultimate air strength of 2,320 planes recommended by the Baker Board Report of 1937 was completely inaccurate. On the other hand, there were no responsible officials who advocated "building our forces up to the total either of planes on hand or of productive capacity equal to the forces of certain other nations." President Roosevelt continued: "We are thinking in terms of necessary

defenses, and the conclusion is inevitable that our existing forces are so utterly inadequate that they must be immediately strengthened." His concrete recommendation was an appropriation of \$300,000,000 for plane purchases, which he expected would "provide a minimum increase of 3,000 planes." There was the possibility, however, that a greater number might be procured through reduction of unit cost in placing large-scale orders. He suggested that \$50,000,000 of the proposed \$300,000,000 "be made immediately available in order to correct the present lag in aircraft production due to plant delays."

In addition to procurement of planes, President Roosevelt emphasized the concomitant need for procurement of pilots:

"Finally, national defense calls for the annual training of additional air pilots. This training should be primarily directed to the essential qualifications for civilian flying. In cooperation with educational institutions it is believed that the expenditure of \$10,000,000 a year will give primary training to approximately 50,000 citizens."

The President concluded with an appeal for the early enactment of the legislation he conceived to be essential to prepare the United States for a war which might come with utter celerity.

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1. Congressional Record, 70 Congress, 1 Session, p18 (Jan. 12, 1939).

"Devoid of all hysteria," he asserted, "this program is but the minimum of requirements."²

Despite the importance of the national defense message, it created little stir in a Congress long since accustomed to presidential requests for large appropriations. The New York Times copy editor reported: "Judging from the immediate reception and subsequent comment it received, the program he outlined left a feeling of relief that a much larger outlay was not proposed." There was "little opposition" arrived because of the "comparatively moderation of the President's language and requests" and because many legislators "had been led to expect a staggering armament program." Congress apparently considered the message a continuation of the administration's program of education of the public toward more active participation in international affairs.³ The Gallup surveys for the American Institute of Public Opinion, however, indicated that the public was probably as far along in its thinking as Congress, more than eight out of ten voters favoring strengthening the Army and Navy, "and an even larger proportion--nine in every ten--favor[ing] a larger air force."⁴

2. Ibid., 21^o (Jan. 12, 1939). It is interesting to note that on the same day as President Roosevelt's message to Congress, Lord Bessborough, speaking to the new session of the Canadian Dominion Parliament, also emphasized the necessity, because of "aggressive policies" abroad, of strengthening defenses. He too stressed the importance of augmenting the strengths of military aviation, and it was anticipated that nearly all of the appropriations for Canadian defense would go to the air force. New York Times, Jan. 12, 1939.

3. New York Times, Jan. 13, 1939.

4. Ibid.

a newspaper observer stated that such adverse criticism as was expressed by congressmen cut across party lines. Representative Hamilton Fish of New York termed the message "another nummerring scheme done up in a red, white and blue bow'not."⁵ In a radio address on January 16, Fish again attacked the defense message, claiming that "it aims to deceive the people into supporting a huge armament program in the guise of national defense, which in reality is nothing but a smokescreen to obscure the depression and economic failures of the New Deal."⁶ The Chicago Tribune commented similarly: "For the shortcomings in American defenses Mr. Roosevelt's administration is responsible. . . . Congress apparently is in a mood to examine defense rationally and to take the advice of military experts."⁷

As in the case of the Chicago Tribune, editorial comment on the President's program was somewhat inclined to reflect accustomed attitudes toward the administration. The San Francisco Chronicle, for example, begrudgingly conceded the need for an armament program, but went on to state that "the nation should be reluctant to accept any opinion without most searching analysis." Further,

It would be foolhardy to minimize the need for defense in a world armed to the teeth, yet we do not for that reason have to prepare on aatching basis.

It should not be forgotten that the display of an over-militant spirit for the purpose of urging America to necessary preparedness may be good capital for sword rattlers who keep their people in subjection by threatening threats from abroad.⁸

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid., Jan. 20, 1939.

7. Chicago Tribune, Jan. 17, 1939.

8. San Francisco Chronicle, Jan. 12, 1939.

The New Orleans Times-Picayune of January 13, 1942, expressed agreement with the President's use of the word "minimum" in describing the requirements which his program was designed to meet, endorsed the procurement of more planes, and contended that "The warning that our present defenses are 'utterly inadequate' is so convincingly supported by the evidence of world conditions that it must be heeded."

Press reaction to the civilian pilot training program was generally favorable. The New Orleans Tribune, the St. Paul Pioneer Press, the St. Louis Irish-American, Journal-Gazette, and the Indiana Times Star all concurred in President Roosevelt's plan for training college students. The St. Louis Globe-Democrat, however, was perturbed at the prospect of career college students devoting time to airplanes.⁹

Potential opponents had been surprised and largely forestalled by the temperate tone of the President's program. Arthur Krock, writing in the New York Times, told of the behind-the-scenes planning by an "informal council" which advised President Roosevelt on the content of his message. Although the "kitchen cabinet" sessions were secret, "it seems established," Krock stated, "that the sure and moderating influences came from the Treasury, and certain civilian and military chiefs of the army and navy." The sober-minded counselors patiently toned down the warlike措 of the

^{9.} Quoted in Army-Navy Journal, Jan. 14, 1942.

moderates and "resolutely held the money totals within the limits of sane and efficient expenditure." Although some of the President's advisers spoke in terms of spending billions, of the government building planes and staffing the plants with mechanics on relief rolls, the wiser heads convinced the Chief Executive of the impracticability of these schemes and "combined in the view that the government could not efficiently spend in one year more than an additional half billion." A memorandum in Krock's possession, dated December 2, 1938, of a conversation with one of the experts on the informal council, indicated that at that time the visionaries were in the saddle. But in a little over a month, as the President's message remonstrated, the experts were able to wield the bludgeon of facts and figures so effectively that a sound and workable program resulted.¹⁰

Foreign events were in themselves enough to produce a favorable reception of such a defense program as that offered by the President. The administration, however, had taken precautions to bring to the attention of the congressional committee on military affairs the imminence of an explosion in world politics. In a joint session of the two committees, Joseph P. Kennedy, Ambassador to Britain, and William C. Bullitt, Ambassador to France, reportedly stated that there would be a "European war in the spring, and they

10. New York Times, Jan. 15, 1939.

also turned of the power of the German Wehrmacht, particularly the air force.¹¹ About the same time the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics issued a report warning that rapid strides in foreign aviation were a serious threat to commercial and military aviation in the United States.¹²

Despite the general concurrence in the President's program, a few basic questions were raised with regard to the defense plans. Hanson Baldwin, a widely known commentator on national defense, quoted the President's statement that the training of the first 20,000 college students should be in "the essential qualifications for civilian flying." The nation already had more fliers than it needed for civilian purposes, "more . . . than any other nation." But there was a "pressing need for a large increase in the number of our military and naval pilots."¹³ A comment made by Captain "Edd" Pickenback on January 17 was to be

11. *Ibid.*

12. *Ibid.*

13. *Ibid.* Baldwin also contended that an "operating air force" of 7,000-8,000 planes would be "considerably larger than that maintained by any other nation." First-line planes on hand in Germany, he stated, did not number more than 3,000-4,000, and the number in Russia would not be much greater. Although these nations might have other planes in reserve, "they are not flown in daily operations." This analysis leaves out of account the fact that a total of 7,000-8,000 planes would not mean anything like that number of first-line planes "flown in daily operations." A large part of that total, in fact, would be training planes, and others would necessarily be in reserve. Further, the Air Corps program called for only 5,500 planes, though this figure was amended to 6,000 in the legislative process. Of the 5,500 the Air Corps contemplated an operating force of 3,333 and a rotating reserve of 2,167. Hearings Before the Committee on Military Affairs of the United States Senate . . . on V. 3701, 76 Cong., 1 Sess., 72.

frequently quoted, both in the press and on the floors of Congress. Although he condoned the President's plan for training fliers, he claimed that it came "just a tiny year too late." He deplored the fact that the United States was "so fully lacking in productive capacity." Captain Lichtenbergh believed that the United States was ten years behind Germany in the development of military aviation.¹⁴

Although Congress proceeded with dispatch after the President's call for action, it soon became apparent that the exigencies of military aviation defense involved more than appropriation for plane procurement and civilian pilot training. Especially after the outbreak of war in September 1939, deficiencies began appearing. Combat planes and training standards became obsolescent overnight. It was essential, therefore, that legislation authorizing Air Corps expansion be sufficiently flexible to provide for quick adaptation to merciful shifts in combat plane types and tactics.

Problems were not only complex, they were intricately interlocked. The question of pilot training, for example, was closely related to the recognition of planes, and the whole procurement program became specially clouded and charged with narrow political issues with the coming up of lend-lease priorities. In view of the allied governments' need for combat planes, especially in the critical period after the fall of France, how could there

14. New York Times, Jan. 18, 1939.

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immediate requirements be met by the limited American productive capacity, and at the same time how could enough up-to-date training planes for the United States' expanding flying training program be supplied?

There were other problems in addition to materiel shortages: What should be the proper relation between civilian training agencies and those of the Army and Navy, and how much direction, instructional staff, and equipment should be supplied by the armed services? In connection with training, too, there were numerous allied problems of rank, pay, insurance, and the matter of Negro training. Also, there was the urgent necessity of building up a vast reservoir of trained aircraft mechanics and technicians to service the projected air armada. Most of these problems were dealt with by Congress during the hectic period 1938-1943, and many of them in the course of enactment of the President's proposals of January 12, 1938.

The provision to meet minimum national defense needs as outlined by President Roosevelt came with the enactment of H. R. 5791, an omnibus bill which lumped various individual measures introduced by several War Department agencies. The sections of H. R. 5791 pertaining to the Air Corps and their origin in that branch.

On December 14, 1938, a draft memorandum from Lt. General Henry H. Arnold, Chief of the Air Corps, to the War Department Chief of Staff called attention to enclosed Dr. 23rd of legislation. The third enclosure contained the nucleus of the second, third, and fourth sections of the measure finally passed, the features relating particularly to Air Corps training.¹⁵ The former's bill provided for detail of Air Corps personnel to technical, professional, or other educational institutions and certain additional facilities for training in specialties required for the functioning of the Air Corps; for the sale, rental, or loan of professional equipment to civilian aviation schools; for military personnel to enter civilian aviation; and for enrollment instructors at accredited civilian flying schools or students at the Air Corps Training Center.¹⁶

Although the essential features later in the original legislation submitted on December 14, 1938, finally were enacted into law, several changes in the provisions were made. General staff consideration of the measure. The section of the Air Corps proposal for detail of Air Corps personnel to extra-War Department institutions for civilian aviation training was substantially

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15. See Appendix I for text of the training sections in the public act (Public No. 10) which at length received congressional and presidential sanction.
 16. Maj. Gen. H. H. Arnold to Chief of Staff, Dec. 14, 1938, in AG O&G, Miscellaneous.
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changed in language and broadened in scope in the Office of the Air Department Budget Officer. The redraft was worked out "in collaboration with the Office of the Chief of the Air Corps" and received "the concurrence of the Chief of Air Corps, and of the Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G-1 and G-3."¹⁷

The revision changed the reference to Air Corps facilities to those of the Army, "at the same time restricting the facilities to those pertaining to training in aviation."¹⁸ In general, there is a tightening up of language and elimination of verbiage. The section of the Air Corps draft to permit instructors of accredited civilian flying schools to enroll in the Air Corps Training Center as students went through only minor phrasological changes before submission to Congress, and these were made in the Plans Section of the Office of the Chief of Air Corps.¹⁹

17. Memo for Deputy Chief of Staff by Col. E. R. Loughery, Chief, Budget and Legislative Planning Branch, Office of the Chief of Staff, Jan. 27, 1939, in AG OII, Revision of National Defense Act. Major Duncan of Plans Section, CGAC, participated in the revision of the Air Corps draft. MAJ, C.S. [Lt. Col. Carl Spaatz] to Chief of the Air Corps, Jan. 30, 1939, in AG OII R.
18. Memo for Deputy Chief of Staff by Col. Loughery, Jan. 28, 1939, in AG OII, Revision of National Defense Act. In addition, provisos were added for compliance with form on limitation of expenses and for purely fiscal reasons. One of the provisos also intended to imply legal authorization for detail of "officers as supervisors or inspectors at the schools [where the training was to be carried out] who will have firearms assigned to them for their use." *Ibid.*
19. Apparently there had been a follow-up by the Air Corps to the drafts of legislation submitted to the Chief of Staff on December 14, as the language of the former measures inclosed with the memorandum of that date do not coincide in every detail with those stated by Colonel Loughery (in *ibid.*) to be the original Air Corps drafts. The Plans section, CGAC, stated that the section authorizing training of civilian flying instructors at the Air Corps Training Center was "exactly as submitted by this office." MAJ, C.S. [Spaatz] to Chief of the Air Corps, Jan. 30, 1939, in AG OII R.

The remaining section of the omnibus bill submitted in the December 14 memorandum went through one major change in the process of review by the General Staff. This was the elimination of the sale and rental feature present in the Air Corps draft. The Budget and Legislative Planning Branch, of the Office of the Chief of Staff, stated "that the submission of the bill might be jeopardized" unless the authorization "to sell and rent as well as to lend aircraft and aeronautical equipment to the civilian schools" were removed. The Air Corps agreed to the change.²⁰

After review and revision by the Budget and Legislative Planning Branch, the measures desired by the Air Corps were dispatched to the chairman of the House and Senate military affairs committees. The parts dealing with detail of Army personnel for training in aviation specialties and with the training of civilian instructors at the Air Corps Training Center were introduced as identical bills in the two houses, S. 800 and H.R. 2129. The section providing for the loan of aeronautical equipment to civilian aviation schools was introduced in S. 800 and H.R. 2129.²¹

Although formal introduction of these proposals took place on January 22 and 24, the House and Senate Committees on Military Affairs had already begun hearings to expedite the preparation of

20. C. S. Memo to Chief of Air Corps, Jan. 28, 1930, in AAC O32 1.

21. Cong. Rec., 76 Cong., 1 sess., 635 (Jan. 23, 1930), 727 (Jan. 24, 1930).

a general measure which would provide adequate national defense. On the first day of the House hearings, January 17, General Malin Craig, Chief of Staff, outlined the War Department program. In addition to an increased number of airplanes and increased personnel, he considered the following authorizing legislation necessary for the Air Corps training program: (1) "Provision to authorize the training of Air Corps personnel in civilian schools"; (2) "Provision for training of the civilian flying instructors of civilian flying schools at Air Corps schools for standardization of instruction"; and (3) "Authority to furnish training planes to civilian schools for training of Air Corps personnel."²² General Craig stated that \$7,000,000 of the President's request for \$300,000,000 for Army aviation would be allocated for the purchase of instructional equipment and for pay rents to civilian aviation schools. "The sum would enable the Army to meet "the accelerated rate of mechanics' training and primary training of pilots." Also, the appropriation would be used for the enlargement of Air Corps technical school facilities for mechanical training and to pay civilian flying schools for the primary pilot instruction they would give under the program.²³

General Arnold, Chief of the Air Corps, explained at greater length the Air Corps purpose and the reasons for the decision to

22. House of Representatives, Hearings on An Adequate National Defense as Outlined by the Message of the President . . ., 76 Cong., 1 sess., 8.

23. Ibid., 6.

utilize civilian institutions in the training work. He told the Senate committee of the War Department decision not to attempt to increase the facilities of the training center at San Antonio to meet the vastly extended needs for pilot production. "Unless production there would be stepped up, it would also be necessary to 'build up a war reserve of productive capacity for pilots'" through the employment of civilian flying schools. The Air Corps facilities for mechanics' training, however, he considered adequate, provided an authorization for additional construction were granted.²⁴

Before the Senate committee on January 20, General Arnold testified on the Air Corps' plan for building up pilot productive capacity:

... we propose to utilize private schools accredited by the Department of Commerce and authorized to give commercial licences to pilots. It will be necessary, however, for us to do two or three things before we can do even that. We will have to train their instructors to Army standards at our training center. We will have to loan equipment to those schools. We will have to examine all the cadets who go there, the same as we do now, so as to be sure they measure up to our educational and physical standards; then, when they are ready to solo, or after a few hours' solo, our instructors will check each one of them to be sure they measure up to our flying standards. Then we will send them to our training center at San Antonio.²⁵

24. Ibid., 11-12.

25. Hearings before the Committee on Military Affairs, United States Senate . . . on H.R. 3701, 75 Cong., 1 Sess., 40.

By this procedure, he believed that the output of the training center would be doubled or tripled without an increase in facilities. General Arnold relates that the Civil Aeronautics Authority (CAA) had talked over with the War Department its program to train 20,000 pilots a year. "We worked with them because we believed it was a sound program. Any program that will give us that reserve, something to fall back on, something that will cut down the time required by us to get the finished product out, we are for it."²⁶

Additional reasons for the enactment of the Air Corps proposals were set forth in a draft letter to be sent to Senator Morris Shepard, chairman of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs. This letter, prepared by Major Warren R. Carter of the Plans section, Office of the Chief of Air Corps, explained the intent of the proposed legislation which became Section 3 of the final enactment (Public Law 18). It was pointed out that existing law regarding the detail of Regular Army personnel for aviation training by civilian agencies was unchanged except that the limitation upon the number of Air Corps personnel who could be detailed by the Secretary of War was removed. This latitude

^{26.} Ibid., 57.

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constituted to "only no latent objection to the bill," but it would be taken care of by "available appropriations." The bill contemplated a three-month period of flying training in civilian schools and also authorized training in "specialties incident to aviation, if so desired, in civilian institutions."

The section of the Air Corps bill authorizing the training of civilian instructors in the Air Corps Training Center, the letter stated, would "enable the War Department to keep the instructional staffs of civilian flying schools . . . in close touch with the curricula and methods of the . . . Training Center," and would "serve to coordinate the instruction given to Army personnel in both classes of schools." It was felt that the measure would involve little additional outlay over the cost of training in Army schools alone. Tuition and related expenses would largely be offset by a saving in additional air fields, matériel, personnel, and equipment which would be necessary to train wholly in Army schools. Indeed, some of these facilities might turn out to be surplus at the end of the expansion period. For these reasons, enactment of S. 890 was recommended.²⁷

The Air Corps felt that since Army facilities for primary flight training were insufficient for the expansion program, it was necessary not only to enlist civilian schools, but also to

27. Draft letter, Secretary of War to Senator Morris Sheppard (prepared Feb. 3, 1939), in AGO DZG A.

lend them equipment. A memorandum of February 3, 1930, explaining H. 300, pointed out that the civilian schools did not have enough airplanes and aeronautical equipment to carry out the training. The War Department, however, did not view "to cause any undue expansion in existing facilities and equipment of civilian aviation schools or arise of the temporary character of the war in contemplation." It was felt that the proposed bill properly endowed the Secretary of War with "wide discretion" in the issuance of rules and regulations on loan transactions.²⁸

The draft letter for the signature of the Secretary of War to be sent to Senator Sheppard explained the change from existing law established in H. 300 and the reasons the War Department favored its passage. It was pointed out that the Secretary of War (under the provisions of the Act of May 26, 1928²⁹) already had authority to transfer or lend aeronautical equipment to museums or schools. H. 300 "limits the transaction to loans only and is broad enough to cover all classes of aircraft and aeronautical equipment, whether new, obsolete or damaged, which may be considered by the Secretary of War as suitable and necessary for training."

28. Unsigned and undated memo or para by Col. W. R. Carter,
F.A.C., 2, 1930, in ibid.

29. 20 U. S. C. 94.

purposes." Again, the only likely point of objection to the bill would be the great increase in the Secretary's lending authority. But "there would be no reason to loan any equipment other than training aircraft and such other aeronautical equipment as is necessary for purposes of instruction and training of Army personnel," and now loans were necessary in the interest of the expansion program.³⁰

By February 9, 1939, house hearings were completed, and on February 7 Andrew J. May, chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs, introduced H.R. 3791, containing the Air Corps measures. The bill was referred to May's committee and on the following day was reported out without amendment.³¹

The greater part of the congressional discussion of H.R. 3791 was devoted to its plane procurement features, with training aspects being treated incidentally. It was impossible, however,

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- 30. Draft letter, Secretary of War to Senator Sheppard (prepared Feb. 3, 1939), in AG 032 K.
 - 31. Cong. Rec., 76 Cong., 1 sess., 1222 (Feb. 7, 1939), 1264 (Feb. 8, 1939). The provisions of H.R. 3791 were identical to those of H.R. 3518, introduced by May on January 31, 1939, except that the latter called for an authorized plane strength of 6,000 instead of 5,500. Ibid., 180 (Jan. 31, 1939); H.R. 3518 (in the House of Representatives, Jan. 31, 1939), 76 Cong., 1 sess. An "f" from Plans Section, OCAC, to the Chief of the Air Corps, dated February 6, 1939, stated that all of the sections of H.R. 3518 had been previously introduced as separate bills and had received favorable action recommendation by the Plans Section. RR in files of Historical Division, ACAS, Intelligence.

completely to dissever the two. On February 14 Representative James V. Wedsworth of New York submitted a proposal by a minority group of the Committee on Military Affairs, which agreed that the authorization of 5,500 planes was vital to defense, but contended that procurement should be staggered over a period of three or four years. The minority members stated that this procedure would simplify the problem of training new "ilot" and tactical units and would also eliminate to a large extent the danger of obsolescence in the planes procured.³² This proposal had been defeated in committee, but Representative Walter G. Andrews of New York offered it to the House in the form of an amendment. The amendment provided for the purchase of only 1,000 planes a year. Andrews based his reasoning primarily on "the ever-present problem of obsolescence," but also stressed that the staggered program would give the Air Corps an opportunity to train additional personnel necessary to man the planes.³³ Proponents of the amendment argued that it would ensure more time for training, would lessen financial strain, and would give time to carry out increased research and experimentation necessary to avoid obsolescence in the planes delivered.³⁴ The proposed amendment, however, was defeated by a vote of 1³⁵

32. Cong. Rec., 76 Cong., 1 Sess., 1378-79 (Feb. 14, 1939).

33. Ibid., 1378 (Feb. 14, 1939).

34. Ibid., 1386-93 (Feb. 14, 1939), 1400-01, 1409-31 (Feb. 15, 1939).

to 136.³⁵

Another amendment was offered on the floor of the House by Representative William J. Miller of Connecticut. He proposed that civilian instructors selected for Air Corps training be provided the same medical care, compensation, and pensions as those provided for flying cadets. Opposition was offered, however, on the grounds that these civilian instructors would undertake such a service voluntarily; that their salaries and welfare would be provided for by the civilian flying schools which employed them; and that the Air Corps courses would be to their own profit. The latter views prevailed and the amendment was rejected.³⁶ On the same day, February 16, H.R. 3771 was passed in the House by a vote of 367 to 15.³⁷

The Senate, whose Committee on Military Affairs had begun to hold hearings on January 17, by February 20 had completed its hearings, made certain amendments to the House measure, and reported the bill favorably.³⁸

On the floor, Senator Bennett C. Clark of Missouri raised a question which was to be a recurring one in other discussions of

35. Ibid., 1434 (Feb. 16, 1939).

36. Ibid., 1434-75 (Feb. 16, 1939).

37. Ibid., 1440 (Feb. 16, 1939).

38. Ibid., 1737 (Feb. 22, 1939); S. Rept. No. 20, 76 Cong., 1 Sess. The major amendment increased the authorization for planes to 6,000 instead of 5,500.

training legislation. He stated that the only provision the bill made to increase the number of pilots for aviation service was to train certain college students. He decried the fact that this training was limited to those able to go to college and cited a letter from an aviation expert to the effect that there was a large potential supply of pilot material among the youth of the nation who were unable to attend college. He did not embody his objection in the form of an amendment, however, and no action was taken on the matter.³⁹

Another issue which was to recur frequently in later congressional action was brought to the fore by Senator Styles Bridges of New Hampshire. He presented amendments "to permit the training of Negro aviators in certain Negro colleges approved by the Secretary of War, and to do other acts to that end, in order that the Negroes of the country may have the advantage in certain institutions of the same training for aviation that is offered to white boys."⁴⁰ Several days later Senator H. W. Schwartz of Wyoming offered an amendment to add to Section 4 the words "including at least one Negro school for the training of Negro air pilots." Bridges thereupon offered his proposals as an amendment to the Schwartz amendment. The Bridges amendment was

39. Cong. Rec., 75 Cong., 1 Sess., 7216 (March 2, 1939).

40. Ibid., 205 (March 1, 1939).

rejected, but the Schwartz change was accepted by the Senate.⁴¹ The Air Corps opposed the adoption of this amendment, "not only because it is superfluous but, also, because it attracts attention to the authorization and might result in political pressure being directed against the Secretary of War."⁴² Apparently, however, the objection was not pressed, for the letter of comment on amendments from the Secretary of War to the chairmen of the two military affairs committees contained no reference to the amendment.⁴³

After consideration of action on committee amendments and certain minor changes in wording, H.R. 3701 passed the Senate on March 7, 1939, by a vote of 77-8.⁴⁴ Since the House disagreed with the Senate amendments, a conference committee was appointed. The conference voted to retain the Senate increase in plane authorization to 6,000 and the provision for Negro pilot training.⁴⁵ Both houses accepted the conference report, and on April 7, 1939, President Roosevelt affixed his signature to the bill, which became Public Law Number 18.⁴⁶

This enactment may be considered the primary legislative authorization for the Air Corps expansion program. It laid the

41. *Ibid.*, 2367-70 (March 7, 1939).

42. Letter from Chief of Air Corps by Lt. Col. James McPhoey, Chief, Plans Section, OCAC, March 3, 1939, in AFHRI files.

43. Harry H. Woodring, Secretary of War, to Morris Sheppard and Andrew J. May, March 10, 1939, in *ibid.*

44. Cong. Rec., 76 Cong., 1 Sess., 2370-71 (March 7, 1939).

45. *Ibid.*, 2449, 2457 (March 8, 1939), 2824-25 (March 16, 1939).

46. *Ibid.*, 3105-7106 (March 22, 1939), 4235 (April 17, 1939).

bases for the first large-scale procurement of aircraft and other material, for the increase in allotment of personnel to the Air Corps, and for a flying training program, to be carried out in part by civilian agencies. Although certain modifications had been in during the congressional phases, Sections 2, 3, and 4 of Public Number 18 were substantially the same as the legislation proposed by Air Corps personnel some time before.

The training program provided for by Public Number 18 was primarily designed for the production of a reserve supply of pilots. Because of the inadequacy of Air Corps facilities, it was determined to utilize civilian training agencies, with appropriate steps being taken to insure the uniformity of primary instruction to be given in the civilian schools and to provide the equipment necessary for proper instruction. Although the legislation provided that personnel of the Regular Army establishment might be detail "as students at any technical, professional, or other educational institution, or as students, observers, or investigators at schools and stations or other places as shall be best suited to enable such personnel to acquire a knowledge of or experience in the specialties incident to aviation," the principal aim was the utilization of civilian flying schools for primary pilot training. But at least authorization was provided for training Regular Army personnel in other aviation specialties,

technical as well as flying. With the rapid expansion of the military establishment, however, it later became necessary to broaden the base to include components other than the Regular Army.⁴⁷

The preparation of draft measures, their subsequent criticism and revision, their compilation into an omnibus bill, their airing before congressional committees, and their eventual enactment, furnish an excellent example of the legislative process. Despite the significance of the Air Corps training features, little opposition was expressed on the part of any of the agencies responsible for initiating the legislation or bringing it to enactment either as to the objectives or the means proposed to achieve them. Certain newspapers, however, for the most part representing an isolationist segment of public opinion, endorsed the measures only with qualifications. Within the War Department itself substantial modifications were made in the Air Corps drafts by the General Staff. These appropriate changes, made with Air Corps concurrence, broadened the scope of one training provision, tightened phraseology, and eliminated a feature which it was feared might jeopardize enactment.

With the passage of H.R. 7701 a significant stride had been taken preparatory to putting the nation in a position to defend

47. See part III, ch. III.

itself. But it soon became apparent that the passage of the act was only a prologue. Much more drastic measures and huge appropriations which were to dwarf Public Number 18 almost into insignificance were necessary when it became obvious that the President's estimate of "minimum" defense needs was considerably underdrawn. In this connection, however, it should be emphasized that the major objective of those responsible for the legislation authorizing the expansion had been a well-rounded program capable of achievement. This measure was designed to implement and round up productive capacity of planes and pilots. Its enactment was made possible, as General Arnold stated before the House of Representatives Committee on Military Affairs, "by the sympathetic attitude of the public, the change in world conditions, and the message of the President to Congress."⁴⁸

48. House of Representatives, Hearings on An Adequate National Defense, 76 Cong., 1 Sess., 9.

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Chapter II

LEGISLATION FOR TRAINING CIVILIAN PILOTS, MECHANICS, AND TECHNICIANS

1. The Civilian Pilot Training Act (1939)

The President's message of January 12, 1939 had stated in general terms his aims for the building up of a backlog of civilian pilots who could be quickly adapted to the specialized techniques of military aviation. That the Air Corps chiefs were looking toward the same end is evidenced by their comments on proposed legislation which received congressional and presidential sanction in the enactment of H.R. 3791. Just a few days after the President's message, Assistant Secretary of War Louis Johnson, in an address before the National Aeronautic Association, expressed the War Department's gratitude for the emphasis placed upon the training and development of civilian pilots by the CAA in its experimental program. Of this program Johnson said: "In time we hope it will produce 20,000 pilots a year. Out of this coterie of intelligent, enthusiastic, air-minded young pilots will come a preponderant number of fliers in any emergency."¹

The enabling legislation to authorize this accelerated program of training civilian pilots came with the enactment of H.R. 5619, a bill to provide for the training of civil aircraft pilots, introduced in the House of Representatives by Clarence F. Len of California on

1. New York Times, Jan. 18, 1939.

April 6, 1939.² In the course of the hearings on the measure, Robert H. Hinckley, chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board of the CAA, testified that the reserve pilot bill would provide for the training of an emergency force which would be a "formidable and salutary deterrent" to any air attack in this hemisphere. When Representative Alfred L. Bulwinkle of North Carolina suggested that the proposed reserve pilots should be made to pass the same physical tests as Army and Navy candidates, Hinckley considered that this would be undesirable and stated that the Army and Navy "would like for us to try out some of these physically sub-standard boys and see how they turn out as pilots." He contended that they might be "valuable adjuncts to the defense forces" in time of war.³

On April 10, H.R. 5619 was reported from committee without amendment.⁴ The committee report cited the potential military value of the program as well as its beneficial effect upon the civilian aviation industry. It asserted that world developments had revealed the American "backlog of aerial manpower" to be inadequate in the event of a national emergency. It further reported that the Army, Navy, and the CAA were all in favor of the bill, and it stated the committee's opinion that the proposed program would be "in accord with the traditional American way of providing for its military needs, not by

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2. The bill was referred to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. Cong. Rec., 76 Cong., 1 Sess., 3942 (April 6, 1939).
 3. New York Times, March 21, 1939.
 4. Cong. Rec., 76 Cong., 1 Sess., 4054 (April 10, 1939).

extensive militarization, but by enhancing the strength and efficiency of the men and machines of civil life."⁵

Lea, the sponsor of the bill, further explained its intent to the members of the House on April 19. He stated that the plan called for the training of 15,000 pilots by July 1, 1940, and that these would have the qualifications required of private flyers. They would receive from thirty-five to fifty hours of piloting and about three hundred hours of ground school work. Physical qualifications under the terms of the bill would be virtually the same as those required by the Army for flying cadets. It would be obligatory for the trainees to carry insurance, each one contributing a fee of not over \$40, from which insurance and other minor charges would be paid.

The appropriation called for by the bill was \$5,675,000. Of this amount, \$4,875,000 were earmarked for the training expenses of the 15,000 civilian pilots, \$300,000 for ground schools, mainly for those which did not meet all the requirements for training schools, \$200,000 for supervision, and another \$250,000 for research work. The duration of the program was to be five years.

In explaining the beneficial features of the bill, Lea stated his belief that it would provide a method by which "the fullest resources of the United States now available for primary training

5. H. Rept. No. 393, 76 Cong., 1 sess.

purposes can be utilized immediately." He further felt that among its most valuable contributions to the country's air strength would be the "widespread diffusion of knowledge concerning the requirements of aircraft operation" and the development of air-mindedness.⁶

The committee which studied the bill had decided against including the training of civilian mechanics--a feature incorporated three years later.⁷ This decision was reached because an inter-departmental committee studying that question had not yet determined upon a policy. With reference to the controversial subject of the college requirement for pilot training, Lea stated that it was not contemplated that a candidate be a college graduate, but that he should "have the mental equipment substantially equal to 2 years of a college course when he finally qualifies." Several representatives, however, in the usual debate following the explanation of the scope and purpose of the measure, objected that the bill would lead to elimination of non-college men from the benefits of the training program. Lea reiterated that the bill did not require college education, but merely proper mental and physical abilities.⁸

Nevertheless, an amendment from the floor regarding the debated college education qualification was successfully passed. Representative

6. Cong. Rec., 76 Cong., 1 Sess., 4477 (April 19, 1939).

7. See section 2, of this chapter.

8. Cong. Rec., 76 Cong., 1 Sess., 4477-78 (April 19, 1939).

James E. Van Zandt of Pennsylvania asked the addition of a provision that at least 10 per cent of the selected students should be from applicants who did not present two years of college education as a recommendation. He apprehended, despite assurances to the contrary, that there would be such a flood of applicants that selection would be limited to those with a degree, or at least two years' college education, and the less fortunate but otherwise well-suited applicants would be passed over unless some safeguard were written into the law. Lea again argued that the opportunity would be open to all on an equal basis and that such a restriction would be undesirable as well as unnecessary. Representative Wadsworth added that the program called for the use of non-collegiate institutions, as well as colleges, and in the former the students would not be on the higher academic level. A substitute amendment reduced the non-college quota to no less than 5 per cent, and this was accepted.⁹

In view of national defense needs, there was also evidence of some concern over the import of the bill for military and naval aviation. Lea pointed out that the training provided would not automatically qualify the graduated student for the armed services. The Army and Navy would have to decide on his qualifications. In response to a question as to whether the committee or the CAA had considered the

9. Ibid., 4487-90 (April 19, 1939).

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likelihood of the civilian pilots being available for military training and service, Representative Charles A. Mellick of Indiana replied that the committee had considered that point and that he had suggested enlisting the graduates in the Organized Reserve so that they would be subject to call. This suggestion was abandoned when the committee was assured "that the character of these boys is such that in the event of necessity . . . they will come forward almost to a man." One representative countered with the pertinent query: "If that is correct, why should any hesitate to assume the obligation that would be entailed in agreeing they would make themselves available?" Mellick replied that the committee had been informed that the training would be insufficient to qualify the graduates for a Reserve commission. In answer to the suggestion made by some that the Army and Navy should carry out the program, rather than the CAA, he cited statements of Army and Navy representatives at the hearings which indicated that the services were not in a position to execute the training program. The expansion program already provided for placed a heavy enough burden on the armed services.¹⁰

10. Ibid., 4478-80 (April 1st, 1938). Examining on Lea's explanation of the general program to be executed under the provisions of the bill, Mellick remarked that the CAA wanted to decentralize the training as much as possible, in two or three hundred schools, "in order to bring about the highest safety factor." The number of trainees in each school could be limited, and the schools themselves would be scattered all over the country. In addition to flight training, courses in navigation and meteorology could be taught concurrently. Ibid., 1481 (April 1st, 1938).

Wadsworth, conceding the "very important" military potentialities of the bill, hoped nevertheless that no amendment would be adopted which would "in any sense tend to militarize the project." Although the trainees would not have a high enough degree of proficiency to qualify them for Reserve commissions, they would provide a pool for the services to draw upon in an emergency. In the event of national emergency, those who had completed primary training could be invited to volunteer or be subject to draft. He said that during the hearings Rear Admiral Arthur B. Cook, Chief of the Navy Bureau of Aeronautics, and Brigadier General Barton K. Yount, Assistant Chief of the Air Corps, had been enthusiastic about the bill, "and they based their enthusiasm on its military value, emphasizing the fact that establishing and maintaining this pool of young men who have had this primary training, will lift from the shoulders of the War Department and the Navy Department a tremendous burden in time of peace, and a much greater burden in time of war." But neither had made any suggestions for militarizing the measure.¹¹

Despite the arguments of the bill's proponents, however, Representative John A. Vorys of Ohio offered an amendment to provide that no trainee would be accepted without written consent to serve in the armed forces in the event of war. He stated as the reason for the

11. Ibid., 4483 (April 19, 1939).

proposed change his desire to prevent any slackers or conscientious objectors from deriving the benefits of free aviation training without becoming obligated for the logical quid pro quo. Bulwinkle took exception on several counts. He contended that there could be no legal measures which would effectively enforce such an amendment. Further, it was not essentially a military bill but a civil aeronautics measure, with wider significance than the provision of a source for the drawing off of military pilots; it contained important implications for vocational training as well as military. After the interposing of these counterarguments, the Vorys amendment was rejected.¹²

The question of Negro training was again interjected when Representative Everett M. Dirksen of Illinois proposed the addition of a clause providing that none of the benefits of the program should be denied because of race, creed, or color. Lee insisted that it was needless to drag in the issue since no differentiation was to be found in existing law, but the amendment was passed nonetheless.¹³

12. *Ibid.*, 4490-91 (April 19, 1939).

13. *Ibid.*, 4487-90 (April 19, 1939). On January 25, 1940, Senator Bridges stated that the provisions for training Negro aviators were being ignored. Senator Elmer Thomas of Oklahoma replied, "We are under no responsibility to administer these laws." Bridges insisted that "the War Department should have its attention called to that matter and that Congress should have some word as to why the administration here in Washington, headed by President Roosevelt, who claims to be so interested in these matters, has ignored the colored people of the country in that particular matter." *Ibid.*, 76 Cong., 3 Sess., 671-72 (Jan. 25, 1940). In April 1940 Representative Louis L. Ludlow of Indiana asked Representative J. Buell Snyder of Pennsylvania "what provision is made for the training of Negroes as air pilots, and, secondly, are Negroes permitted to enlist in the Air Corps of the Army?" Snyder replied that the Army and the CAA had arranged so that "a rather large group of young (contd.)

One other amendment was agreed to. This stipulated that aliens should not be given the privilege of receiving training under the act.¹⁴ On April 19, 1939, H.R. 5619, as amended, passed the House and was transmitted to the Senate.¹⁵

In the interim, a companion bill, S. 2119, had been introduced on April 6, 1939, by Senator Patrick A. McCarran of Nevada.¹⁶ The bill was referred to the Senate Committee on Commerce, which held hearings attended by representatives of the Army, Navy, and the CAA. In order to expedite matters, the House hearings on a similar bill, H.R. 5093, which had been introduced earlier, were inserted as testimony, since the discussion on the House bill had covered many points certain to recur. At these earlier hearings, Robert A. Hinckley had told of the War and Navy departments' approval of the plan, and General Mount had stressed that the greatest value of the program would come from its function in eliminating to a large extent, in the primary phase of instruction, those unfitted for pilot training. By doing

13 (cont'd.) Negroes is now being trained at a school on the outskirts of Chicago as pilots and aviation mechanics or engineers. This is taking place right now." Ludlow, however, insisted that Justice was not being done and submitted as a supporting document the testimony of a Negro leader, Edgar G. Brown. The gist of Brown's argument was that "All Negro citizens are denied an opportunity to enlist in the United States Army Air Corps as pilots or mechanics." Ibid., 4017-18 (April 4, 1940).

14. Ibid., 4491-92 (April 8, 1939).

15. Ibid., 4492 (April 19, 1939).

16. Ibid., 3977 (April 8, 1939).

this, it would enable the Army to speed up its own training procedures, once the candidates had arrived at the Air Corps Training Center. Admiral Cook, representing the Navy Department, expressed similar views.¹⁷

In the Senate hearings, certain points were raised which also came up during the House discussion. Senator James M. Mead of New York objected to the principle of pilot training by the CAA. He wondered why the Army could not take up this work, since the primary object of the legislation was adequate national defense. Hinckley pointed out that the advantages accruing to civil aviation from such a program were equally to be considered, and that it was at the request of the War Department that the CAA was undertaking the program. General Yount reinforced this. The Air Corps training program was already severely strained, and with the limited personnel and equipment available, it would be "out of the question" to try to take on anything more.¹⁸

The House and Senate companion bills were discharged from the Senate committee on June 7.¹⁹ The Senate measure was amended to bring it into conformity with H.R. 5619, with the exception that in Section 6

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17. Hearings of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, on H.R. 5093, 76 Cong., 1 Sess., March 20, 1939, reprinted in Hearings of Senate Commerce Committee on S. 2119, 76 Cong., 1 Sess., X6, 43, 44. H.R. 5093 was introduced by Representative Lea on March 16, 1939. Cong. Rec., 76 Cong., 1 Sess., p895 (March 16, 1939).
18. Senate Hearings on S. 2119, 76 Cong., 1 Sess., 77, 85.
19. Cong. Rec., 76 Cong., 1 Sess., 6742 (June 7, 1939).

the Senate changed the clause "and such other sums as may be necessary to carry out such provisions during subsequent fiscal years" to read "and not to exceed the sum of \$7,000,000 during each subsequent fiscal year." After this amendment, H.R. 5619 was substituted for the Senate bill and S. 7119 was indefinitely postponed. In this slightly altered form the bill received favorable Senate action.²⁰

The House of Representatives concurred in the Senate amendments, and when the President signed the measure on June 27, 1939, H.R. 5619 became Public Law Number 153.²¹ The act authorized the CAA to train civilian pilots and to prescribe regulations for such training; to make contracts with educational institutions or individuals to carry out the training; to lease real property or accept the loan of personal property necessary to execute the program; and to fix the compensation of the instructional and other professional personnel employed, without regard to Civil Service regulations. An executive department or independent establishment could cooperate with and lend to the CAA "aircraft and other property or equipment, and land or buildings under its control and in excess of its own requirements." In the administration of the program, no discrimination was to be made on account of race, creed, or color, and at least 5 per cent of the trainees were to be selected from non-college students. The sum of \$5,675,000 was appropriated to carry out the provisions of the act for fiscal years

20. Ibid., 7210-11 (June 15, 1939).

21. Ibid., 7504-7505 (June 19, 1939), 8862 (July 11, 1939).

1939 and 1940, and "not to exceed the sum of \$7,000,000 for each subsequent fiscal year." The act was to expire on July 1, 1944.²²

Any valid interpretation of the worth of the civilian pilot training program could only come from a thorough study of its execution, together with an investigation as to how it supplemented or facilitated the Air Forces training program. Some inferences as to its value may be drawn, however, from the reaction of those who were concerned with the continuance of the program or changing its scope. Just a year after its inauguration, President Roosevelt indicated that he would ask Congress for money to increase the program in order to train 50,000 volunteer airplane pilots during the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1940. He expressed the belief that approximately three months could be lopped off the training period of a military pilot through the civilian courses.²³ On May 28, 1940, President Roosevelt sent a letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives asking for a supplementary appropriation of \$32,000,000 to train 50,000 pilots in civilian schools,²⁴ and the act of June 26, 1940, making supplemental appropriations for national defense for the fiscal year 1941, made these funds available.²⁵

There were, however, several adverse criticisms of the CAA program. A short while after funds had been appropriated for its

22. 53 Stat. 855. See Appendix 2 for text of the act.

23. New York Times, May 25, 1940.

24. Ibid., May 28, 1940.

25. 54 Stat. 599.

expansion, blasts were leveled at it from several directions. Harry F. Guggenheim, chairman of the aviation division of the Republican National Committee, charged that the program was insufficient for the development of trained military pilots and would amount to "mass murder" if the nation should need the services of these CIA-trained pilots.²⁶ Grover Loening, pioneer aircraft builder, assailed the project as "valueless," claiming that its graduates were of no increased worth to the Army and Navy and were no easier to train as a result of their civilian training. He asserted that they were "fledgling students" who required "many hundreds of hours of flying before they are of any use to either the military services or the airlines," and he charged that the whole scheme was an "aviation boondoggle."²⁷ Congressional criticism came from Representative Melvin J. Maas of Minnesota, who declared that the program was a waste of money and suggested that its facilities--instructors, planes, and fields--be turned to purely military use.²⁸

But defense of the program was not lacking. Colonel George De Z. Lerner, general manager of the National Aeronautic Association, urged that the CIA advanced, or secondary, schedule be doubled or tripled. Although he admitted that a graduate of the preliminary course who

26. New York Times, Aug. 29, 1940.

27. Ibid., Sept. 1, 1940.

28. Ibid., Jan. 11, 1941.

became a flying cadet had "to start from scratch," at least nationwide interest in aviation had been aroused, and current experiments would indicate whether graduates of the CAA secondary course were sufficiently trained to skip the Army primary course.²⁹

The strongest testimony to the essential value of the program came in 1941 from Brigadier General Davenport Johnson, Chief of the Training and Operations Division, Office of the Chief of Air Corps. On at least two occasions he put himself on record as being cognizant of definite benefits accruing to the Air Corps expansion from the civilian pilot training program. In a letter of February 7, 1941 to Frank A. Michenor, chairman of the Special Aviation Committee, Department of Commerce, he stated that a saving of about a million and a half dollars a year to the Air Corps was a reasonable estimate if the civilian program continued as planned. About 85 per cent of the civilian pilot training preliminary course graduates successfully completed the Army's elementary flight training, as against 60 per cent for students who had not had this instruction. In addition, he stressed the value to the Air Corps program of the considerable number of flying instructors trained under the civilian plan who were then sent out to the Army's civil contract flying schools. "The availability of this personnel to the Air Corps Schools," he said, "is unquestionably facilitating and will continue to facilitate expansion of Army Flying Training."³⁰

29. Ibid., Sept. 9, 1940.

30. MAG 353.9, CAA Training Program.

Several months later, in a statement before the House of Representatives Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, General Johnson again came to the defense of the OAA and its program. He stated "without hesitation" that the Air Corps was being saved considerable expense, for in the absence of the civilian program the Air Corps would have had to establish schools specifically to train these instructors. General Johnson further cited the contribution of the program in filling the urgent demand for trained airline pilots, ferry pilots, and test pilots, thus facilitating the retention of military-trained pilots for the military service. In addition, he asserted the value of the primary civilian pilot training in preparing personnel for further Air Corps training. Apparently there had been a falling off in the elimination rate since his previous statement, as he stated that only 12 per cent of the civilian pilot training graduates were eliminated in Air Corps elementary schools as against 39 per cent for those without such prior training. He believed that the lower elimination rate among the civilian pilot trainees could be attributed to the eliminations in the civilian course and to the fact that it gave the trainee a chance to determine for himself whether he was really suited for a military pilot's career.³¹

31. Statement by Brig. Gen. Davenport Johnson before House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, May 22, 1941. (Enclosure with MAR for Chief of Air Corps by D. J. [Johnson], Chief, Training and Operations Division, May 28, 1941, in ibid.)

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The passage of the Civilian Pilot Training Act accomplished another major objective outlined in the President's message of January 12, 1939. It was designed to create a great reserve supply of pilots, trained in "the essential qualifications for civilian flying," who would constitute a source of partially trained personnel in case of a major national emergency. But its significant import for the military services should not obscure its importance as a vital vocational training measure. Considered purely as a civil aeronautics measure, it looms as a landmark in American aviation history. With the coming of war the civil aviation facilities in the United States became an adjunct of the military services. Trained pilots, even those not suited for combat, could still play a real part in the war effort.

Some enthusiasts apparently expected too much of the civilian pilot training program, even though its proponents pointed out from the beginning that it would not train men in the techniques of military or naval piloting. From the first the Air Corps viewed the project as one having value in the primary phase of flying, as one which would probably reduce the number of eliminations in this course because much of the weeding out would have taken place in the civilian training. Thus it would reduce the load and the expense of training and would increase the product. The Air Corps, straining to meet its own objectives under the expansion program, was in no position to undertake the training program itself. Consequently, it was glad for

the job to be done by the CAA, and spokesmen of the air services of the Army and Navy opposed suggestions which were made that they take over the project. And when the program was under fire in 1941, an Air Corps spokesman rallied to its defense. General Johnson's statements indicate that the program was turning out pilots who were more often qualified for military flying than were those who had not had the civilian pilot training. An additional value of the program, and one which apparently had not been clearly forecast, was stressed by General Johnson: the training of flying instructors who were of great utility in the Army's civil contract flying schools.

The civilian pilot training organization probably justified its entire existence from a military point of view when in early 1942 it became necessary for the Army Air Forces to request that its facilities be devoted henceforth exclusively to the procurement and training of men for ultimate service as military pilots or for correlated nonmilitary activities. Regardless of criticisms that had been leveled at the program, there is no doubt that at this time the CAA's organization and its four years of invaluable experience in the civilian pilot training program in turn proved extremely valuable to the Air Forces. Certainly the Army Air Forces were hard pressed to train the ever increasing numbers of aircrew members and mechanics that were being demanded by the strategies of total war.

2. Amendment of the Civilian Pilot Training Act to Include Mechanics and Technicians (1942)

First consideration in the legislative authorization for Air Corps expansion was given to the procurement of planes and pilots. These were the obvious fundamentals of an adequate defensive air force. But it was also realized from the beginning that a large-scale program for the training of mechanics and technical specialists was another prerequisite to a satisfactory aerial combat arm. Public Number 18 of 1939 had made provision for the detailing of Regular Army personnel to civilian agencies "to acquire a knowledge of or experience in the specialties incident to aviation," and in 1941 this was amended to permit personnel of other components of the Army of the United States to be detailed for such training. The chief purpose of these enactments, however, had been to utilize civilian flying schools for the primary training of military pilots.

In addition to the authorization provided in 1939 for the training of military aviation specialists, certain individuals interested in the development of civil aviation felt that a reserve supply of civilian airplane and engine mechanics and specialists should be built up. There was a precedent in the Civilian Pilot Training Act which had contemplated the creation of a backlog of partially trained civilian pilots.

On September 19, 1941 Representative Jennings Randolph introduced "a bill to amend the Civilian Pilot Training Act of 1939 so as to provide for the training of civilian aviation mechanics." The proposal was referred to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.³² In an extension of remarks in the Appendix of the Record, Randolph quoted an article from Southern Flight in support of his bill. This stated:

We approach you in support of the Civil Pilot Training Act of 1939 amendment bill--the most effective plan yet offered to speed up airplane production and provide adequate maintenance of those planes.

We maintain that the facilities of aviation's private schools--for 20 years the chief factor in every type of aviation training--stand wastefully unused while Federal agencies buy duplicate schools and equipment.

. . . Southern Flight's viewpoint is anything but isolated. To those who know the actual facts the logical solution sticks out like a sore thumb.³³

The article proceeded to quote from an analysis of the problem which had appeared in another aeronautical journal, to the effect that although tens of thousands of additional mechanics were needed for the expansion program, private training facilities were being unused because civilian students were being drained from them by the "vocational training activities of the United States Office of Education." Southern Flight stated that sixty-six private aviation

32. Cong. Rec., 77 Cong., 1 Sess., 7494 (Sept. 19, 1941). The bill simply added "and mechanics" after the two references to "pilots" in the first sentence of Section 2 of the Civilian Pilot Training Act.

33. Ibid., Appendix, 5239 (Nov. 10, 1941).

schools were training 34,583 students annually, but that total could be increased to 136,387 if they were operating on a three-shift schedule. This would be a major step toward expansion in aircraft production and maintenance. The magazine claimed that the whole problem could be solved by passage of the proposed amendment to the 1939 Civilian Pilot Training Act.³⁴

Randolph's bill, H.R. 5695, was favorably reported without amendment on January 10, 1942.³⁵ The committee took the occasion of its report to commend the CAA on the success of its civilian pilot training program. Of the proposed mechanics' training program, the report said:

"The information furnished the committee shows that there is a very substantial reservoir of training facilities widely distributed over the country that can be utilized to further the program proposed by this amendment.

The training under this program will not only create a valuable reservoir of men for the mechanical service in our civil and military air services, but it will also provide an economic asset to the Nation, as mechanics so trained can readily adapt themselves to many mechanical lines of work requiring skill and precision. . . .³⁶

When the bill came up for discussion two months later, Representative Bulwinkle explained its purposes. He stated that there

34. *Ibid.*

35. *Daily Cong. Reg.*, 77 Cong., 2 Sess., 503 (Jan. 19, 1942).

36. H. Rept. No. 1801. 77 Cong., 2 Sess.

were many facilities which could be utilized for training men and women as aircraft technicians and mechanics, and he proposed that H.R. 5695 be amended to provide for the training of technicians as well as mechanics and pilots. His amendment was accepted and the bill passed the House on March 25 without further changes.³⁷

In the Senate H.R. 5695 was referred to the Committee on Commerce on March 26, 1942, and was finally reported out on June 22.³⁸ As reported, an important amendment had been added at the instigation of the War Department. On January 27, 1942, the War Department had given an adverse report on a Senate bill (S. 1919) to amend the Civilian Pilot Training Act to include aviation mechanics. The unfavorable report had been based on the contention that the bill would divert training facilities and equipment from the use of the Army. On February 21, however, a letter from the Secretary of War to the Secretary of Commerce had requested the CAA to undertake the training of aviation technicians as well as pilots, "within the limits of law and availability of appropriations." The aviation technician training should be limited to members of the Air Corps section of the Unlisted Reserve Corps who could meet the Army Air Forces technical schools' entrance requirements. It was contemplated that these reservists would remain on inactive status until the Army Air Forces desired their services.³⁹

37. Daily Cong. Rec., 77 Cong., 2 Sess., 3015 (March 25, 1942).

38. Ibid., 3109 (March 26, 1942), 5589 (June 22, 1942).

39. Rad, Director of Legislative Planning to Director of Individual Training, April 17, 1942, in AAG 030 Misc.; Hearing of Subcommittee of Senate Committee on Commerce . . . on H.R. 5695, 77 Cong., 1 Sess., 3, 5.

With reference to the February 21 letter of the Secretary of War, on March 17 the Director of the Bureau of the Budget wrote to Representative John W. McCormack reversing the Budget Bureau's previous stand on H.R. 5695 and giving its approval if the training of aviation technicians and mechanics should be limited to inactive enlisted reservists. He stated that this decision had been reached at a conference between representatives of the Army Air Forces, the Office of Education, the CAA, and the Bureau of the Budget. They had agreed to support H.R. 5695 if a proviso were added stipulating that CAA pilot training might include enlisted reservists and that aviation technician training should definitely be limited to enlisted reservists on inactive status.⁴⁰

In response to a request from the Senate Committee on Commerce for a report on H.R. 5695, the Directorate of Legislative Planning on April 17, 1942, requested the Directorate of Individual Training for its views on the bill.⁴¹ The reply recommended that the War Department support the bill on the basis that the CAA conduct technician and mechanic training, provided that the only ones trained were Air Corps enlisted reservists subject to call by the Commanding General, Army Air Forces. The further provision was made that such

40. AAG 032 O.

41. R&R, AFMLP to AFIT, April 17, 1942, in AAG 032 Misc.

training employ only "that equipment now available to and used in conjunction with the program of pilot training."⁴²

Before this reply was received, however, Lieutenant Colonel G. R. Perera, Director of Legislative Planning, had prepared a letter to be sent to the chairman of the Senate commerce committee. This stated the additional proviso desired by the War Department restricting the mechanic and technician training on the basis of equipment already available for the pilot training program. The letter explained that the Air Forces were giving complete training for the great majority of the Army's aviation mechanics and technicians, but that preliminary training by the CAA in these specialties would be helpful to the Air Force program. But the "need of the Army Air Forces for all equipment" obtainable made "it desirable that no other government agency make conflicting demands thereon."⁴³ At the same time a letter was drawn up for the signature of the Deputy Chief of Staff to be sent to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget. This letter stated the War Department's desire that the mechanics' training program be restricted because of the limitation on available equipment, and it was indicated that the Air Forces should have first call on such equipment as was produced.⁴⁴

42. Rad. No. 2, AFKIT to AFMLP, April 30, 1942, in ibid.

43. Draft letter prepared on April 28, 1942, in AG 032 O.

44. Draft letter, Deputy Chief of Staff to Harold D. Smith, Director, Bureau of the Budget (prepared by Lt. Col. G. R. Perera, AFMLP, April 27, 1942), in ibid.

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The letter from the Secretary of War to the chairman of the Senate Committee on Commerce on May 18, 1942, indicated the War Department's reversal of opinion on H.R. 5695, but the second proviso contained in the draft letter prepared on April 28 for the Secretary's signature was omitted. In other words, the War Department requested that the House bill be amended to read:

The Civil Aeronautics Authority is authorized, within the limits of available appropriations made by Congress, to train civilian and aviation technicians or to conduct programs for such training, including studies and researches as to the most desirable qualifications for aircraft pilots: Provided, That the training of civilian pilots may include, but the training of aviation technicians shall be limited to, members of the enlisted reserves of the military services in inactive status.⁴⁵

The War Department views as they were presented to the Senate Committee on Commerce explain the amendment of H.R. 5695 while it was receiving committee consideration. The bill passed the Senate on July 2, 1942, in this form.⁴⁶ The House disagreed with the Senate on amendment, and the conference committee recommended that the Senate recede from its position.⁴⁷ The Senate and the House agreed to the conference report, and on July 24 the President signified his approval of the bill, which became Public Law Number 677.⁴⁸ By the terms of

45. AAC 032 0.

46. Daily Cong. Rec., 77 Cong., 2 Sess., 6106 (July 2, 1942).

47. Ibid., 6176 (July 6, 1942), 6191 (July 7, 1942), 6354 (July 15, 1942).

48. Ibid., 6513 (July 17, 1942), 6582 (July 18, 1942), 6673 (July 20, 1942), 6628 (July 21, 1942), 6827 (July 27, 1942). See Appendix 3 for text of act.

the act the CAA was authorized to train civilian pilots, technicians, and mechanics, "or to conduct programs for such training, including studies and researches as to the most desirable qualifications for aircraft pilots and technicians and mechanics."⁴⁹

In consequence of the House insistence on its measure without amendment, the final enactment was in a form which had been opposed by the War Department. Therefore, the Department chose to interpret the act in a manner which would secure the sort of training program it desired. A letter prepared in the Directorate of Legislative Planning set forth the interpretation which the Air Forces wished to be placed on the act:

The War Department offers no objection to approval of enrolled enactment H.R. 5695 . . . but desires to make it clear that, under the powers conferred upon the Secretary of War by Executive Order 8974 of December 13, 1941, it proposes to take action to see that the Act be administered to limit the training thereunder of aviation technicians to members of the enlisted reserves of the military services in inactive status. . . .

As enacted, H.R. 5695 does not include the amendment recommended by the War Department. For this reason the War Department takes the position that its administration must be as set forth above. In so far as the Army is concerned, the War Department will utilize the existing facilities of the Civil Aeronautics Administration, where possible, for the elementary training of technicians and mechanics enrolled in the Enlisted Reserve Corps of the Army in order to supplement the training program of the Army Air Forces.⁵⁰

49. 56 Stat. 961.

50. Draft letter, Secretary of War to Harold D. Smith, Director, Bureau of the Budget (written July 21, 1942), in AAG 032 P.

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Under the provisions of Executive Order 8974 the Secretary of Commerce was to be guided in his administration of civil aeronautics statutes by requests of the Secretary of War in accordance with requirements for successful prosecution of the war. In effect, this meant that the congressional enactment for training civilian mechanics and technicians was a legal fiction if the War Department chose to make it so.

More than ten months, therefore, after the introduction of the bill to extend the provisions of the Civilian Pilot Training Act to include mechanics, the measure was finally enacted substantially as it had been first introduced. The only change had been the addition of technicians as well as mechanics to the original provision for the training of pilots. The final enactment was not in accordance with the wishes of the Army Air Forces, but there were means at hand to attain the sort of training program the air arm thought should be undertaken by the CAA. By the authority of Executive Order 8974, the War Department was empowered to see to it that its desires were fulfilled.

Chapter III

MILITARY FLYING TRAINING LEGISLATION

1. Aviation Cadet Act (1941)

During the twenty-two years prior to 1941 the flying training of young men by the Army had been conducted in the grade of flying cadet, a grade created in 1919 under the provisions of the Army appropriation act for the fiscal year 1920. By the terms of that act the Secretary of War was directed to set up and maintain at one or more established flying schools courses of instruction for aviation students, and it was provided that these students should be enlisted in the Air Service as flying cadets. The total number of flying cadets was not to exceed 1,300 at any one time. The act authorized a base pay for cadets of \$75 a month, which included extra pay for flying risk, a ration allowance of not to exceed \$1 a day, and other allowances equal to those of a private first class in the Air Service. It further provided that upon completion of the course, each cadet, if he wished, could be discharged and commissioned as a second lieutenant in the Officers' Reserve Corps.¹

[] From 1919 to 1941 there was little change in the law relating

1. 41 Stat. 102.

to flying cadets, save for increases in the numbers of cadets authorized to be trained.² At the beginning of the expansion program of the Air Corps in 1939 the general status of cadets was as follows: (1) Those eligible for appointment included enlisted men of the Regular Army, officers and enlisted men of the National Guard, Reserve officers and members of the Unlited Reserve Corps, and civilians. (2) The educational requirements called for at least half the credits necessary for a degree at a recognized college or university (about two years) or the equivalent. (3) The applicant agreed that after completion of his training as a flying cadet he would serve three years on active duty as a second lieutenant, Air Corps Reserve, if his services were required.³

By the fall of 1940, with the national defense and Air Corps expansion programs well under way, with the limitation on the number of flying cadets suspended for the fiscal year 1941, and with the Selective Service Bill on the point of enactment, it was

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2. Public, No. 243, 65 Cong., June 4, 1920, Sec. 13a, authorized not to exceed 2,500 flying cadets; Public, No. 445, 69 Cong., July 2, 1926, Sec. 2, authorized the same number; and 2,500 remained the authorized number until Public, No. 703, 76 Cong., 3 Sess., July 2, 1940, Sec. 2 of which authorized the suspension of all existing limitations on the number of flying cadets in the Air Corps for fiscal year 1941.
 3. AR 615-160, July 20, 1938.

becoming obvious that revisions were necessary in order to make the grade of flying cadet more all-inclusive. Air Corps schools were now giving training in activities other than flying, and the term "flying cadet" was no longer strictly correct. In addition, it was desired to give the cadets parity with the cadets of the Navy and Marine Corps in matters of pay, allowances, and status, both while in training and afterwards as commissioned officers.

At the beginning of August 1940 the Personnel Division of the Air Corps pointed out to the Plans Division the situation then existing. This communication stated that unless the Air Corps made its flying cadets' status comparable to that of the Navy's in respect to pay, allowances, and career prospects, the Army would have little chance of meeting its program in terms of numbers of cadets required. It recommended that a bill providing for such equality be prepared without delay and submitted to Congress.⁴ On August 17, General Yount, Chief of Plans, advised Personnel that "Action is already being taken on this matter."⁵ On August 20, 1940, the Chief of the Air Corps, in a communication prepared by General Yount, submitted to The Adjutant General a proposed bill which would give Air Corps flying cadets such parity, and recommended that it be submitted to Congress at once.

4. R&P, Maj. Orin J. Bushey, Acting Chief, Personnel Division, to Plans Division, Aug. 8, 1940, in AAG O32, Bill for Flying Cadets.
5. R&P, No. 3, Plans to Personnel, Aug. 17, 1940, in ibid.

and that an effort be made to obtain its enactment during the current session. "If such legislation is not obtained," the letter stated, "it will be impossible for the Air Corps to compete with the Navy in obtaining the flying cadet material in the number we require."⁶

Subsequently, on September 19, 1940, two bills (S. 4365 and H.R. 10526) were introduced in Congress to create the grade of "aviation cadet" as a substitute for flying cadet, to authorize certain pay and allowances for the aviation cadets, to give them \$10,000 life insurance at government expense while training, and to provide for their status upon commissioning as second lieutenants in the Air Corps Reserve with an agreement to serve for three years on active duty. In addition, the bills authorized the Secretary of War to establish one or more schools for the training and instruction of aviation cadets. They further provided for a bonus to be paid to any Air Corps Reserve officer, except those chosen for commission in the Regular Army, when honorably relieved from active duty that had been continuous for one or more years.⁷

The War Department, in a letter to Senator Shepard, chairman of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, pointed out the

6. Chief of the Air Corps (by Brig. Gen. B. K. Yount) to AG, Aug.

CC, 1st '40, in "G 872 V."

7. Cong. Rec., 76 Cong., 3 Sess., 12274, 12384 (Sept. 19, 1940).

vital importance of placing Army flying cadets on a parity with naval and Marine Corps cadets and of providing the same allowances for Air Corps Reserve officers on extended active duty as was provided for naval and Marine Corps reserve officers in the same situation. The letter stated the procurement difficulties facing the Air Corps because of this disparity. Among the discriminatory provisions to the advantage of the Navy and Marine Corps were:

(1) the provision of government life insurance for \$10,000 during the period of active duty of aviation cadets; (2) the clothing allowance of \$150 provided to this group, either during their period as aviation cadets or upon commissioning; and (3) the payment of a bonus of \$500 a year for each year of active duty to naval and Marine Corps Reserve officers upon their release from active duty of one or more continuous years. The necessity of procuring adequate numbers of high type personnel to meet the requirements of the Air Corps expansion program demanded the elimination of these discriminations.⁸

On the floor of the Senate, Senator Gran Gurnsey of South Dakota explained that S. 1265 was designed to make the same provisions for Army aviation cadets as those provided for navy cadets in H.R. 1007, passed earlier in the session. The Navy

8. Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War, to Senator Morris Sheppard, Sept. 19, 1940, in S. Rept. No. 2182, 76 Cong., 3 Sess.

bill, however, had authorized naval aviation cadets to remain in the service and for them to be enrolled on the Navy's regular promotion list. As there would be too many Army aviation cadets to include in the regular promotion list, the bill under discussion could give them a \$500 bonus at the end of each year of extended active duty with the Air Corps. Senator Warren A. Austin of Vermont, who considered the bill "distinctly a departure from the past," stated that it was devised as a "plan for education, to give the men who take the special training a rank which will enable them to have prestige in their office of teaching when they are called upon to teach men who have not had special schooling and training."⁹

In the course of the Senate discussion, Senator Joseph O'Meara of Wyoming asked about the possibilities of Negroes becoming pilots and was assured by Gurney that it would be unnecessary to have any such specific provisions in the bill, since under its terms all races would have an equal opportunity.¹⁰ The bill was passed by the Senate on September 30, 1940,¹¹ and was referred to the House Committee on Military Affairs on October 2.¹²

9. Gaz., Dec., 76 Cong., 3 Sess., 1287-31 (Sept. 29, 1940).
10. Ibid., 12871-75 (Sept. 29, 1940).
11. Ibid., 12872 (Sept. 30, 1940).
12. Ibid., 13058 (Oct. 2, 1940). /

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Senator Edwin C. Johnson of Colorado, in congratulating the Senate upon its passage of the measure, expressed his gratitude at this recognition of the Army's need for well-trained aviators. But he considered "absolutelyasinine" the regulation he feared would be laid down by the Secretary of War requiring two years of college. He went on to state his intention to introduce, in the next session of Congress, a bill which would provide for the training of mechanic sergeants, along the general lines of this measure. He asserted that the "lack of proficient pilots and skilled mechanics" constituted "the bottle necks and the weaknesses in our defenses."¹³

No further action was taken on the bill, although the Air Corps had apparently expected the House to pass it. A Plans Division representative conferred with House committee members on the aviation cadet bill and reported: "From information received, it appears that the House has reached a gentleman's agreement not to take up any new business until after the election or until about November 18, 1940." The House members, however, were declared to be in favor of the legislation, and one representative expressed his opinion that it would go through after the election.¹⁴

13. Ibid., 17452-54 (Oct. 9, 1940).

14. P/R, G. C. [Col. G. C. Stratemeyer], Acting Chief, Plans Division, to Executive, Oct. 18, 1940, in AAC 032.

Despite the lack of further action on S. 4365 during this session, the Air Corps was evidently doing some thinking on the matter, particularly with reference to the possibility of training enlisted men in grade as pilots and in other aviation specialties. In connection with this question, the Office of the Chief of Air Corps requested an opinion from the Judge Advocate General as to whether the provisions of S. 4365, if enacted, would permit such training.¹⁵ The Judge Advocate General replied that the bill would not provide for such training unless amended so as specifically to authorize it. The Air Corps Act of July 2, 1926 did not alter the 1919 provision "that all enlisted aviation students must have the grade of flying cadet." Since the 1926 act had defined the term flying cadet to mean "aviation student," and since S. 4365 substituted "aviation cadet" for "flying cadet," it followed that the term "aviation cadet" meant "aviation student"; consequently, enlisted men could be given training in grade but would still have to be given the grade of aviation (flying) credits as under existing law.¹⁶

At the beginning of the first session of the Ninety-seventh Congress, the Secretary of War transmitted to Congress a draft of another and identical bill to create the grade of aviation cadet

15. Memo for Judge Advocate General by Brig. Gen. Carl Spaatz, Assistant Chief of Air Corps, Dec. 20, 1939, in AIR 363, p G, Training in Aviation.

16. Memo for Chief of Air Corps by J C, Jan. 8, 1941, in ibid.

in the Air Corps, Regular Army,¹⁷ and on February 10, 1941, Senator Sheppard introduced the bill, S. 240.¹⁸ This time the bill received speedy action and no discussion on the part of either house. By June 3, 1941, it had been enacted into law.¹⁹

The major provisions of the act--Public Number 97--in its final form were: (1) The grade of aviation cadet was substituted for the grade of flying cadet. (2) The Secretary of War was authorized and directed to "establish and maintain one or more schools for the training and instruction of aviation cadets." (3) Aviation cadet personnel were to be drawn from volunteers enlisting in the Air Corps and from qualified enlisted men in the Regular Army who would be appointed by the Secretary of War. All cadets were required to agree that upon completion of the course they would accept commissions as second lieutenants in the Air Corps Reserve and would serve for three years on active duty, upon completion of which they would be promoted to first lieutenant, Air Corps Reserve. (4) Base pay of \$75 a month was provided, which included extra pay for flying risk. In addition,

17. Cong. Reg., 77 Cong., 1 Sess., 817 (Feb. 8, 1941).

18. Ibid., 822 (F. 10, 1941).

19. Ibid., 4729 (June 5, 1941).

\$1 a day subsistence allowance, and full quarters, medical care, hospitalization, clothing, uniforms, and equipment were to be provided at government expense, as well as travel allowances equal to those furnished for officers. (5) Aviation cadets were to be issued government life insurance for \$10,000, the premiums to be paid by the government. Upon commissioning, they were to have the option of continuing such policies at their own expense. (6) Air Corps Reserve officers not selected for commission in the regular Army who might be released from active duty that had been continuous for one or more years were to be paid a lump sum of \$200 for each complete year of active service as such an officer.²⁰

2. Aviation Student Act (1941)

During the period in which the aviation cadet bill was on its legislative course toward enactment, steps had been initiated to obtain passage of a law to permit the training of enlisted men in grade as aviation students. As far back as December 1940 the shortage of pilot training applicants who could meet the rigorous educational requirements was becoming apparent. A newspaper dispatch of December 15, 1940, cited the War Department's announcement that the Air Corps was short of pilot students and that applicants for training had fallen far below the minimum set

20. 55 Stat. 236. See Appendix 4 for text of act.

for running new planes. It was stated that it might be necessary to lower the educational standards in order to accelerate the personnel expansion program to keep step with the pilot objectives.²¹

An illustration of the seriousness of the situation was embodied in the short-lived proposal that the United States Office of Education institute educational "cramming" courses to be given to high school students in order to prepare them for the examination given to Air Corps flying cadet applicants. At the beginning of January 1941 Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson contacted the Administrator of the Federal Security Agency with a suggestion for a training program, free of tuition, to establish courses in such subjects as American History, English grammar and composition, general history, geography, arithmetic, higher algebra, geometry, trigonometry, and elementary physics. It was planned that the courses would be of three months' duration, with a capacity for 1,000 students, and that they would be conducted three times a year "on a nation wide basis to afford the youth of each state an opportunity to benefit from the program."²² The Federal Security Agency Administrator "locomed the project, but

21. New York Times, Dec. 15, 1940.

22. T. L. Stimson to Administrator, Federal Security Agency, Jan. 2, 1941, in AG 221.90, Flying Cadets (1-4-41).

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pointed out that lack of funds would require a legislative authorization to set up the courses.²³

The Office of the Chief of Air Corps, however, did not approve of the whole scheme. It advised the Adjutant General of its opinion that "there can be no permanent benefit to the individual or to the service from an expenditure of public money for this sort of training of combat personnel." It set forth an alternative proposal that any existing shortage of properly qualified applicants be remedied by amending the existing educational standards. It further suggested that practical courses in technical and professional subjects would have much more value for a combat pilot than a "cram course in general educational subjects."²⁴ The Adjutant General's Office also considered the proposed educational course illegal and indefinite.²⁵ On the other hand, The Adjutant General's Office held that the Air Corps proposal to give training in technical and professional subjects was not practicable because it involved no commitment by the student, nor did the government offer the student anything if he passed the courses. "The most effective widening of the fields of applicants might be achieved

23. Paul V. McNutt to H. L. Stimson, Jan. 29, 1941, in ibid; Eugene Gay, Acting Administrator, Federal Security Agency, to H. L. Stimson, Feb. 25, 1941, in ibid.

24. Ind. (basic letter, Feb. 25, 1941), Brig. Gen. Davenport Johnson to AG, April 2, 1941, in ibid.

25. Fenciled memo for Col. Virtue by Lt. Col. J. W. Gilbert, April 5, 1941, in ibid.

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by a change in the existing requirements for the cadet. ²⁶

In reply to the views of the Adjutant General's Office, the Air Corps advised that its current plans contemplated the training of 50 per cent enlisted pilots, continuing "sometime in the fiscal year 1941-42." Also, "Plans were being drawn up "to synchronize the examination for Flying Cadet appointment with a view to fitting it more nearly fit the type of personnel required for pilot training and eventual commission." It was believed that training of enlisted pilots and a vision of the flying cadet regulation would enable the Air Corps to meet its pilot requirements. ²⁷

On May 16, 1941, the Administrator of the Federal Security Agency was informed that the War Department desired nothing further to be done at that time toward the general approach, since "no course of the nature proposed" ²⁸ obviously, the practicability of the idea could easily determine from the start, if with the Air Corps' minimum of its plans for training enlisted pilots, there'd be any such "grant" courses as will last.

For several months the Air Corps had been considering and pushing legislation to authorize training of enlisted men as

26. 2nd Ind., Lt. Col. J. A. Gilbert, AFM, to Chief of Air Corps, April 8, 1941, in ibid.

27. 4th Ind., Col. G. P. Stratemeyer, Executive, CCMC, to AG, May 2, 1941, in ibid.

28. H. L. Stimson to Administrator, Federal Security Agency, May 15, 1941, in ibid.

noncommissioned" pilots. In a memo sent to General Arnold on December 27, 1940, Under Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson said: "I submit that the time has come when we should not require 5 years of college for the Air Corps. It seems to me that this requirement is barring a large number of capable and eligible young men from the Air Corps. I should be glad to have your views."²⁹ General Arnold advised Patterson that he had had this letter in his mind for some time and that a recent decision of study had been made in connection with it. He explained that the prevailing high educational standards had been retained heretofore because graduated pilots were being commissioned upon completion of their courses. If a grade of noncommissioned officer pilot were created, however, the Air Corps would be enabled to accept candidates with lower educational standards. He stated that he would "have this letter forwarded as it not only would be a good thing for the Air Corps but is a necessary step."³⁰

29. Memo for Maj. Gen. H. H. Arnold, Deputy Chief of Staff for Air, by Under Secretary of War R. P. Patterson, Dec. 27, 1940, in A. 21.27, Pilots (124-7-40).

30. Memo for R. P. Patterson by Maj. Gen. H. H. Arnold, Dec. 30, 1940, in A. 21.27, Enlisted Pilots. In a memo to the Chief of Staff, General Arnold pointed out that although the utilization of enlisted pilots would upset the traditional Army Air Corps practice, such a procedure would undoubtedly tend to minimize the possibility of a shortage of pilot candidates. It was felt that the proportions of one provision or the other, and the fact that the Army was utilizing a certain percentage of enlisted pilots, warranted the Department's adoption of a similar plan for using enlisted pilots up to about 20 per cent of the total number of pilots employed in tactical units. Memo for Chief of Staff by Maj. Gen. H. H. Arnold, Deputy Chief of Staff for Air (prepared by F.C. [Carter], Dec. 18, 1940), in Ibid.

In a communication to the Chief of Staff on January 25, 1941, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 presented the results of a study of the problem that had been directed by General Arnold. It was pointed out that the existing law relative to training of aviation students clearly indicated that all students at flying schools were to be trained in the grade of flying cadet. Inasmuch as the Air Corps considered such cadets officer candidates and required the equivalent of two years' college work as a minimum educational requirement for this group, it was obvious that it would not be possible to train enlisted men lacking such requirements under the provisions of this law. Avocations of the aviation cadet bill, S. 4365, passed in the Senate on September 30, 1940, the communication stated that it was to be reintroduced in the Senate early in the new Congress in an effort to insure its early passage. The bill as it stood, however, would not provide authority for the training of enlisted men in grade unless amended so as specifically to authorize such action.³¹ Consequently, it was recommended that the Secretary of War direct the initiation of legislation to this end.³²

Under Secretary of War Patterson was still concerned about the two-year college requirement when he wrote the Special Assistant to the Secretary of War, Robert A. Lovett, in February 1941:

31. This statement was based on the opinion given by the Judge Advocate General on Jan. 8, 1941. See n. 16, above.

32. Memo for Chief of Staff by Brig. Gen. W. T. Shedd, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, Jan. 25, 1941, in AAC 221 B, Enlisted Pilots.

"If the Air Corps has not already done so, it seems to me that it should, without further delay, abolish the requirement of two years in college for flying cadets. I should be glad to have your views." Lovett reported this request to Colonel G. F. Stratemeyer by telephone on February 26 and asked that every effort be made to make enlisted pilot training ~~in~~ transmitting Major George H. Stratemeyer advised that the request to General Brett, Colonel Stratemeyer advised that Lovett be "made cognizant of General Arnold's desire with reference to the cadet legislation prior to making legislation for enlisted pilots."³³

Accordingly, on February 28 General Brett sent Lovett a draft of a memorandum to be sent to Patterson. This communication pointed out that the current educational requirement for flying cadets was not two years of college, but two years of college or its equivalent. It was suggested that it would be undesirable to lower the educational qualifications for flying cadets since this group was destined for commissioning in the Air Corps Reserve, as well as to make up a pool from which Regular Air Corps officers would be obtained. Patterson was further informed that action had been begun to secure legislative authority for the training

33. Memo for E. A. Lovett by R. F. Patterson, Feb. 22, 1941, in AG 351.2B, Applicants; RAF, Col. G. F. Stratemeyer to Maj. Gen. G. H. Brett, Feb. 26, 1941, in Ibid.

of enlisted pilots with only high school education and that such training was to begin about July 1, 1941, assuming that the legislation would be enacted prior to that time.³⁴ In a memorandum to Lovett, General Brett stated that the aviation cadet bill, S. 240, was then pending in Congress and that it was not desirable to submit additional legislation which might jeopardize its passage. The bill to permit training of enlisted men in grade would be submitted immediately upon passage of the "extremely important" aviation cadet bill.³⁵

At the beginning of April 1941 General Brett communicated to Colonel Robert C. Candee, Chief of the Intelligence Division, Office of the Chief of Air Corps, the necessity for taking some immediate action:

... In conversation with General Arnold yesterday he stated he considered it absolutely essential that the proposed bill for the enrollment of enlisted men to take the flight training course should be given considerable attention. At present there is a lot of criticism over the fact that we retain a two-years' college requirement for flight training as a pilot. He believed that publicity pertaining to the training of enlisted men as pilots will offset action to reduce the qualifications for pilot training as a Reserve Officer. Please see me concerning this.

On April 5 the Executive of Plans Division was informed that Col

34. Draft memo for R. A. Patterson, prepared Feb. 27, 1941, by J. P. C. [Carter] for signature of P. A. Lovett, in Ibid.

35. Memo for R. A. Lovett by Maj. Gen. G. H. Brett, Feb. 28, 1941, in Ibid.

36. R-R, Maj. Gen. G. H. Brett to Col. Robert C. Candee, April 4, 1941, in AAC 032 N.

had been notified to General Arnold were to be in isolation committed "without delay." Col. Col. realized that on March 7, 1941, a bill had been forwarded to the Bureau of the Budget for clearance. "Subsequent steps would be taken immediately in accordance with General Arnold's desires."³⁷

Parently in an effort to forestall further criticism, a formation was given at that time to train enlisted men as pilots. On April 6, 1941, the New York Times reported that the Army Air Corps and the Navy were said to be preparing to let down the hatches to enlisted men to assure an adequate number of pilots for their prospective new fleets of warplanes.

Army officials believe . . . that only by following the example of Germany and Great Britain in making pilots of enlisted men can the Army attain its objective of 10,000 flying men. . . .

A prospective change in policy of the Army is likely to be put into effect in the summer.³⁸

On April 22, soon after General Arnold's vision of the urgency of the measure had been communicated to Col. Col. to exert a symbolic effort, the House introduced S. 1371, a bill to authorize the training of non-enlisted men as aviation students.³⁸

37. At. Col. Warren C. Carter to Executive, Long Division, 1941, p. 1, in Ibid. Serial 1941-10-1 indicates that a copy of the House rules on this letter was issued J. 14, 1941.

38. U.S. Stat. 77 Cong., 1 sess., 2785 (April 22, 1941). The day before, on April 21, a similar bill was introduced in the House by Representative A. J. May (H.R. 4449), but was later tabled when S. 1371 was passed in lieu. Ibid., 3528 (April 21, 1941), 4316-17 (May 21, 1941).

The Committee on Military Affairs reported the bill with an amendment increasing the amount of government life insurance to be issued during the period of flying training from \$5,000 to \$10,000, the premiums to be paid by the government during the training period and continued by the recipient at his option thereafter. The committee report stated that the War Department considered the measure necessary to create an additional group of pilots--noncommissioned officers lacking the educational qualifications for flying cadet appointment.³⁹

The bill in its amended form was passed by the Senate on May 16 and four days later was referred to the House Committee on Military Affairs. The House, without amendment or discussion, passed the bill on May 21, and by June 4 it had been signed by the President.⁴⁰

The act--Public Number 99--authorized the training in grade of enlisted men of the Regular Army and of other components of the Army of the United States on active duty status. They were to be known as aviation students rather than aviation cadets. The Air Corps planned, under the authority of the act, to train

39. S. Rent. No. 248, 77 Cong., 1 Sess.

40. Cong. Rec., 77 Cong., 1 Sess., 7481 (May 1, 1941), 4116 (May 15, 1941), 4232 (May 19, 1941), 4316-17 (May 21, 1941), 4728 (June 5, 1941). This bill became Public Law Number 99, the Aviation Student Act. For the text of the act see Appendix 5.

"young men who are physically and temperamentally qualified as combat pilots but lack [the] basic educational level deemed essential to a commissioned officer." At the time of enactment the contemplated requirements for acceptance as an aviation student were that the applicant be unmarried, of good character, and between eighteen and twenty-two years of age; that he be a graduate of an accredited high school, in the upper half of the class, with a minimum of one and one-half mathematics credits; that he meet the Army physical requirements for flyers; and that he pass the Army General Classification Test with a score of 130 or higher (Group I).⁴¹)

Shortly after the enactment of the Aviation Student Act, The Adjutant General received a directive relative to the issuance of Army Regulations on the subject of training of enlisted pilots.⁴²

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41. Memo for Assistant Secretary of War for Air by Col. G. C. Strattemeyer (for Chief of Air Corps), June 5, 1941, in AGC 352.9 1, Pilot Training. If this exceptional rental score had been adhered to, as well as the other requirements, only a very limited number of enlisted men could have been qualified. Certainly those few who scored above 130 on the General Classification Test would seldom have lacked the "basic educational level deemed essential to a commissioned officer." The usual qualifying score for officer candidate school was only 110 (the lowest score in Group II).
 42. Memo for AG by Lt. Col. G. C. Duncan (for Chief of Air Corps), June 21, 1941, in ibid.
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and on August 1, 1941, AR 615-150 was issued. This set forth the requirements and conditions of appointment for such training and provided that no enlisted man would be detailed to aviation student training who had reached his twenty-third birthday.⁴³ It was further stipulated that upon successful completion of the training the student would receive the rating of pilot and a warrant as staff sergeant pilot, Air Corps, without regard to the grade in which he may have been trained. These regulations stayed in effect until after the passage of the Flight Officer Act the following year, when they were superseded by AR 615-150, dated November 5, 1942.

3. Amendment of Section 2 of Public Number 18 of 1939 (1941): Training in Grade
Section 2 of the "Inadequate national defense" act of 1939 had authorized the detail of Regular Army personnel as students in technical, professional, or other educational institutions or industrial plants when the Secretary of War deemed the facilities of the Army for such instruction insufficient. By the end of 1940 the demands of the expansion program were making it necessary for the Air Corps to avail itself of all suitable applicants for flying training. Two sources apparently not yielding all they might were the groups of Reserve officers of branches other than the Air Corps and National Guard officers. The existing regulations tended to restrict applications from these individuals. The regulations required such personnel to take flying training in the

⁴³. The age limit of twenty-seven years was set for aviation cadet applicants.

grads of flying cadets, and the monetary sacrifice was often an important factor. In addition, upon completion of training they had to receive the rank of second lieutenant in the Air Corps Reserve, regardless of the commission they had previously held.

On December 14, 1940, General Brett, Acting Chief of the Air Corps, set forth these facts in a letter to the Adjutant General. General Brett recommended that the law be amended so as to permit personnel of the Army of the United States (instead of just the Regular Army) to be detailed to these civilian schools. He stated that it was probable that a large number of the 150,000 Reserve officers available would desire flying training and be able to qualify for it. Although the cost of training a Reserve officer in the rank of a second lieutenant would be about \$1,445.75 more than the cost of training a flying cadet, the total cost of training a pilot was so considerable that the difference should not be a determining factor, particularly in view of the fact that it will be necessary to obtain applicants from every available source in order to meet the pilot requirements for the existing emergency.⁴⁴

The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-7 concurred in this proposal and recommended to the Budget and Legislative Planning Branch

44. Memo for AG by Maj. Gen. G. H. Brett, Dec. 14, 1940, in AG OII (11-1-40), pt. 1, sec. 1.

of the War Department that such an amendment be initiated.⁴⁵ The Judge Advocate General drafted a bill to put the proposal into legislative form and transmitted the draft to the Budget and Legislative Planning Branch at the beginning of February 1941.⁴⁶ In reply to an inquiry from the Deputy Chief of Staff, the Bureau of the Budget advised that there would be no objection to the submission of the proposed legislation to Congress.⁴⁷

In March and April of 1941 identical bills (H.R. 4443 and S. 1246) were introduced in the House and Senate to amend Section 2 of the act of April 3, 1930, to make its provisions applicable to personnel of all components of the Army of the United States, instead of just to members of the Regular Army.⁴⁸

At the House hearings, Major Ira P. Swift of G-1 clearly set forth the existing situation which needed some legislative change:

. . . At the present time all of our primary flying instruction is conducted in civilian flying schools. It used to be in Army flying schools. We have authority to send a Regular Army officer to a civilian school for flying instruction but that authority is limited to a Regular Army officer. If a National Guard second lieutenant or reserve second lieutenant wants to transfer to the Air Corps we may not send him to a primary civilian flying school; he has got to give up his commission and go to that school as a flying cadet.⁴⁹

45. Memo for Chief of Budget and Legislative Planning Branch by Col. Harry L. Twaddle, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Jan. 25, 1941, in ibid.
46. Memo for Chief of Budget and Legislative Planning Branch by Col. F. W. Llewellyn, Feb. 5, 1941, in ibid.
47. J. R. Blansford, Jr., Assistant Director of Bureau of Budget, to Secretary of War, March 13, 1941, in ibid.
48. Conc. Rec., 77 Cong., 1 Sess., 3728 (April 21, 1941), 2609 (March 27, 1941).
49. Hearing of House Committee on Military Affairs on H.R. 4443 (typescript), 77 Cong., 1 Sess.

The report of the House Committee on Military Affairs on H.R. 4443 favored its enactment and explained its purposes. The report quoted Major Swift's testimony and quoted from the letter of the Secretary of War, dated March 22, 1941, which designated the existing discrimination as "unjust" and contended that it "unquestionably prevents a large number of excellently qualified individuals from applying for pilot's training." The Secretary's letter also stated that quota requirements for pilots would soon necessitate tapping "every available source" of potential applicants.⁵⁰

The Senate Committee on Military Affairs reported similarly on the Senate bill, and on May 1, 1941, S. 1246 passed the Senate and was referred to the House committee four days later.⁵¹ The House bill passed the House on May 21 and was referred to the Senate committee on the twenty-third.⁵² Meanwhile, the Office of the Chief of Air Corps war advised by the Plans Division of that office that the enactment of S. 1246 would solve the problem of training reserve officers of branches outside the Air Corps.⁵³ On June 26, S. 1246 passed the House and its own bill was tabled.⁵⁴ The President signed it on July 3 and it became Public Law Number 152.⁵⁵

50. H. Rept. No. 471, 77 Cong., 1 Sess., 1-3.
51. Cong. Rec., 77 Cong., 1 Sess., 3513 (May 1, 1941), 3600 (May 5, 1941).

52. Ibid., 4315 (May 1, 1941), 4358 (May 7, 1941).

53. R/R, C.S. [Coastal] to Executive, OCAC, June 17, 1941, in "FHII" files.

54. Cong. Rec., 77 Cong., 1 Sess., 5577 (June 26, 1941).

55. Ibid., 5826 (July 7, 1941).

Following the passage of the bill, the question arose as to whether aviation cadets already in training but holding Reserve commissions would have to continue in the grade of aviation cadet and be commissioned as second lieutenants in the Air Corps Reserve.⁵⁶ A-1 of the Air Staff expressed the opinion that the new law required the following decisions:

(a) Aviation cadets undergoing pilot training who at the present time hold reserve commissions will be discharged as flying cadets and continue their pilot training in their reserve grade.

(b) Upon completion of pilot training such officers will be transferred into the grade in which they train to the Air Corps Reserve.⁵⁷

A further question of the application of the law was raised in a memorandum dated September 26, 1941, in which the intent of the act regarding the pilot training of officers outside the Air Corps within the grade of second lieutenant was discussed.⁵⁸

Military Personnel Division, Office of the Chief of Air Corps, held that training in all cases in the grade of second lieutenant was undesirable on several counts:

(1) Publicity and information had already been disseminated on the basis that the particular grade of the applicant was not one of the requirements for eligibility. Any change in this status would entail the retraction of information already

56. R.P., H.W.B. for Maj. Gen. G. E. Brett, Chief of Air Corps, to Maj. Gen. Arnold, Chief, AAF, Aug. 13, 1941, in AAG 032 N.

57. R.P., R.I.N., A-1, to Chief of Air Corps, Aug. 13, 1941, in *ibid.*

58. Memo for AG by Reserve Section, Military Personnel Division, OCAC, Sept. 26, 1941, in AAG 353.9 N, Pilot Training.

widely disseminated and the revocation of definite commitments made to officers above the grade of second lieutenant.

(2) "Such restriction should be contrary to the intent and purpose of the Congress and the War Department in providing for the detail of personnel of the Army of the United States for pilot training." Inasmuch as the legislation proposed to permit the detail of National Guard and Reserve officers "on the same basis as now authorized for personnel of the Regular Army," restriction of training to the grade of second lieutenant would be unjustified since no such restriction was in existence for Regular Army personnel taking flying training.

(3) The proposed restriction "would preclude many desirable applicants from taking flying training, to the detriment of both the individual and the Army Air Forces."

(4) "The placing of some members of a flying class on active duty in a grade higher than second lieutenant would not cause 'substantial disturbance.'"⁵⁰

Still another problem of interpretation of the enactment was set forth in a question from Military Personnel Division as to which aviation cadet courses, other than the pilot course, would

⁵⁰ 1st Ind. (memo for AG by Service Section, 'H', Sept. 16, 1941), Major J. E. Ives, Assistant Chief, 'P', to AG, Oct. 14, 1941, in ibid.

be open to Reserve and National Guard officers training in grade. Among the courses in question were those in bombardment, navigation, meteorology, engineering, armament, communications, and photography. The question was answered by Training and Operations Division, which advised that all of the training mentioned was available to these officers. It stated, however, that "Applicants for training in the following courses: Engineers, Armament, Communications and Photographic, should be limited to those officers who have special qualifications, either educational or experience, which . . . would make their training in grade especially desirable."⁶⁰

4. United States Military Academy Cadet Flight Training Act (1942)

While the Aviation Cadet Act of 1941 had provided for the pay, insurance, and allowances of personnel undergoing flight training at the various schools of the Air Corps, no provision had been made with reference to the cadets at the United States Military Academy in the event that flight training and aviation instruction should be given to them. Consequently, at the beginning of 1942, when plans were announced to institute such training at the Academy about the first of June, the need for such legislation was realized.⁶¹ This realization was voiced in a request by the Acting Chief of Air Corps for the initiation of legislation to provide

T&O

60. T&R, No. 2, to MPD, Oct. 9, 1941, in AAG 357.9 F, Training, Miscellaneous.

61. On February 8, 1942, the New York Times carried a statement, authorized by General George C. Marshall, that elementary, basic, and advanced flying training were to be given at Stewart Field to all physically qualified West Point cadets who desired flying training.

government life insurance equal in amount to that given to aviation cadets for those students at the Military Academy who would be required to participate in regular and frequent aerial flights. The proposed legislation authorized \$10,000 in life insurance, premiums to be paid by the government during the period of training and continued at the option and expense of the recipient thereafter.⁶²

About two months later the Directorate of Legislative Planning submitted to the War Department Chief of Staff a draft of a bill which included not only provision for life insurance, but also authorization for the cadets to receive the same base pay as provided for aviation cadets, including extra pay for flying risk. In addition, they were to be issued necessary aviation clothing and equipment. Moreover, during the course of such training, when not quartered at the Military Academy, they were to receive the same allowances for travel, subsistence, and quarters as the aviation cadets were receiving. With reference to the insurance benefits, the proposed legislation specified that upon completion of cadet training, the insurance was required to be continued, but at the expense of the insured, until such time as he was relieved from duty involving participation in regular and frequent aerial

62. Maj. Gen. Walter A. Weaver, Acting Chief of Air Corps, to Chief, AAC, Jan. 25, 1942, in AAC C32 C.

flights.⁶³

It was explained that plans were being made to institute courses in flight training and aviation instruction at the Military Academy on or about June 1, 1942, the training to be conducted at Stewart Field in the vicinity of the Academy. During furlough periods and for certain phases of the course, the cadets would be trained at fields in other parts of the United States. It was further pointed out that the cost to the government would not be large since not more than three hundred cadets would undergo flight training in any one class. The Director of Legislative Planning noted that the proposed bill had the concurrences of the Judge Advocate General and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, and that the Superintendent and the Finance Officer of the Military Academy had themselves requested inclusion of the revisions for pay and allowances in the legislation. It was recommended that the draft of legislation be approved for submission to Congress.⁶⁴

Late in March the Deputy Chief of Staff submitted the draft bill to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget. Upon his being advised that it was in accord with the program of the President, it was then sent to the chairman of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

63. Memo for Chief of Staff by Lt. Col. G. E. Morris, March 21, 1942, in ibid.

64. Ibid.

with a letter from the Secretary of War explaining the purposes of the bill.⁶⁵

In order to refute any opposition that might be raised to the bill on the grounds of undue expense, on April 2 the Director of Legislative Planning wrote to the Superintendent of the Academy and asked about the cost of housing, feeding, and training the cadets.⁶⁶ The Superintendent replied that the cost of educating a cadet at the Academy was estimated to be \$500 a year, including board, clothing, pay, textbooks, personal supplies, medical and dental service, and the like. He claimed that "the cost of actual operation of air training for cadets . . . cannot be estimated at this time." He did not believe, however, that the additional training in aviation would make the total cost more than that involved in training an aviation cadet. With the broad training supplied at the Academy applicable to all arms of the service, the Superintendent considered that the cadet's given aviation instruction would be "a welding element insuring the necessary teamwork between ground and air forces."⁶⁷

65. Draft Letter, Deputy Chief of Staff to Director, Bureau of the Budget (prepared by Lt. A. L. Wood, AF EP, March 26, 1942), in AG 332 Op. H. L. Stimson to R. R. Reynolds and Speaker, House of Representatives (prepared by Lt. A. L. Wood, AF EP), March 26, 1942, in ibid.

66. Lt. Col. C. P. Myers to Superintendent, U. S. Military Academy, April 2, 1942, in ibid.

67. Superintendent, U. S. Military Academy, to AF EP, April 10, 1942, in ibid.

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The bill (S. 2416) was introduced in the Senate on April 13, 1942, by Senator Reynolds, and was reported out of committee on April 27 without amendment.⁶⁸ Meanwhile, the Directors of the Flying Training Command was urging the passage of the bill as quickly as possible since the Military Academy cadets were scheduled to report at civil elementary flying schools on June 3, and their travel orders had to be issued prior to May 28. Inasmuch as authorization for funds for their travel was contained in this legislation, the emergency was real.⁶⁹ The Directorate of Legislative Planning advised that steps had already been taken to speed action on the bill but that the War Department could actually do no more than request early and favorable consideration.⁷⁰

The Senate passed the bill without discussion or amendment on May 7,⁷¹ and on May 12 it was referred to the House Committee on Military Affairs, from which it was reported on May 26 with an amendment.⁷² The amendment proposed to strike out the provision

68. Daily Cong. Rec., 77 Cong., 2 Sess., 2545 (April 17, 1942), 2502 (April 27, 1942).

69. Col. W. F. Krausk, Chief of Staff, Flying Training Command, to CG, AAF, April 24, 1942, in AAG DPP O.

70. W.R. C.R.T. [Lt. Col. G. R. Lerera] to AFTRIT, April 27, 1942, in Ibid.

71. Daily Cong. Rec., 77 Cong., 2 Sess., 4157 (May 7, 1942).

72. IBID., 4274 (May 12, 1942), 4690 (May 26, 1942).

granting base pay equal to that of aviation cadets, which included extra pay for flying risk. The committee report explained its amendment by citing the testimony of Major General F. B. Wilby, the Superintendent of the Academy, to the effect that increasing the pay of certain cadets without at the same time increasing the pay of all the others would be destructive of morale at the institution.⁷³ General Wilby had testified at the Senate hearings that the pay of West Point cadets was wholly inadequate to meet their expenses and that each class graduated with an average debt per capita of \$500 to \$700. The salaries of the cadets had been fixed in 1919, but their expenses had multiplied many times since then. He urged that Congress increase the pay of all West Point cadets, and he stated that he had so recommended.⁷⁴ The committee, however, "did not consider the reasons advanced for the increase of pay of all cadets sufficient to warrant such action by the Congress."⁷⁵ Without discussion on the floor, the amendment was agreed to, and the bill passed the House in its amended form on May 28, 1942.⁷⁶

In Army Air Forces Headquarters, meanwhile, much concern was being expressed as to whether the bill would be passed by the

73. H. Res. No. 2171. 77 Cong., 2 Sess.

74. Hearing of Senate Committee of Military Affairs on S. 2445 (typescript), 77 Cong., 2 Sess., 4-8.

75. H. Res. No. 2171. 77 Cong., 2 Sess.

76. Daily Cong. Rec., 77 Cong., 2 Sess., 4876 (May 28, 1942).

time training was scheduled to begin. Headquarters of the Flying Training Command reminded the Chief of the Air Staff of the consequences if it were not. It would mean that the cadets would have to bear all their expenses en route to the schools (pay for third-class train accommodations) and pay out of their own funds the difference between the subsistence cost at the schools (\$1 a day) and their Academy ration of eighty cents a day. In addition, they would bear the entire expense for quarters, and since their total salary is \$65 a month, the inequality of the situation was patent.⁷⁷ In reply, Army Air Forces Headquarters reported to the Flying Training Command on the status of the bill and asserted that one of the reasons for the delay in enactment was the "action of the Superintendent of the U. S. Military Academy in attempting to use the bill as a vehicle for increasing the pay of the entire cadet corps." The Command was assured that leaders of the House would be prepared to act on the bill, but there could be no guarantee that it would be passed before May 28, 1942.⁷⁸

The Senate, aware of the fact that the cadets were required to leave for training on a short notice, on May 29 immediately sent to the House agreement to the bill, and on June 1 the bill was signed in both houses and presented to the President.⁷⁹

77. Brig. Gen. W. F. Kraus, Chief of Staff, AFTC, to Chief of Air Staff, May 22, 1942, in AAG 032 O.

78. 1st Ind., Brig. Gen. W. F. Harmon, Chief of Air Staff, to CG, AFFTC, May 23, 1942, in AAG 032 O.

79. Daily Cong. Rec., 77 Cong., 2 Sess., 4865 (May 28, 1942), 404, 4942 (June 1, 1942).

Because of the "determined opposition" of the House military affairs committee to increased pay for West Point cadets and because quick enactment was necessary, the War Department concurred in the amended measure.⁸⁰ On June 5, 1942, the President signed the act, which thereafter became Public Law Number 571.

5. Pilot Officer Act (1942)

In the beginning of 1942 the flood of graduates from the Army Air corps schools was beginning to pose a problem that had to be solved if there was to be most efficiency. The Army Aviation Cadet Act of 1941 provided that upon completion of successful completion of the prescribed course or to be commissioned as second lieutenants, Air Corps cavalry, while the act authorized the training in areas of enlisted men of the Army Aviation students on the last four days of their initial utilization as enlisted men. In June, 1942, however, a new screening test for aviation cadet applicants was put into effect. Educational requirements for recruitment were removed, and the only physical requirement was a passing score on the "Qualifying Examination." In this action, as well as removal of age differences between the two groups, wiped out the essential distinctions between aviation cadets and aviation students and necessitated greater unity of treatment.

80. Secretary of War to Director, Bureau of the Budget, May 30, 1942, in AGO CGO 8. See Appendix 7 for text of act.

81. Initial Selection of Candidates for Pilot, Bombardier, and Navigator Training, prepared in Personnel Section, Administrative History Branch, AFHML, 26.

especially in the matter of rating or commissioning upon graduation. It was also found that many of the enlisted men training as aviation students were fully qualified to assume a commissioned status, or at least a status higher than an enlisted grade. In addition, the lowered requirements for aviation cadets meant that a large number of this group would not measure up to the desired personality and leadership standards for commissioned officers. Thus, steps had to be taken to avoid either the commissioning of men unsuitable for the officer's responsibilities or the retention in an enlisted grade of men who were qualified to assume more responsibility than their status permitted.

Because of this situation, on January 16, 1917, in a memorandum to the Chief of Staff from the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, A-1, 82 legislation was proposed which would eliminate the category of aviation student, designate as aviation cadets all personnel in flying training, and provide, upon completion of the course, that such personnel be appointed either second lieutenants or "flight officers" in the Army of the United States. The decision would depend upon "an evaluation of the individual's capacity for service as a commissioned officer."

It was explained that the status of a flight officer, in general, would be that of a warrant officer (junior grade), to rank above

all other warrant officers, but his base pay would be only \$120 a month. The proposed bill further provided that promotions from the grade of flight officer to that of second lieutenant could be made when deemed advisable. The only personnel taking this training who would be retained in an enlisted status would be those cadets who were eliminated, and they would be assigned to duties other than flying in an enlisted grade for the duration of the war and six months thereafter. The bill also would suspend the provisions of Section 3 of the Aviation Cadet Act pertaining to the commissioning of aviation cadet graduates as second lieutenants in the Air Corps Reserve. The new legislation would assign or commission all graduates either as flight officers or as second lieutenants in the Army of the United States, and the appointment as an officer in the Air Corps Reserve after the war would no longer be mandatory but would be a matter to be determined under regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of War. In addition, for the duration of the war and six months thereafter, enlisted men who had taken training as aviation students and received warrants as staff sergeant pilots could receive temporary appointments by the Secretary of War as flight officers in the Army of the United States.

The proposed bill also included several miscellaneous provisions concerning uniform allowances for flight officers and \$10,000 insurance for aviation cadets, with premiums to be paid by the

government during the period of training, and compulsory insurance thereafter, with premiums to be paid by the insured, until he was permanently relieved from duty involving participation in regular and frequent aerial flights.

Prior to submission to the Chief of Staff, the draft of proposed legislation was referred to the Judge Advocate General for comment or concurrence, with a recommendation that it be approved for submission to Congress. In a memorandum to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, on January 30, 1942,⁸³ the Judge Advocate General concurred in the legal aspects of the action recommended, but suggested several changes in the wording of the proposal, in order to clarify provisions pertaining to date of rank and longevity pay for flight officers and to deduction of insurance premiums from the pay of flight officers or second lieutenants. It was specified that flight officers would be entitled to longevity pay as provided for warrant officers in Section 1 of the act of August 21, 1941.⁸⁴ By memorandum to General Arnold on February 7, 1942, Colonel T. Trubee Davison, Assistant Chief of Air Staff, A-1, recommended that "the attached Bill be approved as the best solution of the

⁸³. Ibid.
⁸⁴. 56 Stat. 651.

problem.⁸⁵ Colonel Davison also stated that although the proposed procedure did "not fit exactly into the policy which the Navy proposes to follow . . . it does not appear to be in conflict."⁸⁶

In a report prepared for General Arnold by two of his special assistants, Lieutenant Colonels Charles P. Gabell and Lauris Norstad, the pros and cons of the proposed legislation were discussed. Among the reasons given in defense of commissioning all graduates were:

1. It would increase combat efficiency because the officer status enhances initiative and morale by the higher standards inherent in that [commissioned] status.
2. Every pilot is either actually a leader or commander or may be required to assume that position. . . . The assumption of such duty involves responsibility and authority normally associated with the commissioned status.
3. The incentive offered by the officer status would increase the quality and quantity of the product.
4. The standards of candidates would be consistent with those of officers procured from other sources. . . . All flying cadets undergo an arduous and exacting course of instruction during which necessary elimination by selection out may be accomplished.
5. Administration would be simplified immeasurably by placing all candidates in a single category. . . .
6. It would insure a constant and uniform flow of officers in appropriate experience brackets to fill

85. AG 032 0.

86. In his memorandum, Admiral J. H. Towers stated: "It does not appear to me that the proposed plan of creating a warrant officer category of aviator will fit in with the Navy scheme of things. We could use a limited number of them in our shore-based activities but not aboard ship because of the lack of arrangements to accommodate them. For the present we propose to continue the policy now being followed by both the Army and the Navy of enrolling cadets and commissioning them if they qualify. . . ." Memo for Col. F. Trubee Davison by Admiral J. H. Towers, Bureau of Aeronautics, Feb. 5, 1942, in ibid.

position vacancies resulting from attrition and would prevent the development of discrepancies between authority and responsibility. . . .

7. It would give equal rank, authority and privilege to all pilots charged with similar duties and responsibilities.⁸⁷

On the other hand, certain disadvantages of the proposed system were also pointed out: (1) the minimum age and formal educational standards for aviation cadets were below those accepted for officers for the Army as a whole; (2) the mechanical requirements for piloting an airplane did not necessarily call for the qualifications or status of an officer; (3) some graduates might prefer not to be on commissioned status; and (4) in the existing emergency situation, when the need for pilots was of greater consideration than the need for officers, "lack of officer qualifications should not result in the elimination of able pilots." The conclusion was reached, however, that inasmuch as the primary purpose of training was to produce the largest number of most effective combat pilots, "Commissioning aviation cadets immediately upon graduation will contribute more toward the accomplishment of this purpose than will the suggested alternative." It was therefore recommended that the proposed legislation be dropped and the existing commissioning policy be continued, with a proviso that any graduates not desiring to serve on a commissioned basis be appointed to a noncommissioned grade.⁸⁸

87. Memo for General Arnold by Lt. Colonels C. P. Campbell and Lauris Norstad, March 13, 1942, in ibid.

88. Ibid.

Despite this unfavorable report, the Director of Legislative Planning was directed by the Commanding General, Army Air Forces to prepare a draft bill for submission to the Chief of Staff for approval. This was done and was transmitted to the Chief of Staff on April 1, 1942, with a recommendation that the draft be approved and submitted to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget.⁸⁹ In this revised draft, provision was made for the pay and allowances of the flight officer to be equal to those of a warrant officer, junior grade.⁹⁰ In addition, the provision that the flight officer outrank all other warrant officers was dropped. These suggestions were made by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 and were concurred in by the Director of Legislative Planning.⁹¹

Accordingly, on April 22, 1942, a draft of the legislation was submitted to the Bureau of the Budget with a request for advice as to whether it would be in accordance with the President's program.⁹² Upon notification that it would be, the draft bill was transmitted to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, accompanied

89. Memo for Chief of Staff by Lt. Col. Farren, April 1, 1942, in ibid.

90. This was done because in 1935, the new pay bill, was going to raise the pay of a warrant officer, junior grade, to that of a second lieutenant. Consequently, this would give the flight officer financial parity with the commissioned pilot.

91. Ibid.

92. Maj. Gen. Joseph T. McNarney, Deputy Chief of Staff, to Director, Bureau of the Budget, April 22, 1942, in ibid.

by a letter from the Secretary of War explaining its purpose.⁹³ The Secretary pointed out that the exigencies of the times called for a lowering of the entrance requirements for flying training on license. "The President's program calling for the training of thousands of pilots has necessitated that former minimum age and educational qualifications for pilot candidates be reduced. It is planned to provide rank and grade for prospective pilots suitable to their ability and capacity for leadership."⁹⁴

In connection with the compulsory post-end-t insurance, the Secretary's letter explained that about 20 per cent of the graduates of the Army Air Forces training centers failed to continue their government life insurance. This was an "unhealthy situation" which needed correcting, and he did not consider the financial load too great for the government to continue the insurance at his own expense. He called attention to the fact that if the bill were passed with this insurance provision included, S. 2180, introduced at the request of the War Department and passed by the Senate on January 22, 1942, could require no further action by Congress, since its provisions were identical with those. With reference to the financial obligations which would be imposed upon the government by the passage of the flight officer bill, the Secretary stated that the additional cost would be approximately

S. Secretary of War to F. D. Reynolds and Speaker of the House of Representatives, May 1st, 1942, in ibid.
94. ibid.

\$5,500,000 in the fiscal year 1943, resulting in necessary revisions in the enlisted pilot training program to provide for training of enlisted personnel as aviation cadets and their ultimate appointment as flight officers instead of staff sergeant pilots.⁹⁵

The bill was finally introduced in the Senate as S. 2553 on May 25, 1942, and was referred to the Committee on Military Affairs.⁹⁶ Testifying before the committee were Colonels F. Trubee Davison and L. S. Smith and Lieutenant Colonels G. R. Perera and John C. Flanagan, all of the Air Forces. Colonel Smith had been asked by Major General M. F. Harmon to represent General Arnold at the hearing since General Harmon could not attend as planned. Colonel Smith was instructed to explain to the committee that the bill was "designed to accomplish a need that has been appreciated by General Arnold for some time" and that the flight officer proposal was "a matter of particular concern to General Arnold and one in which he has taken a vigorous and personal interest because of his conviction that it will materially contribute to the fighting effectiveness of the Army Air Forces." In short, Colonel Smith must assure the committee that the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces regarded the measure "as of the utmost importance."⁹⁷

95. Ibid.

96. H.R. 7129, a companion bill, was introduced in the House on the same day by Representative Key, but was later tabled, and S. 2553 passed in lieu. Daily Cong. Rec., 77 Cong., 2 Sess., 4690 (May 25, 1942), 6121-22 (July 2, 1942).

97. Memo for Col. L. S. Smith by Maj. Gen. M. F. Harmon, Chief of Air Staff, June 2, 1942, in AAC 032 F.

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Some interesting testimony was brought out at the hearings. Lieutenant Colonel Perera, Director of Legislative Planning for the Army Air Forces, stressed the fact that the bill was an emergency measure only and that for purposes of wartime or during a period of "commencing emergency" the Aviation Cadet Act would be entirely satisfactory. The outbreak of the war, however, had caused an enormous increase in demand for personnel which

necessitated an expansion whereby the air forces are obliged to dip down into the pool of available material and to call upon individuals who, physically and mentally, are able to perform certain functions in connection with flight but who are not, through lack of experience or educational qualifications or other qualifications, entirely qualified to be commissioned officers and leaders of men.⁹⁸

He further stated that an alternative to this proposed legislation would be to continue to train individuals either as aviation cadets or as enlisted men who would become enlisted pilots. It was felt upon analysis, however, that "the difference in caliber of the individuals was not sufficient to justify that distinction being made at the outset in training."⁹⁹

Colonel Davison told the committee of the necessity for a feeling of comradeship among the members of a squadron. He believed that cordially personal relationships would be fostered by creation of the flight officer grade and elimination of the

^{98.} Hearings of Senate Committee on Military Affairs on S. 2563, 77 Cong., 2 Sess., 5.

^{99.} Ibid., 5, 6.

staff sergeant pilot status. Although flight officers would not have command responsibilities, creation of the new grade would enable flight and commissioned officers "to so mix with each other that they will have that teamwork feeling."¹⁰⁰ He too stressed the point that many men who can serve admirably as pilots cannot always carry out the responsibilities of commissioned officers. "General Arnold feels very strongly," he said, "that we should not prevent those men from being pilots, which we are doing at the present time."¹⁰¹

Senator Chan Gurney raised the objection that any man who could actually pilot a plane of any type in combat was at least entitled to a commission in the Army of the United States. Colonel Davison replied that the men who had the proper qualifications for a commission could still be made second lieutenants; in addition, the bill would give the opportunity to become pilots to many more men who under existing law would not be eligible for anything higher than an enlisted rating. He stated that the proposed legislation had "been studied by every division in the Air Corps" and by the War Department General Staff. To his knowledge, this study had proceeded for at least three months.¹⁰²

100. Ibid., 10.

101. Ibid., 11.

102. Ibid., 14.

The different qualifications for commissioned and flight officers were explained to the committee by Lieutenant Colonel Flanagan, Chief of the Psychological Division, Office of the Air Surgeon. The officer, he stated, had to make decisions requiring "superior reasoning, logical judgment, and comprehension." But the Air Forces wanted to make flight officers of cadets capable of "performing satisfactorily the general elements of flying duties" but who lacked the qualifications which would enable them to grow into commanding officers.¹⁰³

Colonel Smith, Director of Individual Training, provided a final interpretation of the bill for the committee. He argued that men who had a powerful urge to fly and the ability to do it should not be excluded because of lack of educational qualifications. And "they can make themselves suitable for selection to officer grade as they progress along the ladder."¹⁰⁴

On June 1, S. 2557 was reported from committee without amendment and passed the Senate on June 15, 1942, without discussion or change.¹⁰⁵ On June 16 it was referred to the House Committee on Military Affairs and passed the House without amendment on July 2, in lieu of H.R. 7122, an identical bill.¹⁰⁶ On July 8 the President signed the bill and it became Public Law Number 658.¹⁰⁷

103. *Ibid.*, 17-20.

104. *Ibid.*, 20.

105. *Daily Cong. Rec.*, 77 Cong., 2 Sess., 4807 (June 1, 1942), 5734 (June 15, 1942).

106. *Ibid.*, 5456 (June 15, 1942), 6172 (July 2, 1942), 6190, 6241, 6243 (July 7, 1942).

107. See Appendix 8 for text of act.

Almost immediately upon the enactment of the Flight Officer Act a few questions arose in connection with it. One of these was the status of those qualified applicants who had been enlisted as privates in either the Army or the United States or the Air Corps Enlisted Reserve and who were currently on furlough or inactive status awaiting appointment as aviation cadets and assignment to training. This situation was brought to the attention of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, A-1 by the Chief of the Military Personnel Division in an R&R dated July 24, 1942, in which the latter suggested the necessity of taking steps to correct the situation.¹⁰⁸ The communication invited attention to the fact that Section 2 of the act, suspending commission in the Air Corps Reserve upon graduation, would preclude such commission to those applicants in the category stated above. "To apply the provisions of the bill to all those persons, enlisted and civilian, qualified prior to July 8th (some as long ago as March or April), who have not yet been appointed Aviation Cadets, would be to violate their enlistment contract and in effect make the bill retroactive."

The Chief of Military Personnel also stated that certain corrective steps had to be taken because of the delay in notifying rear training and examining authorities of the passage of the law

^{108.} AAC 032 R.

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and its effect on those enlisted on and after the date of passage. Undoubtedly some individuals did enlist after July 8 "without knowledge of the existent fact that their enlistment or qualification was subject to the terms of that law." It was suggested that all enlistments from July 15 on could be considered subject to the new act, as radio instructions were sent out by The Adjutant General on July 11 notifying examining and enlisting authorities of the provisions of the act and setting July 15 as the definite date on and after which all persons qualified or enlisted for Air Corps appointments would be subject to its provisions. In the case of the previously mentioned category of enlistees, however, the division suggested proper handling of the situation either through amendment of the act or in the Secretary of War's regulations for its administration. In the second case, regulations should prescribe that civilians and enlisted men who qualified for aviation cadet appointment prior to July 15 be granted commissions as second lieutenants upon graduation, and that they be appointed immediately in the Air Corps Reserve. In addition, it was recommended that those persons qualified or enlisted for aviation cadet ground duty before July 15 receive commissions in the same manner as set forth above, and that those aviation cadets (ground duty) who had qualified for appointment subsequent to July 15 be commissioned,

upon graduation from ground duty training, as second lieutenants in the Army of the United States, and not as flight officers.¹⁰⁹

On July 27 the Executive of A-1 advised Military Personnel that its recommendations were approved,¹¹⁰ and they were embodied in AR 615-160 of November 5, 1942. Another Army Regulation provided that persons who had completed aviation cadet or aviation student training and had "served in time of war as a commissioned officer or flight officer in the Army of the United States, may be appointed an officer in the Air Corps" upon recommendation of the Commanding General, Army Air Forces.¹¹¹ It will be noted that although Military Personnel had recommended commissioning in the Air Corps Reserve of personnel who had been qualified or enlisted prior to July 15 but not assigned to a school, the provision as finally promulgated stated only that such commissions might be issued to those who had served as commissioned or flight officers in time of war. It did not make specific reference to the particular category of individuals in question. Another question that arose in connection with the Flight Officer Act was whether enlisted men appointed as aviation students and given glider pilot training were eligible for temporary appointment as flight officers.¹¹² The Air Judge Advocate held that such personnel were eligible for the

^{109.} Ibid.

^{110.} R.R., "Executive, AC/AS, A-1, to Director of Military Personnel, July 27, 1942, in Ibid."

^{111.} AR 610-50, Nov. 5, 1941, par. 8.

^{112.} R.R., Brig. Gen. L. S. Smith, AFRIIT, to Air Judge Advocate, Nov. 27, 1942, in AAC 072.1, Congress.

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appointment.¹¹³

6. Summary

The five enactments treated in this chapter together represent an extremely significant body of legislation authorizing changes in the military flying training program. Considered chronologically, as here, they reveal the increasing difficulties in meeting pilot procurement and training objectives under the ever-increasing pressure of the expansion program. The same trend, of course, is readily discernible in other fields than aviation. For example, the aviation cadet qualifying examination was continuously undergoing revision in this same period in an effort to recruit all possible suitable applicants for flying training.¹¹⁴

The principal reason for the initiation and passage of the Aviation Cadet Act was to provide parity for flying cadets of the Army with those of the Navy and Marine Corps. Because of discriminatory provisions operating to the disadvantage of the Army Air Corps and because of the urgency of securing an adequate number of high-caliber personnel to meet expansion objectives, the Air Corps was faced with a difficult procurement objective. The enactment eliminated the disparity which had existed.

113. FAP, No. 2, Col. T. H. Snodgrass, Air Judge Advocate, to AFPIF, Nov. 30, 1942, in ibid. By Change 1 (dated Jan. 5, 1943) to AF 810-50, warrant officers, enlisted men, or civilians, recommended by the Commanding General, Army Air Forces and qualified to perform the duties of an aircravt member, were also eligible for appointment as flight officers in the Army of the United States.

114. See Initial Selection of Candidates for Pilot, Bombardier, and Navigator Training.

Concurrently with legislative consideration of the aviation cadet measure, the Air Corps was considering plans for flying training of enlisted men in grade. Again, the pilot requirements lay at the base of the proposal. There were already in the Army large numbers of enlisted men proper and physically qualified to become pilots, but lacking the high educational qualifications still being adhered to. This was a difficult problem in that the Air Corps did not desire to lower standards for commissioning. But Germany and England furnished precedent for training pilots who would be noncommissioned officers, and it was determined that this procedure should be adopted by the United States Army Air Corps. While the aviation cadet bill was still pending, however, it was not desired to introduce another measure which might confuse the general problem and possibly jeopardize passage of both bills. But Congress delayed so long on its action--marking a "gentleman's agreement" to defer the pending bill until after the November 1940 election--that the Air Corps eventually felt forced to submit its aviation student bill before passage of the aviation cadet measure. An additional factor seems to have been public criticism of the high qualifications required for flight and training. Also Under Secretary of War Littler urged that steps be taken to lower the existing educational requirements. Anticipated difficulties were not encountered, once the aviation student bill was submitted.

Congress quickly acted and on June 1, 1941, the President signed the act, the day after he had given his approval to the loaned aviation cadet program.

While the aviation cadet and student pilots were being recruited, other legislation was introduced to extend the flight school and career officers the privilege of receiving aviation training under the provisions of Public Number 18 of 1929. That enactment had provided for the detail to civilian institutions for training aviation specialists of only Regular Army personnel. In its search for additional sources of potential pilots, the Air Corps encouraged first term members of regular Army career officers and career officers of branches other than the Air Corps desired to become pilots but were not willing to give up their commissions and take their chances as flying cadets. A student of the 1929 act submitted them to be detailed to civilian schools for flying training, and interpretation of a January 1941 letter they could receive training in the rank which they held in the Service or attend courses and retain first term commissions on return of the course.

A fourth amendment to the Military Academy Cadet Flight Training Act, was necessary by the institution of pilot training at West Point. The moment hit an urgent enforcement stage when the Superintendent of the Academy opposed increasing the

pay only of cadets taking flying training. He contended, with some justification, it seems, that the whole cadet corps was grossly underpaid and that an increase in pay for a single group of cadets would bring dissatisfaction. Some Air Force personnel viewed his action as approaching obstructionism in its attempt "to use the bill as a vehicle for increasing the pay of the entire cadet corps."

The Flight Officer Act is a significant and controversial piece of legislation. The anomalous, neither-fish-nor-fowl status of warrant officer was reproduced among flying personnel. Apparently desire for its passage was dictated by the lowing of requirements for acceptance of aviation cadets, elimination of the essential distinctions between aviation cadets and aviation students, and dissatisfaction with the staff sergeant pilot status resulting from the Aviation Student Act. Efficient combat pilots had to be procured and trained. Although standards for commissioning were undoubtedly being lowered in actual practice, the Air Forces still contend that a pilot who was commissioned must have the educational background and the mental ability to make him at least a potential candidate for a commanding officer. But a staff sergeant rating was not a particularly enticing prospect for most enlisted men who wanted to become pilots. It would seem that it was General Arnold's personal sponsorship of the flight officer

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proposal which provided most of the impetus for its initiation
and passage.

In any attempt to evaluate the flight officer legislation, it must be borne in mind that it was enacted in a period of emergency when the need was primarily for qualified combat pilots and only secondarily for officers of the proper cultural and social background and personality. In a more normal period the advisability of such legislation might be questioned, and it might be argued that a more sensible procedure would be simply to stiffen up the initial requirements so as to eliminate from the very beginning those candidates who did not measure up culturally as well as mentally and physically. Such a step in time of war, however, would undoubtedly have slowed up and set back the whole personnel procurement and training program and, consequently, was out of the question.

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Chapter IV

PROPOSED LEGISLATION

The three preceding chapters have dealt with legislative proposals which were enacted into law. In addition to these, numerous other bills were introduced in Congress in the years 1939 through July 1943 which would have had some bearing on the Army Air Forces training program if they had received the sanction of Congress and the President. Some of these were primarily civilian in their import, although in all cases the proponents related the aims of the bills to the national defense of war effort. The War Department, however, opposed all such proposals on the grounds that they were secondary to the defense measures being undertaken, that the military air arm was the proper agency to carry on training in military aeronautics, and that enactment of the bills might cause a drain of material or personnel vitally needed by the Army's air arm. The most significant of these rejected proposals were those for the creation of a civil air reserve, for a program of civilian glider pilot training, for the establishment of a Division of Aviation Education, and for the creation of national aviation academies.

1. Proposals for Establishing a Civil Air Reserve

During the congressional discussion of the Army expansion bill in 1939, proposals were also put forth for creating a pool of pilot

personnel from among civilians already engaged in flying or undergoing flight training. On March 16, 1939, Representative Lea of California introduced H.R. 5093, a bill "to provide for training of civil aircraft pilots" which was referred to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.¹ Four days later Senator McCarran introduced an identical bill, S. 1857, in the Senate.² The Air Corps, apparently, did not have any objection to either of these bills if they were amended in such a way as to prevent the possibility of the CAA being authorized to borrow Army personnel or land and buildings in use by the Army. General Yount, during the hearings on H.R. 5093, suggested such an amendment. The Navy's representative concurred in General Yount's suggestion, and the CAA did not object to such an amendment.³ Ultimately, however, neither of the bills progressed beyond the committee stage.

The following month another bill, H.R. 5844, "to aid in the national defense by developing a civilian air reserve in the United States with basic military training, by providing for a pilot training program, and authorizing an appropriation therefor," was introduced by Representative Van Zandt.⁴ The purpose of the bill was to

1. Cong. Rec., 76 Cong., 1 Sess., 2899 (March 16, 1939).

2. Ibid., 2935 (March 20, 1939).

3. Memo for Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, by General Arnold (prepared by H.P. [Lt. Col. Hume Peabody]), April 4, 1939, in AAG 032 L.

4. Cong. Rec., 76 Cong., 1 Sess., 4422 (April 18, 1939).

increase the sources from which trained air pilots could be drawn in the event of an emergency, and to this end it proposed to create "a Civilian Air Reserve, the members of which shall be selected and appointed by the Secretary of War." This reserve group, however, was not to constitute a part of the Army of the United States. The Secretary was to be further authorized to prescribe the rules and regulations for the training of such personnel "in basic military subjects and in navigation, meteorology, engine and aircraft mechanics, radio, ordnance, and allied military or aeronautical subjects." The Civilian Air Reserve was to consist of holders of the CAA's airmen certificates who had a minimum of twenty-five hours solo flying time and other qualifications to be prescribed by the Secretary of War. Persons accepting this training would be liable for military service in any branch of the government that the President might direct in the event of war or other national emergency. They would receive their training at military training centers for periods of one week or more annually, where housing and subsistence would be furnished at government expense. At least ten hours of flying training in government aircraft would be provided. An additional clause stipulated that the government would take out \$5,000 life insurance for each participant.⁵

As might have been expected, the Air Corps opposed the measure on the grounds that it was unnecessary in the light of programs then

5. H.R. 5844 (in the House of Representatives, April 18, 1939),
76 Cong., 1 Sess.

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in effect or about to be set up. In fact, provision for this additional source of partially trained pilots would interfere to some extent with the progress of the expansion program, as Army men would have to assist in the training program and its administration. It was believed that the Air Corps Training Center and the civilian flying schools which would be utilized would be able to keep pace with the existing aeronautical manufacturing establishment. Finally, "The organization of another group of reserve personnel separate and distinct from the existing Reserves and National Guard adds unnecessarily to the administrative problems of the War Department pertaining to civilian components."⁶

During the remainder of 1939 and through the winter, the development of the Air Corps expansion program seems to have occupied congressional interest to the point that the legislators wished to see its progress before introducing any further bills to supplement existing sources of pilot personnel. By the spring of 1940, however, the war in Europe had started, and after a weird winter of "sitzkrieg" on the western front, there were increasing signs of imminent activity on the part of the Nazi war machine. It was natural, therefore, that people's minds turned once again to defense and means of strengthening it.

6. Unsigned memo for Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 (prepared by Maj. W. R. Carter, May 16, 1939), in AFHQ files.

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On April 17, 1940, Senator D. Worth Clark of Idaho introduced S. 3793, "a bill to supplement existing laws with respect to the training of civilian aircraft pilots," which was referred to the Committee on Commerce.⁷ This bill was identical to one introduced a month later in the House by Representative Randolph, H.R. 9786.⁸ The measures provided for the issuance of "aviation-training certificates" to holders of student-pilot or private-pilot ratings. After completion of a course of aviation training, the certificates would be redeemed by payment of \$50 to the holders.⁹ The purpose of the bills was to encourage and expedite the training of civilian pilots from whom candidates for appointment in the Air Corps might be drawn as the need arose. Although neither of the bills got beyond committee, both were indications of the general tenor of the period, when the urgency of developing a strong air arm was becoming increasingly apparent.

A similar indication is embodied in a news item in the New York Times of May 20, 1940, which reported a program presented by the "Civilian Air Corps," an organization composed of a group of Chicago airmen who proposed that the government provide military flight training for experienced civilian fliers. They suggested that since events in Europe had proved that the United States needed every pilot it

7. Cong. Rec., 76 Cong., 3 Sess., 4607 (April 17, 1940).

8. Ibid., 8205 (May 16, 1940).

9. H.R. 9786 (in the House of Representatives, May 15, 1940), 76 Cong., 3 Sess.

could obtain, the nation should avail itself of its approximately fourteen thousand licensed pilots who were not members of any military unit. With some training by Army pilots these experienced civilian fliers could be fitted "for rapid transition from civilian to army flying in case of an emergency." Such training would enable cutting down the time lag in that transition "to weeks instead of years." Arthur J. La Pointe, Jr., spokesman of the group, asked that the Army supervise such a training program and allocate advanced models of training planes and the money necessary to pay instructors.

Another variation of the same theme was set forth in a bill, S. 4153, introduced by Senator James M. Mead of New York on June 19, 1940. This proposed to establish an "Air Line Pilots' Reserve."¹⁰ The members of the reserve would all be pilots employed by carriers holding certificates authorizing their transportation of air mail. The bill provided that every such pilot

* * * shall be commissioned as a reserve officer in a separate aviation unit, to be known as the Air Line Pilots' Reserve. Each such pilot shall take a course of training in such unit for one month during each calendar year. Each such pilot, while taking such course of training, shall receive training pay from the United States, at a rate equal to his average monthly pay for the twelve months immediately preceding the month during which he begins such course, together with traveling expenses and subsistence, or allowances in lieu thereof, subject to limitations corresponding to

10. Cong. Rec., 76 Cong., 2 Sess., 8563 (June 19, 1940).

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those provided by law in case of officers of the United States Army, insofar as they are not inapplicable.¹¹

The bill further provided for periodic advances in grade, but would not require any pilot already commissioned in the Army or Navy reserves to join this new group. The Air Line Pilots' Reserve would be a reserve component of the Army, but its members would be subject to active service only when ordered into it in time of war. The training of this reserve would correspond to the tactical training given by the Air Corps, would "emphasize bombardment tactics," and would "be carried on in a separate unit, with tactical equipment corresponding to that used by the Army Air Corps."¹² The bill was referred to the Committee on Commerce and died there.

In the ensuing months air lines experienced an increasingly serious shortage of pilots as a result of calls to reserve duty. Therefore, renewed attention was given to Mead's bill. When Mead had first introduced his proposal in 1936, the air lines had opposed it. When he introduced it the third time in early 1941, however, it was believed that the commercial carriers were more in favor of it. They could no longer recruit replacements from the Army and Navy, and the measure furnished an alternative to the prospect of losing their pilots altogether. Many air lines, however, were still cool to the idea and apparently preferred an exchange arrangement whereby Army

11. S. 4155 (in the Senate, June 19, 1940), 76 Cong., 2 Sess.

12. Ibid.

and Navy pilots would rotate in and out of the air lines, along with regular transport pilots, giving all an equal amount of training. Another objection to the proposal, voiced by Army authorities, was the fear that the difference in pay between the Regular Army and Navy personnel and the air line reservists--who by the terms of the bill would be paid on the basis of their previous twelve months' earnings--might engender dissension and bad feeling.¹³ The bill, S. 765, which was introduced on February 6, 1941, again expired in committee.¹⁴

On April 29, 1941, Jennings Randolph introduced another bill, H.R. 4670, "to establish a civilian air reserve, to be organized and trained by the War and Navy Departments, and for other purposes."¹⁵ Under the proposed legislation, the War and Navy departments would organize and train civilian pilots, mechanics, ground crew members, and others who owned their own aircraft and ground equipment. War gear, such as bomb racks and machine guns, would be provided and installed on private planes. The bill proposed to subsidize the personnel of this civilian air reserve for their service in war exercises, but no figure was set to limit the amount of this subsidy. The War Department designated the bill as "uneconomical" and "unsound" as well as unnecessary. Air Corps schools were the proper places to provide such training. Further, the value of using civilian reserve pilots

13. New York Times, Feb. 9, 1941.

14. Cong. Rec., 77 Cong., 1 Sess., 689 (Feb. 6, 1941).

15. Ibid., 3739-40 (April 29, 1940).

in war exercises was considered "extremely doubtful and their value in time of actual war even more so." It would be sheer suicide to attempt combat in current private aircraft. In short, the bill did not seem to have any national defense value, and the large appropriations which it would make necessary could be better spent for other purposes.¹⁶

On several similar bills introduced in Congress during the same period,¹⁷ the War Department made similar comment.

The War Department is now engaged in preparations to defend this country against one or more of the greatest professional armies ever developed. To succeed, our military and naval forces, including our air force, must possess technical excellence found in professional organizations. While it may be possible later on, when our basic training has been completed, to divert some of our time and energy to civilian organizations such as is proposed in this bill, now is not the time to divert them. The Army does not have the instructors and other necessary individuals to carry on the training of civilians provided for in this bill, nor should it be called upon to provide the administrative personnel and equipment needed for the same purpose. The powers and duties enumerated in the Bill are rather loosely defined. The provisions relating to the installation of bomb racks, machine guns and such materiel in private airplanes appear to be impractical. . .¹⁸

Thus, all these proposals to establish a formal civilian air reserve came to naught, in view of the Army's stand that the best means of establishing a strong air defense was to conserve all

16. Secretary of War to A. J. May, Aug. 8, 1941, in AG 032 N.

17. J. 1554, H.R. 4758, H.R. 4746, H.R. 4604.

18. Secretary of War to A. J. May, Aug. 8, 1941, in AG 580 (5-14-41).

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facilities and personnel for the chief use of the Air Corps and its civil contract schools in the flying training program of the air arm. From the standpoint of administration, such a civilian reserve organization would have been unwieldy. The tactical training which the measures contemplated would have been so meager as to be valueless. And the proposal to arm private aircraft in an effort to convert them into warplanes displayed a discouraging unawareness of advances in tactical and materiel factors.

2. Proposed Legislation for Glider Pilot Training

The first congressional proposals for the use of gliders in the emergency defense program were made in January 1941, just a few months before the Germans made their most spectacular use of the glider in the conquest of Crete. As early as 1939, however, recommendations had been made for a glider pilot training program. In February of that year it was reported that the Soaring Society of America was seeking government aid for the training of glider pilots, and that its president, Richard C. du Pont, was to confer with members

of Congress on the possibilities.¹⁹ In July 1940 a New York Times editorial urged the adoption of glider training as a basis for military pilot training. At least, the writer claimed, such training could play "an important supplementary role in primary instruction," particularly in the meteorological knowledge it would impart.²⁰ Glider experts were asserting the same thing. Lewin E. Barringer, in a newspaper interview, introduced the further argument that preliminary glider training would save the government money and would lead to a lower accident rate in power-pilot training. He contended that "Gliding has a definite place in training fliers."²¹

On January 10, 1941, Senator Patrick A. McCarran of Nevada introduced a bill, S. 290, "to establish a Civilian Glider Pilot Training Division in the Civil Aeronautics Administration, and for other purposes."²² Shortly thereafter, Representative John M. Costello of California introduced H.R. 2661, a bill to provide for

19. New York Times, Feb. 12, 1939. The project included a formal request to the technical development section of the CAA for the purchase of several gliders and for the subsidization by the CAA of the training of 100 glider pilots. A recommendation was also to be made to Army officials to buy gliders for use in the training school at Randolph Field, Texas. Ibid. In December 1939 Bernard M. Baruch submitted to Assistant Secretary of War Louis Johnson a report on "The Air Power of the Totalitarian Aggressors and Its Significance for the United States," written by "a man who knows something about the subject." Baruch thought that something ought to be done to get the country more air-minded, and he asked that the report be passed on to the Chief of Staff and the "Chief of the Air Service" for their comments and suggestions. The report cited the methods employed by the Axis powers in building up their air forces, with particular stress being laid on the German gliding activities. Memo for Chief of Staff by Louis Johnson, Assistant Secretary of War, Dec. 13, 1939, in AAG 380-381-381.4 G (War Plans, National Defense, etc.).

20. New York Times, July 7, 1940.

21. Ibid., Aug. 4, 1940.

22. Cong. Rec. 77 Cong. 1 Sess. 90 (Jan. 10, 1941).

the training of civil glider pilots.²³ Costello proposed that the CAA, as part of its civilian pilot training program, include the study of gliders, and he stressed the value of trained glider pilots in any program of aerial defense and offense. He contrasted the neglect of glider training in the United States with the attention given this phase of aviation in Germany, and he claimed that Germany's glider training program had resulted in more than a quarter of a million trained glider pilots, from whom the nucleus of the Luftwaffe was selected.²⁴ In further support of his bill, Costello introduced an article by William L. White, who described the very likely part that German glider troops might play in any attempt at invading England.²⁵

Despite the fact that Costello's bill was buried in the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, another bill—"to establish a civilian glider pilot training division in the Civil Aeronautics Administration"—was soon introduced by Representative Hamilton Fish.²⁶ Fish's bill met the same fate as Costello's, but meanwhile the question had been taken up to a certain extent by publications and individuals who were stressing

23. Ibid., 303 (Jan. 24, 1941).

24. Ibid., Appendix, 230 (Jan. 24, 1941).

25. Ibid., Appendix, 642-4² (Feb. 13, 1941); cf., Daily Cong. Rec., 77 Cong., 2 Sess., Appendix, 1442-44 (April 7, 1942).

26. Cong. Rec., 77 Cong., 1 Sess., 942 (Feb. 12, 1941).

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the military advantages of a glider pilot training program. In the interim, the War Department had been considering the first bill, S. 200, and had apparently come to the conclusion that such training might be of considerable value if given as civilian training, but opposed it as a part of the Air Corps training program. Its value for the training of military pilots would not be "commensurate with the cost involved." But encouragement of glider clubs and civilian glider training would be of "considerable potential value to national defense." Therefore, it was "recommended that the War Department report favorably on subsections . . . which relate to the establishment of Civilian Glider Clubs and the fostering of Civilian Glider Pilot Training."²⁷

Public opinion was being expressed in communications sent by various individuals to Major General George H. Brett, Acting Chief of the Air Corps, urging the War Department to support the bill as a means of bringing low-cost preliminary pilot training to thousands of young men who could not otherwise obtain it.²⁸ An editorial in the New York Times on February 16, 1941, analyzed the pros and cons of the question and urged positive congressional action. It said that "experts in both the Army and Navy maintain that the motorless craft provide a safe and speedy medium in

27. Memo for Assistant Chief of Staff, G-7, by Lt. Col. Muir S. Fairchild, Executive, Long Division, CGMC, Feb. 14, 1941, in AGO 032.

28. Arnold P. Cannon to Maj. Gen. G. H. Brett, Feb. 24, 1941; C. B. Colby (editor of Air Trails) to General Brett (telegram), Feb. 25, 1941; R. W. Griffield to General Brett (telegram), Feb. 28, 1941; Ernest Litz to General Brett, March 17, 1941, in Ibid.

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which to give the student glider a feeling of confidence in the air, a knowledge of basic control mechanisms, and an invaluable groundwork in first-hand knowledge of air currents, thermals and the like." These would be excellent foundations for powered flight training. It was held, too, that gliders "could be provided rapidly and without drain on the resources of metals and power-plant facilities urgently needed for the construction of airplanes."

The reports from the War, Navy, and Commerce departments, however, ultimately opposed passage of S. 290 because of the fear that such training might draw off and divert materials needed for the procurement of planes for the flying training program. Senator McCarran, the sponsor of the bill, was apparently irked by these arguments, and a confidential report to the Secretary of the General Staff from the Budget and Legislative Planning Branch noted part of his speech on the floor of the Senate on May 26, 1941:

Apparently Secretary Stimson does not know what is going on in the War Department, because during the period the War Department had this bill under consideration, that is, from January 30 to April 15, the United States Army Air Corps was very much occupied about troop-carrying gliders and how they should be built. . . . I feel certain that if Secretary Stimson had consulted the Air Corps before making his recommendation to the Chairman of the Commerce Committee, the recommendation would have been different.²⁰

²⁰. Memo for Secretary, General Staff, by Col. A. T. Brown, Chief, Budget and Legislative Planning Branch, May 27, 1941, in AG 452.1 A, Gliders.

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Despite the War Department's official recommendation against the passage of this bill, it is evident that the Air Corps was giving the problem serious consideration and that Secretary Stimson knew it. In a confidential memorandum to General Brett on February 25, 1941, General Arnold had directed that a study be made of the possibilities of troop- and cargo-carrying gliders.³⁰ In response to this directive, a memorandum prepared for the Chief of Staff, dated by 28, 1941, with reference to the training of glider pilots stated that the opinion of the Secretary of War on S. 290 had been shared by the Chief of the Air Corps. The latter official considered that glider training would be of doubtful value for power-pilot training. The Navy had found this true. Secretary Stimson's failure to mention troop-carrying gliders in his report on S. 290 could be explained by the fact that the Air Corps project was confidential in nature. The memorandum also stated that gliders were being procured for experimental purposes and that eight pilots had been ordered to glider schools for instruction.³¹

Meanwhile, the battle for Crete had taken place, and the part played by German glider-borne troops in its conquest had received front-page notice as well as editorial comment. On May 28, 1941,

30. Memo for General Brett by General Arnold, Feb. 25, 1941, in *ibid.*
31. Unsigned memo for Chief of Staff, May 28, 1941, in *ibid.*

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the New York Times carried a dispatch to the effect that the House Committee on Naval Affairs had ordered an investigation into the possibilities of using gliders as combat aircraft, and a subcommittee had been instructed to begin a preliminary inquiry.

In a letter to President Roosevelt on June 5, 1941, Edward Stanton Evans of Detroit, a pioneer in the gliding field and founder of the National Glider Association, advocated the teaching of gliding to all pilots as preliminary instruction which would greatly improve their flying ability. He pointed out that the invasion of Crete had demonstrated the usefulness of gliders in the actual field of battle for the transport of armies. "Our Army and Navy seem to overlook this valuable arm to our service. I have always been deeply interested in the subject and I feel it is worthwhile bringing it personally to your attention."³²

Evans' letter was referred to the Department for reply, and in a letter from Robert A. Lovett, Assistant Secretary of War for Air, on June 16, 1941, the Air Corps' feelings about S. 270 and similar bills were set forth:

"Whereas the Air Corps has given encouragement and aid to civil aeronautics in time of peace, the country is now in the midst of an all-out defense program. If we are to create adequate air power, military demands for modern aircraft and competent crews for such aircraft should be a paramount. Civil concerns should not be permitted to impair or diffuse the military effort. From reports the German civilian gliding program has not continued at its previous level."

32. AAG 052 Legislation--General.

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after that country went to war in September 1939. . . . It is believed that to uprove another civil aeronautics venture such as is proposed in S. 290 would serve to encourage the business-as-usual attitude which has been so detrimental to the national defense program.³³

The letter stated that the Air Corps felt that the training of power pilots was of more importance than the training of glider pilots, and while glider pilots would have to take a long course of training before being able to use military planes, the military pilots could easily and quickly be taught to operate towed gliders after they had received their usual pilot training. The theory that Germany had built up a vast reservoir of military pilots as a result of her extensive gliding activities was refuted. The Air Corps program of glider pilot training was explained in general terms, and the opinion was expressed that "there exists in the Air Corps, adequate development, procurement, and training organizations to satisfy its likely glider needs."³⁴

The congressional exponents of glider training went right on introducing legislation to that end. McCarran, despite the failure of his previous bill, on July 15, 1941, introduced another bill, S. 1749, "to promote the national defense and preparedness through the creation of a vast reservoir of potential

33. R. A. Lovett, Assistant Secretary of War for Air, to Edward S. Evans, June 16, 1941, in ibid.

34. Ibid.

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airplane pilots and mechanics, and for other purposes." In this bill he proposed the establishment of a glider division within the National Youth Administration for the purpose of promoting the art of glider soaring in the United States.³⁵

The War Department was asked for its opinion of this measure, and in a letter to Senator Albert D. Thomas, chairman of the Senate Committee on Education and Labor, the Secretary of War expressed the Department's disapproval. It is interesting to note, however, that this time the objections were based on slightly different grounds, namely, that the value of glider training as a preliminary to pilot training was not considered essential enough to warrant the expense and use of materials involved. "The use of gliders for strictly military purposes is of definite interest. But it is believed that training of personnel for such military use should be undertaken by the Army Air Forces, and this is being done."³⁶ A year later, when a revised draft of the bill was again coming before the committee, the War Department reiterated its objections on the same grounds.³⁷

The wide public interest in the German use of glider-borne troops in the Crete campaign and the congressional criticism

35. Cong. Rec., 77 Cong., 1 sess., 6026 (July 15, 1941).

36. H. I. Stimson to Senator E. D. Thomas, n.d., (about July 20-30, 1941), in AAG 032, L-G Aviation.

37. Draft letter, H. I. Stimson to Senator E. D. Thomas (prepared by Lt. Col. Perera, April 28, 1942), in AAG 032 D.

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of the War Department for its "parent lack of interest in the glider as a military weapon called for a reply as to what was being done." This came in a radio address by General Arnold at Ulster, New York, on July 13, 1941, entitled "Speaking for the Army." General Arnold acknowledged that the introduction of gliders had changed the whole scheme of combat, and he stated that the Army had been preparing for their prospective use for more than six months. First attention had been devoted to over-driven planes, but the Army Air Forces had not ignored the glider.³⁸

Even with the dissemination of information on the Army Air Forces glider program, there were still some demands for a civilian glider pilot training bill. In a radio address on March 20, 1942, Representative Fred Briley of Michigan urged the establishment of a Civil glider training program for young people, to sustain their initial interest in aviation and to prepare them to go on to later pilot training in over-driven aircraft. He felt that the Army and Navy should actively support such a project in order to build up a backlog of potential pilots. He cited opinions of well-known Army and Navy pilots to the effect that gliding training would show up deficiencies and eliminate

38. Quoted in Cong. Rec., 77 Cong., 1 Sess., Appendix, 4474-75 (Oct. 6, 1941).

unexitable pilot material and that such training was "an essential to the art of flying."³⁹

Although legislation to provide for a glider training program by the CAI was never enacted into law, the events of the European war, the expression of public opinion in newspapers and magazines, and congressional interest in glider training, all combined to make the Army Air Forces fully conscious of the military possibilities of gliders. On May 27, 1942, the War Department, in connection with its first public recruiting of civilians for the program, announced that the Army Air Forces would train large numbers of glider pilots under an expansion program to be started June 1. Candidates were to receive preliminary training at fifteen CAI schools, with nine additional schools to be utilized for elementary and advanced training.⁴⁰ In an editorial on July 5, 1942, the New York Times caustically commented upon the belated commencement of the program:

At least there is substantial evidence that the glider training course for the Air Corps is under way. . . . even after the Nazis demonstrated at Crete how effectively gliders can be used in an attack, an extraordinary amount of inertia apparently had to be overcome before a programme for a suitable supply of this military weapon. . . .

39. Daily Cong. Rec., 77 Cong., 2 sess., Appendix, 1377-78 (March 30, 1942).

40. New York Times, May 28, 1942.

The Air Corps reaction to the various bills to encourage civilian glider training was one of disapproval. Viewing the glider as a potential military weapon, the air arm began experimentation and training before the German demonstration of the use of gliders in the invasion of Crete. But it was unwilling to let material needed for the production of power-driven aircraft be diverted to glider production for civilian training; only on the grounds of possible worth of glider training as a preliminary to power piloting. As a military weapon the development of a glider echelon and the necessary training to that end should be an Army project.⁴¹

3. Proposals to establish a Division of Aviation Education
Directly related to the training program of the Army Air Forces but originally civil in import was the proposal to establish a Division of Aviation Education in the United States Office of Education. The proposal merits some attention, however, because its advocates held that the promotion of interest in aviation through instruction and practical participation in aeronautical

41. For a detailed study of glider training activities carried on by the Army Air Forces, see The Glider Pilot Training Program, 1941-1943, prepared by the Training Section, Administrative History Branch, ATIBI.

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ctivities in secondary schools was related to the national defense program.

At the annual convention of the National Aeronautic Association in St. Louis in January 1939, concern was expressed at the American failure to match Germany's air training for youth. Expansion of the military and civilian aviation programs was urged, and a three-point program for aviation education was submitted by William L. Nygart, secretary of the association. He proposed: (1) "establishment of courses in aviation in high schools"; (2) "development of train & instructors for those schools"; (3) "establishment of a balanced, well-rounded program which would take boys and girls . . . at the age of 10 and instruct them in aviation up to the age of 18, when they would be eligible for the more advanced government courses." The resolution finally adopted by the convention urged the "introduction of some form of aviation education or activity in every junior high school and college in the United States, and the establishment of a section of aviation in the Federal Office of Education."⁴²

In December 1939 the attention of the War Department was called to the specific programs of the totalitarian countries

42. New York Times, Jan. 16, 17, 1939.

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involving the military training of youth groups, with particular emphasis upon aviation, and it was urged that the United States adopt some modification of the same plan in order to make American youth air-minded. Such a program, it was pointed out, would greatly enhance the future of civil aviation as well as provide a pool of potential military pilots. The immediate reorganization of the air arm of the United States on a mass basis was urged, with the building up of a country-wide organization to mobilize American youth for air sport. The part of the government should be to arrange for speedy training of several thousand flying teachers. Specifically, Congress should be requested to appropriate \$100,000,000 to further air sport in the interest of national defense; and all Americans between the ages of eighteen and twenty-two should participate in a three-month flying course to be given free by the national government, in turn obligating themselves to serve in the air forces in the event of national emergency. The results of such a program, it was stated, would be development of a tremendous enthusiasm for air sport on the part of American youth; the provision of a vast pool of energies and talents to which the Army and Navy could turn in the moment of danger; confidence of American youth in the air as great as that on the highways; and acceleration of air traffic with consequent stimulation of the aircraft industry.⁴³

43. "The Air Power of the Totalitarian Aggressors and Its Significance for the United States," (author unknown, n.d., but about December 1930), 11, 12, in AG 380-381-381.4 C (War Plans, National Defense, etc).

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Prior to 1940 the Office of Education in the Federal Security Agency had for some time been engaged in the promotion of aviation education through its Vocational Educational Division, which maintained relations with public schools throughout the country. With the increasingly active general interest in aviation, however, it was felt that the creation of a special division within the Office of Education specifically to handle this work might be desirable. On May 5, 1940, Senator McCarran introduced S. 4521 to establish such a division.⁴⁴ Its general purpose should be to "conduct research and make studies and investigations with respect to means and methods of carrying on education in aviation in the United States." This should be accomplished through cooperation with public educational institutions in providing plans and material for instruction in aerodynamics, the theory of flight, the airplane and its engine, meteorology, navigation, and other related subjects in aviation.⁴⁵ The Department's opposition to the proposed legislation was based on the contention that "general dissemination oferonautical educational information" was of questionable value.⁴⁶

44. Cong. Rec., 76 Cong., 3 Sess., 6768 (May 21, 1940).

45. Ibid., 7273-74 (May 31, 1940).

46. Memo for Chief of Staff by Brig. Gen. T. C. Andrews, June 5, 1940, in AAG 072.1.

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In response to a request from Representative William V. Larrabee, chairman of the House Committee on Education, asking for his views on a similar bill, H.R. 9074, General Arnold stated that he felt an expression of his views would be inappropriate. Such a division's relationship to the Air Corps would be limited to representation on the Advisory Committee which would be set up under the terms of the bill. He did point out, however, that the War Department study of the bill "shows the effect of its enactment to be of secondary consideration in the national defense, and that the Bureau of the Budget reports that it is not in accordance with the policy of the President." Neither of the bills got beyond committee.

In May 1942 Representative Randolph introduced H.R. 7069, a bill with similar purposes and provisions.⁴⁷ He cited the training being given in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, high schools as "a good example of what could be accomplished by an intensive program of aviation education. Termination of aerodynamics on the secondary level would provide "a great class of ready-made candidates for military flying" and would lay "the groundwork for

47. General Arnold to W. V. Larrabee, July 25, 1940, in AGO 032 N.

48. Daily Cong. Rec., 77 Cong., 2 Sess., 4214 (May 11, 1942).

world leadership in a vast post-war industry which gives every prospect of dominating our commerce, economics, and world-wide politics."⁴⁹ Again, on September 8, 1942, in a radio address on the "National Radio Forum," Pendleton urged the creation of a Division of Aviation Education to facilitate remedying the "danger to short-term of both pilots and mechanics."⁵⁰

This bill, like its predecessors, got no further than committee, but its fate apparently did not discourage proponents of similar legislation. As late as January 7, 1947, at the beginning of the Seventy-eighth Congress, Senator McCarran once again tried to obtain passage of a bill, S. 25, with similar purposes.⁵¹ This time the bill did not receive the outright disapproval of the War Department, but doubt was expressed as to whether its purposes could be carried out without interfering with the immediate demands of the training program of the Army Air Forces. It was stated that

Additional instruction materials and instructor personnel are essential to the successful prosecution of the Air Forces training program. Training courses conducted by the aircraft industry for Army Air Forces personnel are an integral part of the training program for mechanics and technicians. It is important that no equipment or personnel be diverted from this primary effort and that the instruction facilities of the aircraft industry be devoted entirely to training military and civilian aircraft technicians.⁵²

49. Pittsburgh Press, Sept. 8, 1942, quoted in ibid., Appendix, 3465 (Sept. 8, 1942).

50. Daily Cong. Rec., Appendix 341-14 (Sept. 14, 1942).

51. Ibid., 78 Cong., 1 Sess., 33 (Jan. 7, 1943).

52. Draft letter, Secretary of War to Senator D. Thomas (prepared by Maj. A. M. Hanson, Jan. 21, 1943), in AG 037.1 Congress.

Inasmuch as one of the functions proposed to be carried out by such a Division of Aviation Education would be "the encouragement of active cooperation between educational institutions and the aviation industry to foster courses in aviation education," the expression of such doubts is understandable. The War Department, however, did stress its desire "to contribute in every way possible to the furtherance of aviation education subject to the reservations" contained in the letter of comment.⁵³ Once again the bill died in committee.

4. Proposals to Establish an Aviation Academy

With the increased burden of training more and more men for the Army Air Forces, from time to time legislative proposals were made to help alleviate the problem by the creation of "aviation academies," schools for the air forces similar to the Military Academy at West Point and the Naval Academy at Annapolis. The proponents of such legislation felt that the only real answer to the training problem lay in the creation of such schools which would take the students from the very beginning and carry them right through the entire training at one school.

As early as 1917 a bill was introduced into the House of Representatives which had, among other provisions, a section

⁵³. Ibid.

authorizing the establishment of one or more air academies for the training of cadets in the science of military and naval aeronautics and making such academies equal with the Military Academy and the Naval Academy in that graduates would become regular officers in the military and naval air arms.⁵⁴

At the beginning of 1930 Representative John L. Houston of Kansas introduced H.R. 4751, to provide for the establishment of a United States Aeronautical Academy in Sedgewick County,⁵⁵

Misses.⁵⁶ Although the proposed academy was to instruct officers and cadets in aeronautical science in preparation for service with the Army Air Corps, the Secretary of War might also accept qualified naval officers and cadets detailed to the Academy by the President. The courses of instruction were to "be supplementary, or similar, or both, to the courses offered at the United States Military Academy."⁵⁷ The War Department comment on the bill was succinct. The Plans Section advised the Chief of the Air Corps that the bill "should be opposed by the War Department because there is no need for another Air Corps Training Center."⁵⁸

Meanwhile another type of aviation school had been proposed. On March 8, 1930, Senator Lister Hill of Alabama had introduced

54. H.R. 7925 (in the House of Representatives, July 28, 1910), 66 Cong.

55. Cong. Rec., 76 Cong., 1 Sess., 2242 (March 3, 1939).

56. H.R. 4751 (in the House of Representatives, March 3, 1930), 76 Cong., 1 Sess.

57. H. R. [Lt. Col. June Abbott], Plans Section, CGAC, to Chief of Air Corps, March 10, 1939, in AFHQ files.

S. 1738, a bill to authorize "the establishment and operation of a military aircraft engineering center to determine production costs of military aircraft, and for other purposes."⁵⁸ Among these "other purposes" was the creation of a military aeronautical school in the vicinity of the proposed engineering center. The school should train military pilots and aviation mechanics under supervision of the War Department. Requirements for pilots trained at the school should be at least as high as those necessary for a commercial pilot's certificate, and "world mechanics" courses should be a prerequisite for flight training.⁵⁹ War Department opposition to this phase of the bill was based on the fact that the expansion program contended for went beyond the existing facilities for Air Corps training, and that the proposed school could not be established in time to be of any value during the expansion program anyway, nor was it likely that it could be needed after completion of the expansion program.⁶⁰ The bill never got beyond the Committee on Military Affairs. Two years later, in 1941, S. 82⁶¹ was introduced, the content of which was identical to the bill introduced by Senator Hill.⁶² In

58. Cong. Rec., 76 Cong., 1 sess., 3410 (March 8, 1939).

59. S. 1738 (in the Senate, March 8, 1939), 76 Cong., 1 sess.

60. Draft letter, Secretary of War to Senator Morris Sheppard (prepared by E. H. S. [Capt. E. H. Snodgrass]), March 24, 1939, in AAG 032 L.

61. Cong. Rec., 77 Cong., 1 sess., 1032 (Feb. 17, 1941).

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recommending unfavorable consideration, the Secretary of War presented the same objections offered to the earlier measure.⁶²

Later in 1941 a House bill, H.R. 5745, was introduced "to provide for the establishment and operation of an aviation academy for training of persons for service as commissioned officers in the aviation branches of the military and naval forces," and a few days later an identical bill, S. 1647, was introduced in the Senate.⁶³ In commenting unfavorably on the latter bill, the War Department pointed out that while the bill provided that such an academy would train students to fit them for service with both the military and naval forces, in the rank of commissioned officers, actually the training of naval and military aviators necessarily differs. It was believed unlikely that one course of training could be adapted to fit both categories without entailing a good deal of wasted time on the students' part. "The proposed bill does not provide for any numerical limitation between student naval aviators and student military aviators nor does it stipulate to what extent the proposed academy would devote its teaching to primarily naval aviation or primarily military aviation matters." It was further pointed out that the number of graduates from such an academy would fall far short of the needs of the Army and Navy for aviation officers, and it

62. Secretary of War to Senator R. R. Reynolds, April 17, 1941, in AAC 032 N.

63. Cong. Rec., 77 Cong., 1 sess., 7613 (Oct. 2, 1941), 7614 (Oct. 6, 1941).

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was concluded that the existing plan of training Army aviators at Air Corps training centers was adequate with no need for duplicating the program by creating an additional aviation academy.⁶⁴

Halfway through 1942, when the United States had been at war for about six months and the need for aircraft personnel was becoming more urgent every day, Senator Tom Stewart of Tennessee introduced S. 2507 to establish both a "Military Aviation Academy" and a Naval Aviation Academy. Senator Stewart argued that these were needed to speed up the training of cadets. He considered that combat training in the academies would be especially valuable.⁶⁵ The Secretary of War, however, held that a military air academy was not needed under the Air Force training program and would tax facilities and personnel badly needed for the program already in operation. Also, the institution of aviation training at Post-Flight should solve the special problem. However, "Post-war requirements and experience gained from methods now in use will dictate the advisability of establishing a separate aviation

64. Secretary of War to Senator A. R. Reynolds (prepared by Lt. Col. G. E. Jerritt), Dec. 29, 1941, in AF 03P 1.

65. Daily Com. Rec., 77 Cong., 2 Sess., 5505 (June 18, 1942).

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academy for training addition 1 personnel for the Regular Army Air Corps.⁶⁶ Early in 1943 Senator Stewart introduced a bill which was identical to his measure of the preceding year.⁶⁷ The War Department's opposition was based on the same arguments as those set forth previously.⁶⁸

As late as September 1943 the idea of an aviation academy was still being given congressional consideration in some quarters. H.R. 3296, a bill to create a Department of Air Defense, provided among other things for the creation of a United States aviation academy to train personnel who would be commissioned as officers.

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66. Secretary of War to Senator R. R. Reynolds, Aug. 7, 1942, in AG 353 (R-20-42). Although Stewart's bill died in committee, one of his home-state newspapers, the Seattle Commercial Appeal, took vigorous issue with this routine treatment and urged emergency consideration of the measure. It suggested that the academies, instead of being patterned as Army and Navy assistance arms, should be established in their own right as air academies, similar in status to the institutions at West Point and Annapolis. "In our judgment the immediate years will bring aviation to supremacy with the Army and Navy as auxiliaries. We believe recent land and sea battles have borne that out. . . . Yet here we are still struggling to build a two-ocean navy and squandering billions of dollars on iron-dollars that should be going into an air fleet." Quoted in Daily Cong. Rec., 77 Cong., 2 sess., Appendix, 2616 (June 25, 1942).
67. Ibid., 78 Cong., 1 sess., 1340 (Feb. 26, 1943).
68. Secretary of War to Senator R. R. Reynolds, March 29, 1943, in AG 353 (2-27-43).

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in a United States air force. Such an academy could be administered and arrangements to it made in conformance with rules similar to those governing the Naval Academy. The bill remained unreported from the Committee on Expenditures in Executive Departments to which it had been referred.⁶⁹


In connection with proposals to establish aviation academies, it is interesting to note the introduction, in May 1940, of two bills to authorize appropriations to establish a national airport and aviation school at Indianapolis for training aviators to become aviators in the Army and Navy. Representative Lidlow introduced the House bill (H.R. 9671) and Senator Fulton the Senate bill (S. 4078).⁷⁰ Both bills provided that upon completion of the prescribed courses the students would be eligible for admission into the "Regular Aviation Corps."⁷¹ The actual wording of the bills, both of which were introduced by request, was such that their exact intent could not be ascertained. The Senate bill, upon being reported from committee, was indefinitely postponed,⁷² and the House bill was never discharged from committee. The Plans Division recommended that the Air Corps not comment on the proposal until the War Department specifically requested it.⁷³

69. Daily Cong. Rec., 76 Cong., 1 Sess., 271 (Sept. 17, 1940).

70. Cong. Rec., 76 Cong., 3 Sess., 5458 (May 2, 1940), 7255 (May 31, 1940).

71. S. 4078 (in the Senate, May 31, 1940), 76 Cong., 3 Sess.

72. Cong. Rec., 76 Cong., 3 Sess., 9465-66 (June 22, 1940).

73. R.E. Captain Moore, Plans Division, OSAC, to Chief, Plans Division, May 8, 1940, in AG 035. 

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It may be expected that certain of the measures treated in this chapter will continue to be introduced, both during the war and after. For example, proposals to establish aviation academies are often linked with bills calling for a separate air force or a single department of national defense.⁷⁴ Also, after the war, in line with the tremendous aviation expansion anticipated, a far-reaching system of aviation education to instill air-mindedness in American youth may be adopted. But during the period of national defense preparation and after war came such proposals as those discussed here constituted a possible strain on the facilities and personnel of the Air Force's training program. Therefore, they were opposed by the air arm and by a majority of the legislators.

⁷⁴. See "Digest of Legislative Proposals for a Department of Aviation and/or Department of National Defense," prepared in Legislative History Section, Administrative History Branch, A.I.H.

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Chapter V

CONCLUSION

The period 1939-1943 inaugurated a revolution destined before it runs out to overturn many comfortably accepted ways of life. Those most immediately apparent, of course, are in the arts and sciences of war-making, particularly in the employment of aviation not only as a spearhead and support for the traditional arms, but also as a powerful striking force in its own right. The role of air power, it is true, had been forecast, and its potential led inspired fear in the minds of British and French statesmen at the time of the Munich crisis. But without a clearer demonstration than had then been furnished, its terrific impact in actual conflict had been only dimly realized. It is to the credit, then, of the President, the American Congress, and the War Department that the legislative process was able to furnish a sufficiently flexible basis of authorization to permit the construction of an aerial combat arm second to none. Perhaps it is not to their credit that so little, relatively speaking, had been done in advance. The bantering influence of an easy-going defense psychology furnishes the explanation.

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The basic planning for Air Corps expansion was first reflected in the legislative realm in the President's message to Congress on January 12, 1939. His program embodied the Air Corps decision to utilize civilian agencies to facilitate Air Corps pilot training as well as to authorize training of Army personnel in other aviation facilities. In addition, the President called for a civilian pilot training program to create a reservoir of partially trained pilots upon which the armed services could draw in time of crisis. Within less than six months the funding authorizations for the expansion program were enacted into law.

Although first consideration was given to pilot training, with expansion of Air Corps facilities mainly depended upon to meet requirements for aviation mechanics and technicians, under the provisions of Public Law Number 18 of 1939/Army personnel could be given technical training by civilian agencies. Also, in 1940 the Civilian Pilot Training Act was amended to provide for the training by the CAA of civilian aviation mechanics and technicians. The Air Corps tried to get the bill amended so that only enlisted reservists would be trained under its provisions. Congress did not make the requested changes, but through Executive Order 8974 the War Department had the power to control the program.

The constant pressure of the expansion program necessitated

securing ever greater numbers of candidates for military flying training. This inevitably kept falling away from ideal standards, but the air arm sought to retain as many of them as possible. Several legislative steps were taken to broaden the procurement base to include all possible applicants. The aviation cadre ensure was designed to equalize the status of Army, Navy, and Marine Corps flying cadets so that the Army's procurement program would not continue working under a disadvantage. The aviation student bill sought to open the way for flying training of large numbers of enlisted men who could not meet the high standards for commissioning. When age, mental, and educational requirements for aviation cadets were relaxed in the continuous effort to set procurement goals, the flight officer bill effected a compromise on the commissioning policy.

The military air arm was consistently unwilling to permit the diversion of urgently needed materiel, manufacturing facilities, training agencies, and personnel to civilian training programs which were considered of doubtful value to the Army's expansion program. This was the attitude, more so in the case of the bill to create a reserve of civilian mechanics. Also, in the proposals for civilian glider training, the Air Corps was perfectly willing to acknowledge the possible military value of

the glider; but as it had not been established that glider flying was of value as a preliminary to power-pilot training, the Air Corps held that the glider project should be military rather than a civilian consideration. The same basic idea governed the Air Arm's attitude toward creation of a civil air service and the establishment of a Division of Aviation Education to sponsor a nation-wide system of aeronautical education on the secondary school level. The Air Corps comment on one of the civilian glider pilot training bills is worth repeating, as it neatly expresses the rather consistent policies on civil aviation bills only incidentally related to the war effort:

Whereas the Air Corps has given encouragement and aid to civil corporations in time of peace, this country is not in the midst of an all-out defense program. If we are to create adequate air power, military demands for powered aircraft and convertable air or "air such aircraft should be paramount. Civil corporations should not be permitted to I air or distract the military effort. . . . It is believed that to an造e another civil aeronautics venture such as is proposed in H. R. 270 would prove to undermine the business-as-usual attitude which has been so detrimental to the national defense program.¹

In the legislative process for the bills just considered in this study, relationships between the Air Corps and the War Department General Staff were apparently harmonious. Although minor changes might be made during general staff consideration

1. R. A. Lovett, Assistant Secretary of War for Air, to Edward S. Evans, June 16, 1941, in WFO SP: Legislation-General.

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of draft measures prepared in the Air Arm, or bills referred by the War Department to the Air Corps for comment, the Air Corps attitude was invariably identical as the War Department opinion.

Although the President's program of June 12, 1938 received widespread newspaper comment, most of the other proposals received little or no significant editorial notice in the press, with the exception of the New York Times. Proposals for glider training, however, were mentioned in many papers, because of the spectacular German use of the glider as a military weapon. A sampling of editorial columns of outstanding newspapers in 11 sections of the United States reveals a paucity of comment on other bills, apparently reflecting lack of interest in such important measures as those for military flight training.

In 1937 the various service contributions to the enactment of Air Corps legislation were working largely in a vacuum. They had, of course, some record of experience and certain basic policies to guide them. But the character and scope of the demands which could be proposed by them were so utterly beyond their immediate comprehension that their lack of authoritative current information and their failure to make definite preliminary plans to meet the exigencies of war sometimes caused indecision, duplication of effort, and waste of valuable time on anomalies. These

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shortcomings, especially in the early period, are understandable. After war in Europe began, the legislative body rapidly became better informed on the nature of the general problem. Both Congress and War Department officials usually put first things first. Visionary ideas were to be treated with less serious deliberation and practical problems with more dispatch, though not always with the necessary forethought to prevent the need for later patchwork. Generally the legislation passed was of sufficient flexibility to allow the requisite administrative modifications. This last factor is especially important. It is obvious that, although Congress and the War Department did not always see eye to eye, the legislators usually held the competence of the military men in high enough regard to accept their suggestions on technical matters and to permit them a relatively free hand in the execution of basic national defense policies. Preserving the prerogatives of investigation, criticism, and speaking its mind on grand strategy, Congress realized that the using agency, the War Department, was best able to develop types, tactics, and techniques.

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TO DO J.V.

Official Publications

may:

Top Regulations

including:

Congressional Record. 76 Congress, 1 Session-77 Congress, 1 Session.
January 7, 1972-July 7, 1972.

Daily Congressional Record. 77 Congress, 1 Session-77 Congress,
1 Session. January 7, 1972-July 7, 1972.

use of Representatives:

Bills
Speaker's
Reports

Senate:

Bills
Speaker's
Reports

United States Code. 1971 Edition.

United States Statutes at Large.

The criteria listed below are used in the selection of sources for the study. They are guidelines for the use of congressional action. The bills and reports also frequently indicate the range for the initiation of legislative proposals and conflict with existing congressional actions. The actual record of debate in the congressional debates contributes greatly to knowledge of the development of bills. In some instances, there is a number of bills, for the bill record is virtually the only official record. Section 103, Issues were raised, in the course of business or further action, which was done but did not appear in the bill or record.

Central Files

Army Air Forces:

000	miscellaneous
001	bit for flying date
002	revision
003	revision--central
004	
005	
006	
007	
008	
009	
010	Congress
011	militia
012	militia--militia
013.00	militia--militia
014.01	Training
015.0	C.W. Training--no. 20
016.0	Training, Miscellaneous
017.00	Training in Aviation
018.0	Militia Training
019.00	Army Tanks, Third Defense, Waco
020.0	children

These Army Air Forces Central Files contain some of the original or distilled materials of value for this study. In other files
are printed references. The books contain routine and record
writings, letters, messages, etc., dealing with details of the
missions for Army Air Forces or War Department action in World War
II, and for training, service, or commanding personnel
of the Service during the war. In addition to the usual five main
subject areas in this set of files, the files contain similar files dealing
with other types of legislation.

Adjutant (Adjutant General):

001 (11-1-40), No. 1, sec. 1
001.00--list, (11-1-40)
001.00 Flying Cadets (11-1-41)
002 (11-1-41)
003 (11-1-41)
004 (11-1-41)

The Adjutant General Central Files were used for materials
not found in the Army Air Forces Central Files. They contain
material similar to those described above.

AIR Historical Division

Miscellaneous Files and Correspondence.

The principal file material housed in the Historical Division, Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence, of use for this study is to be found in the Archives Section. Especially useful were the files of the Plans Division, Office of the Chief of the Air Corps. Although much of this material is duplicated in the Army Air Forces Central Files, some of it was not found in any other depository.

Special Studies:

The Glider Pilot Training Program, 1941-1943.

Army Air Forces Historical Studies: No. 1. September 1943.

This detailed study, prepared by the Training Section, Administrative History Branch, Historical Division, treats generally some of the legislative proposals for a glider pilot training program, although its chief emphasis is upon the actual conduct of the training.

"Digest of Legislative Proposals for a Department of Aviation and/or Department of National Defense." Typed study in files of Administrative History Branch.

This digest, prepared by the Legislative History Section, Administrative History Branch, Historical Division, in the winter of 1943-1944, is a detailed list and analysis of congressional bills to create a separate air force or a Department of National Defense.

Initial Selection of Candidates for Pilot, Bomber, and Navigator Training. Army Air Forces Historical Studies: No. 2 November 1943.

This study, prepared by the Personnel Section, Administrative History Branch, Historical Division, traces the development of selection and classification procedures from 1917 to the summer of 1943, with particular attention given to the Aviation Cadet Qualifying Examination.

Newspapers

Argus-Journal. January 1830-June 1830.

Chicago Tribune. April 1837, July 1847.

Denver Post. July 1852.

New Orleans Times-Picayune. January 1830-April 1831, February 1841,
June 1841.

New York Times. January 1830-July 1843.

St. Louis Post-Dispatch. January 1830-June 1831, May 1841.

San Francisco Chronicle. January 1830-June 1831, May 1841.

The above newspapers were sought for expression of opinion
on the major bills treated in the study. The New York Times
was useful both for editorial opinion and factual information.

APPENDIX 1

Sections of Public Law Number 18, April 5, 1929, Pertaining to Training
(83 Stat. 555)

S. C. 2. When the facilities of the Army for instruction and training in aviation are deemed by the Secretary of War to be insufficient in any, and in such regulations as he may prescribe, and without reference to any limitation contained in section 177a of the National Defense Act, as amended (10 U.S.C. 555), detail personnel of the Regular Army as said personnel at any technical, vocational, or other educational institution, or as students, observers, or inventigators at such industrial plants or other places as shall be best suited to enable such personnel to acquire knowledge of or experience in the specialties incident to aviation in which the training of such personnel is essential: Provided, That no expense shall be incurred by the United States in addition to the authorized allowances of the personnel so detailed except for the cost of tuition at such educational institutions, and the cost of maintenance and necessary expenses to may be detailed as supervisors or instructors and of the equipment assigned to them for their official uses: Provided further, That the tuition for the personnel for the period of their detail may be paid from any fund which may hereafter be made available for the procurement branches.

S. C. 3. The Secretary of War, in his discretion, and under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe, is authorized to enroll as students at the Air Corps Training Center, for the pursuit of such course of instruction as may be prescribed therefor, such civilians, upon their own applications, as may be selected from the instructional staffs of the civilian flying schools which have been accredited by the War Department for the education, experience, and training of personnel of the military establishment: Provided, That except for the furnishing of such supplies, material, or equipment as may be necessary for training purposes, the training of such student shall be without cost to the United States: Provided further, That in case of injury to or sickness of such students, hospital or medical treatment may be given in Government hospitals, but shall be without charge to the United States other than for services of medical department personnel and the use of hospital equipment, not including medicines or supplies: And provided further, That the United States shall be under no obligation in respect to payment of compensation, compensation, or otherwise to the service of any such student who dies of disease or injury while undergoing such training, nor to any such student in the event of personal injury sustained by him.

S. C. 4. The Secretary of War is hereby authorized, in his discretion and under rules, regulations, and limitations to be prescribed by him, to lend to accredited civilian aviation schools, one or more of which shall be selected by the Civil Aviation Authority for the training of any negro air pilot, at which personnel of the Military establishment are pursuing a course of education and training pursuant to detail thereto under contract or lease of the War Department, out of aircraft, aircraft parts, pharmaceutical equipment and accessories for the Air Corps, or land and belongings to the Government, such articles as may appear to be required for instruction, training, and maintenance purposes.

APPENDIX 2

Civilian Pilot Training Act of 1939
(53 Stat. 855)

Be it enacted . . . That this Act may be cited as the "Civilian Pilot Training Act of 1939."

"C. 2. The Civil Aeronautics Authority is authorized, with the limits of available appropriations made by the Congress, to train civilian pilots or to conduct programs for such training, including studies and researches so to the most practicable suffic tines for aircraft pilots. Such training or programs shall be conducted pursuant to such regulations as such Authority may from time to time prescribe, including regulations requiring students participating therein to maintain appropriate insurance and to pay such laboratory or other fees for ground-school training, not exceeding \$1 per student, as the Authority may deem necessary or desirable. Provided, That in the administration of this Act, none of the benefits of training or programs shall be denied on account of race, creed, or color. Such training or programs may be carried out either through the use of the facilities and personnel of the Authority . . . by contract with educational institutions or other persons ("as defined in section 1 (27) of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1934).

"C. 3. At least 50 per centum of the students selected for training under this Authority shall be selected from applicants other than college students.

"C. 4. The Authority is authorized to lease or acquire leases of such real property, and to purchase, lease, exchange, or receive leases of such personal property, as may be necessary or desirable for carrying out the provisions of this Act.

"C. 5. For the purpose of carrying out its functions under this Act, the Authority is authorized to exercise all powers conferred upon it by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 and to appoint and fix the compensation of experienced instructors, firmans, medical and other professional examiners and experts in training or research without regard to the provisions of other laws applicable to the employment and compensation of officers and employees of the United States. The provision of section 270 of the revised Statute shall not apply to contracts with educational institutions and other persons for the use of aircraft or other facilities or for the performance of services authorized by section 2 of this Act.

"C. 6. Any executive department or independent establishment is hereby authorized to cooperate with the Authority in carrying out the purposes of this Act, and for such purpose may lend or transfer to the Authority, by contract or otherwise, or if so requested by the Authority, land to educational institutions or other persons co-operating with the Authority in the conduct of any civil training or program, civilian officials, experts, or employees, aircraft and other property or equipment, or lands or buildings under its control and in excess of its own requirements.

SEC. 7. There is hereby authorized to be expended the sum of \$,675,000 for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this Act during the fiscal years 1970 and 1971 and not to exceed the sum of \$7,500,000 during each subsequent fiscal year. This Act shall expire on July 1, 1971, unless counteracted, renewed, or other obligations created by this Act shall remain in effect prior to such date: provided, that no person shall receive training under the provisions of this Act.

(Approved June 27, 1970)

AMENDMENT 5

Amendment of Civilian Pilot Training Act of 1942 (56 Stat. 961)

Be it enacted . . . that the first sentence of section 7 of the Civilian Pilot Training Act of 1942 is amended to read as follows: "The Civilian Interagency Authority is authorized, within the limits of available resources made by the Congress, to train civilian pilots and technicians and mechanics or to contract therefor for such training, including staff, and recommends to the Joint Chiefs the qualifications for aircraft instructors and controllers."

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Activity Report (in part, etc.)

In it enacted . . . "that the right of revolution set forth in the
covenant of the said charter be made available in the new Constitution,
after this, in substitution for the right of revolt granted, "vested by
the Act now passed July 17, 1790, entitled "An Act vesting the Right of
Revolution of the Colony for a Regt. of Militia in the State of New
Hampshire or New Hampshire being in the aggregate to
be reckoned among the militia of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts."

The Ministry of Education has issued a circular letter dated 10th January 1961, establishing and re-arranging the system schools for the Central Board of Secondary Education, Sri Lanka.

7 C. 12 " : Back side of my writing case which is 20 x 22 cm.
This will include extra room for stationery, etc. etc. The
writing case is still in vogue. In addition, I may add some
for persistence of I may say at all, will be grateful to have,
as I have no writing, school case. A considerable sum of money
for a leather, stitching, and an instant of your most esteemed

exterior outlet will be installed to provide temporary access to existing underground piping, tanks, wells, under rail road tracks

presently "in my possession, ready to be exhibited" at the
first fair day at the "lecture" which he intended to exhibit it, or
not in time for the fair, he could not be expected to let it go,
but if it is sold by him, all the money for it will go to the
present owner, and when I have "in possession" of him for the

"3. G. Variation will be in the amount of \$10,000, the variation on which will be paid by the Government. Upon death or disablement of one of the tenants, the other surviving tenant will have the option of buying the interest of the deceased tenant at fair value.

"3. G. Section 2 of the Act of June 16, 1928 (c. 2d, 194), shall apply, in so far as it may be necessary.

"3. G. In view of the fact that no file record has been kept of those officers who have been released from active duty, it is further recommended that all officers, both men and women, for whom one year's pay will be paid in the first year of active service, twice such officers, and if re-entered for active duty annually thereafter, the amount to be paid shall be sufficient to cover their services as determined by the secretary of the army in his discretion. It is recommended that the amount of pay for each active service, be increased by twenty-five percent in addition to any increase, or reduction, made after such officer may again be entitled to receive."

"3. G. All parts of this interpretation will be in conflict with the provisions of file 1st January 1941.

"3. G. This interpretation will be cited in the "Army Standard Texts." (Approved June 3, 1941)

AL - DDX 6

Aviation Student Act (G.Sec. 51)

In it appears . . . that the Secretary of War be, and he is hereby authorized, before such regulations as may be made, to call for a full or enlisted force of the Regular Army and other components of the Army of the United States in active Federal service for training at institution as aviation students, in their respective trades, in such numbers and schools as he shall direct; provided, That enlisted men so detailed as aviation students who are undergoing courses of instruction which require them to participate regularly and frequently in aerial flights shall be issued Government life insurance in the amount of \$10,000 under the National Service Life Insurance Act of 1930 (Public Law 601, title VI, part i), except that the premiums shall be paid by the Government during the period such enlisted men are undergoing training and instruction, and upon completion of training and instruction as aviation students they shall have the option of continuing such policies at their own expense;

And provided further, That nothing herein shall be construed as rendering or otherwise affecting existing statutory authorizations for the recruitment of training of aviation students or aviation cadets.

(Approved June 3, 1941).

Mr. DIA C

Section 52 Section 5 of Public Law 18 of 1923 (53 Stat. 677)

"Be it enacted . . . That section 5 of the Act of April 3, 1920
(Ch. L. 865), is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Section 5. When the facilities of the Army for instruction and
training in aviation are directed by the Secretary of War to be insufficient
for the use, upon such royal terms as he may prescribe, without
a fee, to pay it to him maintained in section 1774 of the original
U.S. Code, is intended (in U. S. Stat.), detail personnel of the Army
of the United States, or students of any technical, professional, or
other educational institution, or as agents, on behalf of investors
or contractors, or individuals, or other persons who will be sent
out to help and required to acquire a knowledge of avia-
tion or the facilities offered to aviation in which the training
is offered by the United States in addition to the actual oblique
of the personnel in the account for the cost of tuition at such
technical institutions, and the cost of tuition for the necessary
expenses of travel, or living expenses of the personnel of the
United States, or their dependents, or their official wives, provided further,
that the tuition fees of the agents or students the price of their tuition
shall be paid by the agent or student, and certified up to authority for the
'receipt of same.

(Amended July 2, 1923)

LOV. 1921 7

United States Military Aviation Safety Flight Training Act (66 Stat. 10)

Be it enacted . . . That during such time as events of the United States Military Academy are undergoing flight training involving participation in regular and frequent aerial flights they shall be issued at Government expense the necessary aviation clothing and equipment for said training; under the control of such training "head and quarters" of the Military Academy they shall receive the allowances for travel, subsistence, and quarters as are now or may hereafter be provided for Army aviation cadets; and during the course of such training they shall be entitled to the same insurance benefits as are provided by the Act of May 2, 1921 (Public Law 62, Seventy-first Congress), for continuation of the Army detailed as aviation students; provided, that, upon completion of the prescribed training as aviation students, and until temporarily relieved from duty involving participation in regular and frequent aerial flights, the insurance provided shall continue, but the premium shall be deducted from the pay of the individual concerned and paid to the Secretary of War to direct to the Adjutant General of the Army; and when held temporarily relieved from duty involving participation in regular and frequent aerial flights, the insurance may be continued at the option and at the expense of the individual concerned.

AIR FORCE

Flight Officer Act (E.O. Sept. 30).

In it enacted . . . that there is hereby created for the Army Air Force the title of "flight officer". A flight officer shall have the rank, pay, and allowances, now paid for a warrant officer, junior grade, and shall take rank as of the date of enactment. Flight officers shall be entitled to the benefits of all existing laws or regulations covering recruitment, continuance, and the liability to serve in the Army of the United States when called or required to perform active military service of the United States under existing statutes. They shall be entitled to longevity pay as provided for in section 1 of the Act of August 21, 1941 (Public Law 273, Seventy-first Congress). Flight officers (warrant officers, junior grade) so enlisted under this authority shall not be subject to the restrictions as to numbers set forth by section 3 of the Act of August 21, 1941 (Public Law 273, Seventy-first Congress).

(b) 1. The provisions of section 1 of the Army Aviation Act of June 24, 1941, are hereby repealed for the duration of the present war and for six months thereafter except as to any person who has enlisted or who has been appointed or designated prior to the date of enactment of this Act. Persons with valid commissions and recruitments in the Army of the United States, or in the aviation branch of the United States Army Air Corps, and who have been enlisted under the Act of 1941, may remain in civilian credit and may have their enlisted status in the Army of the United States maintained by the Secretary of War or his designee. Flight officers shall be for the time of the duration of the war and for six months thereafter given a term of six months by the President. On such successful completion of the prescribed course of training and instruction as may be required or with respect to selection as the Secretary of War may prescribe, such enlisted officer shall be commissioned as a second lieutenant in the Army of the United States under the provisions of the Act of October 22, 1941 (Public Law 273, Seventy-first Congress), or appointed as a flight officer in the Army of the United States. After such qualifications as the Secretary of War may prescribe, the state, pay, and allowances of civilian credit will fail to complete successfully the prescribed course of training and instruction as hereinafter set forth, the enlisted status of the Army of the United States may be restored to any in "graduated" status with the pay and allowances of such status.

(b) 2. After six months of the duration of war for six months thereafter, the Secretary of War is authorized, after such qualifications as he may prescribe, to make temporary appointments as flight officers in the Army of the United States for periods not exceeding one year and to leave in enlisted status in the Army of the United States to have a third training as aviation student.

(b) 3. Pursuant to such regulations as the Secretary of War may prescribe, flight officers may be promoted, by selection, to the

grade of second lieutenant, and, upon such appointment, shall be commissioned in the Army of the United States under the provisions of the Act of September 7, 1921 (Public Law 537, Seventy-seventh Congress).

C. G. 5. Any person who has completed the prescribed course of training and instruction as an aviation cadet or aviation student and has served in time of war as a commissioned officer or flight officer in the Army of the United States, under such rank, times or the secretary of army prescribes, be appointed an officer in the U.S. Army of Veterans.

C. G. 6. Section 4 of the Army Aviation Cadet Act of June 7, 1921, is hereby amended by striking out the last sentence thereof and by substituting the following in lieu thereof: "Any person appointed as a flight officer in the Army of the United States shall be entitled at the time of such appointment to an allowance of \$10 for uniforms."

C. G. 7. Section 5 of the Army Aviation Cadet Act of June 7, 1921, is hereby amended to read as follows:

"C. G. 6. Aviation cadets who are undergoing courses of instruction under regular tuition to participate regularly and frequently in aerial flights shall be forced insurance in the amount of \$10,000 under the National Service Life Insurance Act of 1920 (P.L. Stat. 1608), as amended, except that the premium shall be paid by the Government. Upon being an aviator as second lieutenants or appointed as flight officers and until permanently relieved from duty involving participation in regular and frequent aerial flights, the insurance provided for aviation cadets or aviation students under this or any existing law shall continue, but the premium shall be deducted from the pay of the individual concerned and paid, to the Secretary of Army first, to the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs. Upon being permanently relieved from duty involving participation in regular and frequent aerial flights, due to separation from active duty, or discharge, the insurance of aviation cadets, flight officers, and officers may be continued at the option of the expense of the individual concerned."

C. G. 8. "This act may be cited as the 'Flight Officer Act.'

CLO CITY OF ABBREVIATIONS

AAF	Army Air Forces
AAG	Air Adjutant General (file)
AC/AS	Assistant Chief of Air Staff
AF/CD	Flying Training Command
AM/D	Historical Division, AC/AS, Intelligence
AP/DP	Directorate of Legislative Planning
AP/IT	Directorate of Individual Training
AS	Adjutant General (file)
CAC	Civil Aeronautics Administration (or Authority)
CC	Commander General
<u>S.</u> <u>S. Gent.</u>	House of Representatives Bill House of Representatives Report
<u>Ibid.</u>	The same <u>or</u> the same virus
JAG	Judge Advocate General
MPD	Military Personnel Division
n.d.	No date
OCAC	Office of the Chief of the Air Corps
ORR	Outline and Record Sheet
<u>S.</u> <u>S. Gent.</u> <u>St. t.</u>	Senate Bill Senate Report <u>Statutes at Large</u>
T/OD	Training and Operations Division
U.S.C.	<u>United States Code</u>

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